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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on post entry strategies of Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from a
developedeconomy (Australia) operating in an emerging market (India). The research is
organised around two core questions: (a) What are the post entry institutional challenges for
service sector MNEs operating in an emerging market and (b) How do ﬁrms respond to
institutional distancefollowing their initial entry into an emerging economy? These questions
are closely allied to the fundamental questions confronting international business (IB) such as
“What drives ﬁrm strategy in international business (IB)?” and “What determines the success
and failure of ﬁrms around the world?” (Peng et al., 20081920).
This study draws on institutional theory (IT) and the network perspective to identify
challenges faced by Australian service MNEs in India and the strategies they adapt to mitigate
the liability of foreignness (LOF). The institutions in emerging economies are quite different
from those in the developed economies, and recent research suggests that both formal and
informal institutions, more commonly known as the "rules of the game" (North 1990) have an
impact on the strategy and operations of MNEs (Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Wright, et al., 2005).
Operating in emerging markets is challenging as the rule of law is poorly enforced (Hoskisson
et al., 2000), proprietary technology and knowledge cannot be protected through enforceable
legal mechanisms (Delios and Henisz, 2000) and there are large differences in culture and
business norms. Contemporary institutional theory (Scott, 1995) indicates that, in order to
survive, organisations must conform to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Scott (1995) defined the
institutional environment in terms of three pillars - regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive. These unfamiliar institutions in the emerging markets often lead to unforeseen
transaction costs as a result of which MNEs struggle to implement successful strategies in
emerging markets. This thesis describes how the Australian service MNEs adaptively curb
these costs by developing strategies that suit emerging markets as they acquire relevant local
knowledge, re-script mental models and adapt plans and tactics.
iv
This study investigates key areas of concern to MNEs seeking competitive advantage in
emerging markets through the development of superior strategies post-entry within the
institutional framework of India. The AT. Kearney FDl Conﬁdence Index 2007 rates India as
the second most attractive destination for FDI. Its dynamic environment provides a rich
context for examining the success strategies of Australian service MNEs. Finding effective
strategies that can overcome the challenges of operating in an emerging market is the central
issue in this thesis.
Given the relatively new and unexplored nature of the phenomena — managing operations in
emerging markets — this study adopted an exploratory research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Yin, 1984). This qualitative study uses a multi-case research design using semi-structured
interviews with key decision makers. An analysis of 16 Australian MNEs operating in India in
the services sector suggests that there is a liability of foreignness, and that it changes over
time. Cultural sensitivity and networks operate as complements in overcoming this liability of
foreignness. Many IB studies suggest a link between the performance of MNEs and measures
of cultural distance (Barkema et. al., 1997; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kogut and Singh, 1988;
Sim and Ali, 1998), institutional distance (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xu and
Shenkar, 2002) and psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Studies that take this
perspective make the implicit assumption that cultural, institutional and psychic distance
encumbers all MNEs equally. The data from this research suggests that this assumption is
mistaken.
Certainly, as extant theories well predict, MNEs that enter foreign markets face unexpected
conditions and incur unforeseen costs when they misjudge and misunderstand local cultures
and institutions. The ﬁndings suggest that these conditions and costs are not uniformly
distributed across all MNEs, as previously had been assumed. Instead, the evidence reveals
that MNEs face different types of challenges in varying levels of complexity in the emerging
market context because every MNE has specialised objectives, resource needs, activities,
regulatory requirements, capabilities and levels of exposure to government. The diversity with
which institutional differences impact a particular MNE suggests that we need to stop taking a
“one size ﬁts all” approach.
The ﬁndings also indicate that with increased knowledge in an uncertain market context,
successful MNEs work around the institutional challenges. They develop strategies that are
different from those they use in the home country and ﬁnd new ways of implementing them.
They appreciate the institutional differences between the home country and the emerging
market and customise their business model and the way they do business to suit the emerging
markets norms and cultural context without compromising their core values. Finally, the
Australian service MNEs drew upon their capabilities developed via industry-speciﬁc,
country-speciﬁc and international experience to mitigate the institutional challenges in India.
The study also ﬁnds that corruption and risk ratings have minimal effect on MNE operations
in emerging markets because MNEs adapt strategies to ﬁt these markets by either engaging
local agents to interface with government or hiring highly networked retired professionals
from the government or public sector. Evidence suggests that FDI decisions are most likely
motivated by the proﬁt potential in the Indian market. Another important ﬁnding supports the
view that networks and relationships are critical in overcoming the institutional challenges
when operating in India. However, the importance attached to networks and relationships
varies depending on the nature of the industry.
This thesis contributes to the growing research on strategy in international business that
considers the extent to which theories and methodologies used to study strategy in mature,
developed economies are suited to the unique social, political and economic contexts of
emerging economies. It shows how an institution based view, grounded in the context of
emerging economies, adds to our understanding of [B strategy. This study also has practical
implications. It recommends that managers should anticipate varied and unpredictable
differences in cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative institutions in an emerging market
and assess these gaps with an open-mind towards the localisation of strategic responses.
vi
Table of Contents
Statement of Originality
Acknowledgements
Abstract
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction to study
1.2 Background to study
1.3 Australia’s Services sector
1.4 Research Question
1.5 Literature review
1.6 Research methodology
1.7 The gaps
1.8 Contribution and Limitations
1.9 Organisation of Study
Chapter 2: Literature review
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Institutional Theory
2.3 The three pillars of Institutional Theory
2.3.1 Regulatory pillar
2.3.2 Normative pillar
2.3.3 Cultural-cognitive pillar
2.4 Institutional Distance
2.5 Institutional Uncertainty and Liability of Foreignness
2.6 Resource based view
2.6.1 Firm speciﬁc resources and strategic issues
2.6.2 Firm speciﬁc capabilities
2.6.3 Proprietary technology
2.6.4 Tacit knowledge
2.6.5 Business experience
2.6.6 Complementary resources
2.7 Knowledge based view
2.8 Deﬁning Emerging Markets
2.9 Challenges in emerging markets
2.9.1 Institutional constraints
2.9.2 Role of Networks
vii
Page number
ii
iii
iv
AN
ox
ou
cn
-b
-N
—
15
18
22
22
23
24
25
28
31
32
32
32
33
33
34
34
35
36
37
37
2.9.3 Corruption
2.10 Strategic responses to institutional distance
2.1 1 Research question and Propositions
2.12 Conclusion
Chapter 3: Economic transition and doing business in India
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Emergence of India
3.3 Pre -1991 Phase
3.4 Post—1991 - The road to economic transformation
3.5 Investment climate
3.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment
3.6 Growth of service sector
3.7 Business environment in India-An institutional perspective
3.7.1 Regulatory environment in India
3.7.2 Normative dimension
3.7.2.1 Indian mode ofthinking
3.7.2.2 Dominant behavioural patterns
3.7.2.3 Perceptions ofjustice
3.7.3 Cognitive dimension
3.8 Economic Freedom - Comparison of
Australia and India
3.9 Ease of doing business
3.10 Conclusion
Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Qualitative research method
4.2.1 Why case studies?
4.2.2 Multiple case study approach
4.3 Sampling design
4.3.1 Purposive sampling
4.3.2 Sample selection
4.3.3 Number of cases
4.3.4 Interviewee selection
4.3.5 Reliability and validity
4.4 Starting-point of investigation
4.5 Data collection
4.5.1 Respondents
4.5.2 Interview questions
4.6 Data analysis
4.7 Conclusion
viii
38
41
46
47
49
49
51
54
56
58
59
62
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
75
77
79
79
82
85
86
87
88
90
91
93
93
94
95
97
99
101
Chapter 5: Collaborative strategies to reduce Liability of Foreignness
5. 1 Introduction 102
5.2 Reliance on local Joint Venture partners 107
5.3 Partner selection in Strategic Alliance 1 1 1
5.4 Mergers not Acquisitions 1 14
5.5 Managing Liability of Foreignness as a Sole Venture 1 17
5.6 Overcoming the liability of foreignness
through collaborative arrangements 120
5.7 Conclusion 122
Chapter 6: Corruption: Adaptive strategies
6.1 Introduction 125
6.2 Adaptive business strategies in response to corruption 128
6.2.1 Managing corruption through Joint Venture partners 130
6.2.2 Project-based Joint Ventures 133
6.2.3 Managing corruption at arms length-
Local Agents/Consultants 134
6.2.4 Avoidance strategy 136
6.3 Corruption and FDI flows 139
6.4 Conclusion 140
Chapter 7: Bridging Cultural distance
7.1 Introduction 143
7.2 The Aussie advantage 149
7.3 Cultural challenges in the external environment 151
7.3.1 Managing the bureaucratic process 152
7.3.2 Dealing with family firms 155
7.3.3 Reliability of suppliers 156
7.3.4 Communication & Negotiations- The taxi factor 157
7.3.5 Time orientation 159
7.4 Cultural challenges in the internal environment ofthe MNE 160
7.4.1 Ironing out differences through cultural sensitivity 161
7.4.2 Introducing cultural change with a safety net 164
7.4.3 Local Employees vs. Expatriates 170
7.4.4 Talent crises and training 161
7.4.5 New talent source: Retired Public Servants 178
7.5 Conclusion 180
ix
Chapter 8: Networking and regulatory uncertainty
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Regulatory concerns
8.2.1 Federal and state level regulations
8.2.2 Contrasting regulations
8.3 Operating the business
8.3.1 The rules ofthe game
8.3.2 Tax Regime
8.3.3 Intricacies of the legal system
8.3.4 Intellectual property rights
8.4 Importance of networks and relationships
8.5 Conclusion
Chapter 9: Conclusions
9.] Introduction
9.2 Summary of main findings
9.2.1 Collaborative Arrangements
9.2.2 Corruption: Adaptive strategies
9.2.3 Rising above Cultural Challenges
9.2.4 Networks and relationships
9.3 Critical success factors for managerial effectiveness
9.4 Limitations of the study
9.5 Robustness and credibility
9.6 Roadmap for future research
9.7 Contributions
9.8 Concluding Remarks
REFERENCES
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 — Invitation to participate in the research
Appendix 2 - Ethics forms
Appendix 3 - Interview Protocol
Appendix 4 - Proﬁle of the participating Australian MNEs
182
184
184
186
188
191
194
195
202
204
211
214
215
216
218
220
221
223
224
225
226
227
230
232
269
271
274
280
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the study
MNEs confront numerous challenges, including a number of different "liabilities of
foreignness" (Zaheer, 1995) when entering new international markets. Key among these
difﬁculties is a lack of foreign market knowledge - a lack of local knowledge of the new
market and its economics, politics, culture, society and history. This lack of knowledge
makes the formulation and implementation of successful operational strategies quite
difﬁcult as it throws up challenges not encountered in the past. Oliver (1991) has opined
that the existing literature on institutional theory is lacking in an understanding of the
strategic behaviours that organisations employ in direct response to the institutional
processes that affect them. This study examines how Australian service MNEs adapt their
strategies to cope with such challenges at the regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive
levels (Scott, 2001).
The global integration of markets, advent of new technologies, changing political and
economic systems, as well as socio-cultural changes, all have an impact on businesses. In
response to these changes, MNEs adopt a variety of strategic postures as they seek to
obtain competitive advantage over their rivals (Parnell, Shwiff, Yalin and Langford, 2003).
The success of these strategic alignments in international business is crucial to determining
whether an organisation succeeds or fails. MNEs operating in emerging and transition
economies are confronted with additional uncertainties related to a variety of factors
(Ramamurti, 2000). It is anticipated that this research will lead to a better comprehension
of the strategies that MNEs adopt to mitigate or overcome the challenges of operating in
emerging markets.
Most studies in international business (IB) have concentrated on entry mode and
performance in the context of MNEs from developed economies entering developed
markets. This study focuses on the post entry strategies of MNEs from a developed
economy (Australia) operating in an emerging economy (India). Emerging markets are
attracting FDI from the developed economies but the conditions in emerging markets often
challenge the assumptions of conducting business in the developed world and call for very
different strategies compared with the ones used in the developed markets. Khanna, Palepu
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and Sinha (2005) believe that the absence of specialised intermediaries, regulatory
systems and contract enforcing mechanisms in emerging markets hampers the '
implementation of globalisation strategies and they coined the term “institutional voids”
for these gaps which have made it difﬁcult for MNEs from developed economies to
successfully manage operations in developing nations. MNEs entering these markets look
for ways to overcome limitations in the business environment. They design boundaries to
protect internal resources and capabilities from unintended spillover and look for partner
organisations that give them substantial capability to ﬁll voids in the business environment
(Dunning 1988; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Resource based View and Knowledge based
view will provide a backdrop to gain an insight into the sources of competitive advantage
available to MNEs.
1.2 Background to the study
The terms emerging markets and developing countries are sometimes used
interchangeably. Generally deﬁned, emerging markets are countries that are experiencing
rapid economic growth and ﬁnancial and economic liberalisation, prompted by policy
reforms. According to the World Bank (2005), emerging economies will continue to grow
more rapidly than the developed world in the decades ahead. The designation “emerging
market” is associated with the World Bank. The basic idea behind the term is that these
countries “emerge” from less developed status and join the group of developed countries.
The past two decades have witnessed tremendous growth and remarkable transformation in
the economies of many less developed and newly industrialised countries from around the
world. These emerging markets have beneﬁted from the infusion of capital, technology and
managerial expertise from the industrialised countries. The inﬂux of inward investments,
combined with favourable governmental policies to foster development, have enabled
these emerging countries to attain some of the fastest economic growth rates in the world
even during times of the global ﬁnancial crisis. A recent article in the Sydney Morning
Herald dated 7 October 2009 stated that the developing economies are leading the world in
economic recovery after the global ﬁnancial crisis and will become an increasingly more
important part of the international economy. In the same article, the HSBC group
Chairman Stephen Green said that as the world's economic centre of gravity shifted from
west to east, the economic strength of emerging markets would play an increasingly central
role in the development of ﬁnancial markets and international relations and HSBC expects
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emerging nations to post economic growth of six per cent in 2010 while developed world
will expand by only 1.8 per cent. India is one of the fastest growing major markets for
Australia, with both goods and services exports growing at an annual average of over 34
per cent during the last ﬁve years (DFAT, 2008).
The economic liberalization which began in India in the 1990’s attracted foreign investors
from the developed world and prompted their entry into this emerging economy to take
advantage of India’s huge market and access the high quality pool of knowledge workers.
A study conducted by Goldman Sachs, ‘Dreaming with BRICs’ (2003) has predicted that
the Indian economy is expected to continue growing at the rate of 5% or more until 2050.
According to the 2005 A.T. Kearney's Foreign Direct Investment Conﬁdence Index, India
has emerged stronger on the global investment radar, overtaking the US to become the
second most attractive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination in the world. This is
conﬁrmed in the 2007 A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Conﬁdence Index at Table
1.1. This survey tracks the impact of likely political, economic and regulatory changes on
FDI intentions and preferences of executives of the world's leading companies.
Table 1.]: Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, 2007
Country Rating (1) ~ Ranking
China 2.21 1
India 2.09 2
United States 1.86 3
United Kingdom 1.81 4
Hong Kong SAR 1.78 5
Singapore 1.75 7
Germany 1.70 10
Australia 1.68 11
France 1.67 13
Canada 1.65 14
Japan , 1.63 15
Malaysia . 1.62 16
Indonesia - . 1.58 21
Korea 1.57 24
Footnotes: Ratings are calculated on a scale of zero to three, where zero represents a highly unattractive
market and three represents a highly attractive market.
Source: FDI Conﬁdence Index, AT. Kearney, December 2007.
1.3 Australia’s services sector
Australia’s economic engagement with India has grown rapidly since the opening of
India’s economy in 1991. The then Australian Minister for Trade, Mark Vaile stated in a
speech in 2004, “When India started its economic reforms, it was Australia’s 24th largest
trading partner. . ..it is now our 7th largest export market. India’s growing prosperity is also
attracting a surge of Australian services export.” Australia is keen to increase its share of
FD1 in India with several initiatives underway between the governments of Australia and
India, the latest initiative being the Australia-India FTA (Free Trade Agreement) feasibility
study which is expected to be completed in 2009.
Australia has a competitive, world-class service sector which accounts for 80 per cent of
the country’s economic activity (DFAT, 2008). It includes: banking, insurance and ﬁnance;
the media and entertainment industries; consulting, tourism and retail; services provided by
government, such as education, health and welfare; and other personal and business
services For a snapshot of Australia’s service sector see Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Australia’s service sector
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Source: Adapted from Australia’s Services Sector: A Study in Diversity, Productivity
Commission Staff Research Paper, 2002,
Several Australian companies have established a presence in India to capitalise on
emerging market opportunities. However, the Indian business environment also poses
several challenges for the Australian MNEs. AcCording to the Australia-India FTA
feasibility study (2008), despite the considerable progress made in reforming India’s
economy, there remains much to be done. The report mentions a recent survey of India by
the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operations and Development) which found that
the overall level of regulation of Indian goods markets is still quite high and service
industries are often affected by high regulatory burdens, governance issues and
infrastructure deﬁciencies. There are many other challenges which need to be addressed
when operating in India.
The above developments in the attractiveness of India as a destination for FDI and
Australia’s growing interest in India offer a special context for this study to examine the
experience of Australian service MNEs that have established operations in the Indian
market. Australian service MNEs are perhaps reﬂective of the growing global interest in
India as an important emerging market in Asia, although their entry into India was later
than many others Western MNEs. Given the late start into establishing business activities
in India, the Australian MNEs experience will provide a unique opportunity to investigate
the factors that impact upon the successful business operations in an emerging economy
and understand the strategies to overcome the challenges in unfamiliar contexts. Peterson
(1990: 13) states that the ‘success or failure of international businesses depends on the
extent to which they understand the environmental nuances of the new and alien markets
into which they choose to expand.’
Hoskisson et al., (2000) have pointed out that the focus of research on enterprise strategies
in emerging economies to date have been China and some countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. In the light of limited scholarship on India, this study’s objectives are to show the
different perspectives of doing business in India, and to discuss the possible explanations
for these perspectives in successfully managing operations in India.
1.4 Research Questions
Multinationals bring to emerging markets not just their products, technology, and skills,
but also implicitly, their understanding of market structures from developed-country
contexts. Assumptions about the similarity of consumer preferences and buyer behaviour,
segments, and arguments about scale economies justify the wholesale import of strategies
from developed markets. But these strategies may not match the needs of the emerging
market. The conditions in emerging markets often challenge these assumptions and call for
very different strategies compared with the ones used in the developed markets.
The key research questions in this study are: What are the post entry institutional
challenges for service sector MNEs operating in an emerging market and how do ﬁrms
respond to institutional distance following their initial entry into an emerging economy?
This question is closely allied to the big question on the international business (IB)
research agenda: “What determines the international success and failure of MNEs?” (Peng,
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2004: 100). Included in this question is another very important question. To what extent do
multinational MNEs adapt to the foreign business system they are working in? In order to
ﬁnd answers to the research questions, propositions have been drawn from institutional
theory and network perspectives. This literature is used to help illustrate and evaluate the
nature and importance of foreign market knowledge in overcoming the challenges in an
emerging economy. The factors that may have an impact on the MNEs operations in an
emerging market along the dimension of institutional distance have been examined and a
framework of the strategies employed to mitigate the LOF has been drawn, which is
discussed in detail in Chapter 9. This study identiﬁes how MNEs craft intelligent
internationalisation strategies to overcome these challenges.
1.5 Literature review
The literature on Institutional theory and Network perspectives was reviewed as a means of
providing an intellectual background for studying the challenges faced by MNEs when the
institutional environment of the host country is different from the home country. The
review is organised by examining the impact of institutional distance on the operations of
MNEs from a developed economy as they compete in the arena of an emerging economy
and goes beyond the scope of cultural distance. Institutional distance is a recently
developed construct in strategic management literature that captures the differences
between the institutional environments of two countries (Kostova, 1999). The MNE has to
adapt its entry strategies, organisational forms, and internal procedures to manage these
differences (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth,
2002).
Hoskisson et al., (2000252) noted that “in the early stages of market emergence,
institutional theory is pre-eminent in helping to explain impacts on enterprise strategies”.
Given the key role that institutions play in building stable structures for economic activity
(Meyer, 2001), the ambiguous nature of the institutional arrangements in emerging markets
has a major impact on the performance of the ﬁrm. Institutional theory is employed in the
development of propositions because it emphasises the importance of the social and
cultural environment to ﬁrm strategy (Scott 1995).
IB scholars who write about entering foreign markets repeatedly employ key terms that are
conceptually similar. The terms most commonly used are “liability of foreignness”
(Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Hennart, Roehl and Zeng, 2002; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995),
“liability of newness” (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Lu and Beamish, 2004), “cultural distance”
(Barkema et. al., 1997; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Sim and Ali,
1998;), “institutional distance” (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xu and
Shenkar, 2002), “psychic distance” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and “political or social
risk” (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Chua, Wang and
Tan, 2003; Goodnow and Hansz, 1972; Kobrin, 1979;). Each of these terms has a long and
rich history in the IB literature. Yet all of these terms imply a common assumption: that
foreign MNEs face challenges and, perhaps, outsider disadvantages, when they enter and
operate in new or unfamiliar market settings.
In order to overcome such challenges, ﬁrms strongly rely upon networks at the beginning
of the internationalisation process as well as post entry since they facilitate the acquisition
of experiential knowledge about these markets (Freeman and Sandwell, 2008). The
network perspective views organisations as a system of objects that are joined together by
relationships. These objects, including individuals, teams, and the organisation as a whole,
can be connected both directly and indirectly via these relationships (Tichy, Tushman and
Fombrun 1979). The relationships play a major role in mitigating the liability of
foreignness and bridging the institutional distance between the home and the host country.
Peng and Zhou (2005: 323) have noted that during the early phase of institutional
transitions, when formal rules that are supportive of market systems have not been well
established, “MNEs’ strategic choices will be network-centred, heavily relying on the
strong personal ties (see also Peng and Heath, 1996).”
The network perspective offers an understanding of the complex networks within which a
business operates and provides a 'relationship focus' to managing business operations in the
international business environment, especially in an emerging market (Freeman and
Sandwell, 2008). According to the network perspective, the knowledge a ﬁrm has about
foreign markets and the opportunities open to the ﬁrm in these markets, extend beyond the
boundaries of the firm itself; it is principally contained in the network that the ﬁrm has
been developing and will be able to develop, and anchored by key actors within them
(Benito and Welch 1994). Networks assume a greater importance in cases where a foreign
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market is perceived as complex, different and distant - which is the case for most
Australian MNEs in India. Salmi (2000) argues that although the importance of networks
in emerging markets has been recognised, it is still under researched.
1.6 Research Methodology
This study employed a theory-building research design because the purpose of this
research is to develop a better theoretical understanding of the strategies of the Australian
service MNEs crafted from the interplay between MNEs’ competence and the institutional
factors that inﬂuence operations in emerging markets. A multiple-case study design was
applied in a comparative framework to enhance the quality and robustness of the ﬁndings
and to provide the thick description needed to understand how Australian service MNEs
overcame the LOF in an institutionally distant emerging market. Yin (2003) highlights that
when the research includes answering “why” and “how” questions, this will lead to
qualitative research, because such questions deal with events that need to be linked rather
than observed as mere frequencies or incidence. Case studies are particularly suitable for
this research because they provide an effective way of understanding the links between
macro-environmental factors, industry level relationships and ﬁrm decision making
(Ghauri and Holstius,1996).
In this case study research, sampling is purposive rather than statistical. Cases are selected
for theoretical reasons that enable the researcher to follow experiment-like replication logic
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). The selection of participants or settings is set to be criterion-
based or purposive (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002). This approach can be distinguished from
probability samples in that the evaluation is "judged according to the richness of the data
and the quality of concepts and theories generated"(Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004281)
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with at least one senior manager from each of
16 Australian service MNEs. Most interviewees could be categorised as “corporate elites"
because of their status and international exposure (Welch et al., 2002). This sample
represented 16 distinct organisations ranging in size from SMEs to large Australian service
MNEs who have operations in India and the goal of interviewing respondents from both
SMEs and large MNEs in different service industry sectors was to develop a general
descriptive model and achieve maximum variation.
Analysis consisted of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and veriﬁcation
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The data analysis in this study entailed the intertwining of
iterative analysis and data collection (Miles, 1979) until adequate conceptual categories
were developed (Harris and Sutton, 1986, Sutton, 1987, Sutton and Callahan, 1987). The
reduced text was then examined through another iterative round of reading and word
search to identify common patterns and themes that were consistent or inconsistent with
the propositions from the literature review.
1.7 The Gaps
Numerous researchers have studied various point-of—entry decisions such as why
(motivations), how (entry modes), where (location choices), and when (entry timing)
MNEs make foreign entries. However, little is known about what happens after initial
entry into a foreign market is made and how MNEs evolve strategies to navigate the
different challenges they come across in an unfamiliar market environment. Existing
literature has put too much emphasis on entry mode choice as a key strategic decision for
success and too little attention has been given to developing strategies for overcoming
challenges in the host country’s business environment. There is thus an incomplete
understanding of the different challenges MNEs face in an emerging market and it is the
level of understanding of these challenges and devising strategies to overcome them that
differentiate the winners from the “also rans”. This study aims to ﬁll this gap in
understanding how MNEs overcome their LOF in an emerging market.
The knowledge necessary for companies to operate in new international markets consists
of both explicit knowledge, such as market research and macroeconomic data, as well as
more ambiguous and tacit forms of knowledge stemming from the many historical,
cultural, political, and economic forces particular to the country (Andersen. 1993;
Erramilli, 1991: Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Root, 1987). Obtaining and using explicit
market knowledge can be difﬁcult in many international contexts because of a lack of
adequate data sources and because of rapid change. But obtaining and utilising the more
ambiguous and tacit forms of foreign market knowledge is an even more challenging task.
Several researchers argue that a ﬁrm's experience in a new market is the most important
means by which the ﬁrm may obtain this tacit knowledge - gaining knowledge by
"learning through doing" (Barkema et al., 1996; Johanson and Vahlne. 1977). However,
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the factors that facilitate or hinder the acquisition of foreign market knowledge and the
dynamics of the process by which this knowledge is utilised by the MNE to overcome the
institutional challenges has received little attention. This study seeks to gain a better
understanding of this phenomenon.
Institutional environments are based on Scott’s (2001) three pillars: regulatory, normative
and cultural—cognitive. Furthermore, these three pillars can be individually utilized to
assess the impact of institutional distance on ﬁrm performance. Scott’s (2001) three ‘pillars
of the institutional framework’ provide a broad basis to differentiate aspects of a country’s
institutional proﬁle (Busenitz, 2000; Kostova, 1998) and of institutional distance (Kostova
and Roth, 2002) and can be also utilised to ascertain if institutional distance matters.
Extant literature suggests that these pillars critically impact the performance of the MNE
and success depends on how best the MNE can mitigate the negative inﬂuence of such
factors. The possibility that some MNES might gain this knowledge more effectively and
efﬁciently than others is rarely considered. The impact of an effective management
strategy in meeting the challenges in an emerging market is a nascent but promising area of
inquiry that is explored in this study.
The number of theoretical and empirical studies using an institutional perspective in
emerging economies is limited, even though some theorists have argued that this
perspective is the most applicable paradigm for explaining enterprise behaviour in
emerging economies (Shenkar and von Glinow, 1994). The existing IB literature, largely
based on developed economies, tends to ﬂow from a set of known institutional 'rules of the
game' and then to explore strategic responses. As a result, this literature does not provide
enough insightful answers to new questions, such as 'How do organisations play the new
game when the new rules are not completely known?’ (Peng et al., 20082924). This study is
an attempt to fill this gap in the existing international business literature and extends both
institutional theory and network perspectives to include post entry operational strategies in
emerging markets
Bruton et al., (2008) have noted that China is a model for many of the emerging economies
of the world but there is an absence of investigation of such economies, and therefore there
is a strong need to examine economies outside of China and examine the similarities and
differences that exist between these economies. This study responds to the need of
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studying an emerging economy, India, which is second only to China in terms of inward
FDI.
1.8 Contributions and limitations of the study
This thesis contributes to research on MNE strategy by introducing a more comprehensive
measure of cross-country differences, and by revealing its strategic implications for the
MNE. It contributes to institutional theory by extending the “strategic response”
perspective of the theory (Oliver, 1991) to the international arena, and by attempting to
assess the consequences of such strategic responses on the operations of the MNE, with
special reference to Australian service MNEs in India.
Most scholarly research has focused on the concept of psychic distance, which has been
narrowed down in empirical work to indices based on Hofstede’s (1980) work on culture.
However, these measures do not capture other important dimensions of distance which are
of concern to international business. In this study, we show how the broader theoretical
concept of institutional distance, which incorporates normative, regulatory, and cultural-
cognitive aspects, affects post-entry operations of Australian service MNEs in India and
the strategies they adopt to achieve success.
The international management literature has highlighted the need for MNEs to obtain in-
depth knowledge of new international markets in order to reduce uncertainty, to improve
decision making, and to facilitate the successful execution of new international ventures
(Barkema, Bell, and Pennings. 1996; Chang, 1995; Pennings, Barkema, and Douma,
1994). A lack of sufﬁcient foreign market knowledge is likely to have negative
_ consequences for both strategy formulation and implementation and, consequently, is
likely to have a negative impact on the operations of new international ventures (Root,
1987). This study enhances our understanding of how MNEs can craft strategies to
overcome/mitigate the difﬁculties of operating in an emerging market.
As reSearch in emerging markets becomes more developed, it is important for scholars to
know whether or not the metrics they use for their fundamental constructs are universal
and how they may vary in different contextual settings. The results of this research also
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provide a better understanding about how concepts originally derived in Western settings
may or may not be applied in emerging markets.
Theoretical propositions discussed in this study have practical implications for the MNE,
as they provide a new context, namely institutional distance, for developing effective
strategies in an emerging market. Not only can researchers now study MNE strategy from
a new angle, but managers can also compete with other MNEs by designing strategies that
better match the MNE’s institutional context.
In View of the emergence of India as an economic powerhouse, there is a greater interest to
understand the institutional environment of doing business in India. This research will
therefore be of considerable signiﬁcance both for academics as well as practicing
managers. Most studies in IE have focused on enterprise strategies in emerging economies
like China and some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hoskisson et al., 2000) and
India has somewhat been understudied. This study provides a better understanding of the
formal and informal institutions in India and offers strategies to MNEs who are keen to
engage with India.
A limitation of this study is the small sample size represented by the 16 MNE cases
investigated and the sample is limited to Australian MNEs in India. Thus they should not
be generalised without further replication in a different context. As this is an exploratory
study, there are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn. In the future, additional
case studies and broader empirical analysis would be valuable in extending the results of
this research effort. From an academic perspective, the study of business strategies in
emerging markets provides an interesting opportunity to explore the trends that are part of
an important future research direction for strategy and IB scholars (Rumelt et al., 1994).
Future research in this area could include examining how ﬁrms understand and create a
competitive advantage in unfamiliar environments and examining further what strategies
are valuable for successful operations in an emerging market context.
l3
1.9 Organisation of the study
The organisation of this thesis is as follows. Following Chapter 1 which has given an
overview of the study, Chapter 2 examines both the broader and more speciﬁc theories in
IB to study MNE operations in emerging markets. It offers a survey of the relevant
literature on institutional theory, network perspective, resource based theory and
knowledge based view and draws propositions to guide this study. The focus will however
be on network perspective and institutional theory because of the growing relevance of
understanding the impact of institutions on post-entry operations. Chapter 3 sets the
context of this study by describing the evolution of FDI in India and Australia's investment
interest in this emerging economy. The research design and methodological issues are
discussed in Chapter 4. The analysis and discussions are explicated in Chapter 5 through to
Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 provides concluding remarks which includes the contribution
and limitation of this study as well as outlines the agenda for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops the theoretical framework upon which this research is built. It reviews the
existing literature on the institution-based view, the resource-based View and the network
perspective to examine the challenges of institutional differences, which exist to varying
degrees in all international markets. The emergent uncertainty and liability of foreignness
(LOF) faced by MNEs in an emerging market context is drawn out through the review of
existing literature on emerging markets. The increasing importance of globalisation and
international investment makes it crucial that managers understand varied market contexts.
Strategic decision making is complicated in international markets by a number of factors
including cross-cultural considerations, regulatory changes, idiosyncratic competitive
landscapes, and much more, resulting in liability of foreignness (LOF). This study
identiﬁes and examines how MNEs craft intelligent strategies in emerging markets to
overcome LOF at the regulatory, normative, and cognitive levels (Scott, 1995).
Several recurrent themes can be seen in the international business (IB) literature, including
the rationales for multinational ﬁrms, the process of internationalisation, entry modes for
international expansion, location decisions, and the management of international
subsidiaries. The rationales for the emergence and existence of the multinational ﬁrm in
the IB literature include the product life cycle (Vernon, 1966), oligopolistic interaction
(Hymer, 1976), transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982), and the
ability to obtain and organise knowledge across markets (Kogut and Zander, 1993). The
internationalisation process has also received attention (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990),
as has the impact of the degree of internationalisation on performance of a MNE (Carpano
et al., 1994; Contractor et al., 2003; Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003). Literature on foreign
entry modes has contrasted the performance of ﬁrms that entered new markets through
mergers and acquisition, joint ventures, strategic alliances or wholly owned subsidiaries
(Buckley and Casson; 1996, 1998; Hennart, 1982; Root, 1987).
A large portion of the international business literature focuses on the organisation and
management of multinational ﬁrms. The issues addressed include the control and
coordination of subsidiaries, the level of integration across subsidiaries, and the balance of
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control between headquarters and subsidiaries (D02 and Prahalad, 1984; Gates and
Egelhoff, 1986; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989, 1991; Paterson and Brock, 2002). More
recently, researchers are increasingly focusing on emerging economies whose institutions
differ considerably from those in developed economies. Early institutional research was
focused on the study of a more mature and stable environment (Powell, 1991) but in recent
years, institutional theory has emerged as a key theoretical foundation for research in
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Scholars have suggested that for strategy
research in this area to ﬂourish and make a lasting contribution, there is a need to consider
the extent to which theories and methodologies used to study strategy in mature, developed
economies are suited to the unique social, political, and economic contexts of emerging
economies. The aim of this study is to make a contribution in this area of research in
emerging economies.
There is an increasing appreciation amongst scholars that formal and informal institutions,
commonly known as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990), shape the strategy and
performance of ﬁrms — both domestic and foreign — in emerging economies (Hoskisson et
al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). According to North (1990), the "rules of the game" are the
"rules" that deﬁne the most basic relationships in social life, and particularly economic
relationships. Institutions can include the family ﬁrm, capital markets, the credit system,
the legal system, standard contracts, relationships between ﬁrms and the government, and
so on. In recent times, institutional theory has emerged as a leading theoretical foundation
for research in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000).
Most of the existing literature examines the impact of institutional differences on the entry
mode choice (e.g. Agarwal, 1994; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Park and Ungson,
1997). The study of post-entry management of operations (internal and external) in the host
country and the challenges faced by MNEs in a diverse institutional environment has been
a relatively under explored area of research. In order to address this gap, this study focuses
on post-entry operational strategies of service MNEs from a developed economy
(Australia) operating in an emerging market (India) and examines how these MNEs
effectively respond to the demands of the institutional pressures to overcome the LOF.
This study goes beyond the rationales of entry mode choice and explores the challenges
posed by the formal and informal institutions on the operations of MNEs in an emerging
16
economy and examines the strategies employed to cope with such challenges at the
regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive levels (Scott, 2001).
In order to overcome the challenges of operating in an institutionally distant host country,
the resource—based view offers valuable insights as to maintaining a competitive advantage.
The resource-based View of the ﬁrm articulates the relationships among ﬁrm resources,
capabilities, and competitive advantage. The connection between ﬁrms' capabilities and
competitive advantage has been well established in the literature. Andrews (1971) and,
later, Hofer and Schendel (1978) and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) noted the centrality of
"distinctive competencies" to competitive success. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and Ulrich
and Lake (1991) have reemphasised the strategic importance of identifying, managing, and
leveraging "core competencies" rather than focusing only on products and markets in
business planning. The resource-based view takes this thinking one step further: It posits
that competitive advantage can be sustained only if the capabilities creating the advantage
are supported by resources that are not easily duplicated by competitors. In other words,
ﬁrms' resources must raise "barriers to imitation" (Rumelt, 1984).
This research is organised around two core questions:
1. What are the post entry institutional challenges for service sector MNEs operating in an
emerging market, and
2. How do ﬁrms respond to institutional distance following their initial entry into an
emerging economy?
According to Peng et al., (20042920), the big question on the 13 research agenda is: “What
determines the success and failure of ﬁrms around the world?” The research questions in
this study are closely allied to this big question. This study draws on institutional theory to
identify challenges faced by MNEs in an emerging market. Institutional theory has
emerged as an accepted approach to the study of relations between the organisation and its
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). The
differences between the institutional environments of two countries are known as .
institutional distance, a recently developed construct in the strategic management literature
(Kostova, 1999). Institutional distance is of particular concern for Western MNEs
operating in emerging economies, where idiosyncratic regulatory environments may inhibit
17
international business (Henisz, 2000). For instance, legal codes governing market
transactions may be less extensive, and law enforcement may be less efﬁcient, for instance,
With respect to intellectual property rights (IPR). The MNE has to adapt its entry strategies,
organisational forms, and internal procedures to manage these differences (Johansen and
Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002). The MNE literature has
shown “a growing appreciation of the importance of the institutional context and of the
patterns in the way MNEs respond to that context” (Westney, 1993: 60). The strategies that
MNEs adopt to meet the challenges in an emerging economy context will also be examined
from the existing literature. North (1990) argues that institutions provide the rules of the
game for functioning in societies and that organisations follow these formal and informal
rules in their interactions with various actors in societies. The rules, regulations, and norms
of doing business in foreign countries can be quite different from those in MNEs’ home
countries. Such differences present both opportunities and challenges to MNEs and to their
foreign subsidiaries and add to the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995).
The ﬁrst section of this chapter develops the importance of the institutional context and
discusses its impact on MNE operations and examines the ways in which MNEs respond to
that context, speciﬁcally in an emerging market. It also examines the resource-based view
and the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources on the successful operations of a ﬁrm in an
institutionally distant country followed by a brief discussion on the knowledge based view.
The second section brieﬂy describes the signiﬁcance of emerging markets in international
business and the challenges of operating in these markets. The ﬁnal section of this chapter
outlines the propositions that emerged from the review of the existing literature.
2.2 Institutional Theory (IT)
In this study, institutional theory is employed in the development of propositions because it
emphasises the importance of the social and cultural environment to ﬁrm strategy (Scott
1995). Traditionally, there are two perspectives in the ﬁeld of strategic management that
address the strategy and performance of a MNE. The industry-based view of Porter (1980),
argues that conditions within an industry, to a large extent, determine ﬁrm strategy and
performance. The second perspective is the resource based view, presented by Barney
(1991), which suggests that it is ﬁrm speciﬁc differences that drive strategy and
performance. However, these views can be criticized for ignoring the formal and informal
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institutional foundation that provides the context of competition among industries and
ﬁrms (Kogut, 2003). Institutional theory has recently been found to provide robust
predictions regarding entry mode choice in view of host-country conditions (Davis et al.,
2000, Henisz and Delios 2001, Yiu and Makino 2002), in particular when entering
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Institutional theory suggests that where rules
and practices are broadly diffused, organisations will conform to their institutional context
(Oliver, 1991). This implies that MNES will adjust their strategies to meet the local
institutional demands. This may, however, generate intraﬁrrn institutional pressures when
adapting to various institutional environments, possibly reducing internal consistency when
subsidiaries adapt to local conditions that conﬂict with norms or rules in other parts of the
organisation (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991, Xu and Shenkar 2001). To cope with such
conﬂicting pressures, MNEs may engage in strategic behaviour (Scott 1995), such as the
adjustment of entry modes (Davis et al., 2000) as well as crafting policies and procedures
to manage operations post entry.
An important characteristic of emerging economies is that market-supporting institutions
are less developed, and thus constrain MNEs’ strategic choices (Khanna and Palepu 2000;
Peng, 2003, Ramamurti, 2004). Institutional theory provides a framework to analyse the
determinants of business strategies in such economies (Peng 2003, Wright et al., 2005).
Institutional theory is a non-efficiency perspective in which institutional environment is
seen as the key determinant of ﬁrm structure and behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,
Scott, 1995). The number of theoretical and empirical studies using an institutional
perspective in emerging economies is limited, even though some theorists have argued that
this perspective is the most applicable paradigm for explaining enterprise behaviour in
emerging economies (Shenkar and von Glinow, 1994). Emerging economies, characterized
by trends towards "marketisation" and privatisation but still heavily regulated, provide the
necessary institutional inﬂuences in developing and testing theories (Hoskisson et al.,
2000). The role of institutions has become very important in the IB literature. Ahlstrom
and Bruton (2006: 299) argue that “emerging economies are characterized by fundamental
and comprehensive institutional transformations as their economies begin to mature”. This
body of work has been very useful for understanding the core institutions required for
business activity to take place, and the role that informal structures and practices like
networks and relationships play in the absence/ineffectiveness of more formal structures
such as laws and regulatory agencies.
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IT focuses on the role of the political, social, and economic systems surrounding MNEs in
shaping their behaviour (North, 1990). Hoskisson et al., (2000) noted the potential
importance of this paradigm for explaining enterprise behaviour in emerging economies
but observed that at the end of the 19903 relatively few studies adopted this approach. It is
the entries of MNEs from developed economies into emerging economies that ﬁrst created
the rising appetite for knowledge about competition in these new markets (Meyer, 2004;
Ramamurti, 2004). This appreciation of institutions was preceded by a dominance of
economic theories attributing competitiveness to variables ranging from industry structure
(Porter, 1990) to location-speciﬁc advantages (Dunning, 1980; Hennart, 1982; Hill and
Kim, 1988). In a departure from economic explanations, Kogut (1991) credited
competitiveness to national differences in organising principles and societal institutions.
This coincides with the internationalisation process model, in which internationalisation is
viewed as a series of incremental adjustments to changes in the ﬁrm and its environment.
The main variable in this model, “psychic distance,” is “the sum of factors preventing the
ﬂow of information from and to the market” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), for example,
differences in language, education, business practices, culture, and development.
While the rise of the new institutionalism has been found throughout the social sciences
since the 19705, IT'S ascendance as a leading perspective in strategy is a more recent
phenomenon (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). A hallmark of emerging economies is
institutional transitions deﬁned as ’fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to
the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organisations as players' (Peng,
2003). Not surprisingly, research on emerging economies has helped propel this
perspective to the leading edge of the strategy research agenda (Meyer and Peng, 2005;
Peng, 2000). Some recent IT-based studies include Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) on the
role of cultural and institutional distance affecting entry decisions, Delios and Henisz
(2000) and Meyer (2001) on experience and capabilities in unfamiliar environments in
emerging economies, Fey and Bjorkman (2001) on HRM practices in host countries, and
Meyer (2004) on MNEs' spill over effects in emerging economies.
While such IT-based studies on MNEs from developed economies entering emerging
economies are helpful, they have barely scratched the surface of the impact of both formal
and informal institutions on the strategies of foreign entrants (Wright et al., 2005). This
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research aims to closely study the impact of both formal and informal institutions on the
strategies of Australian service MNEs in India thereby making a modest contribution to
this body of knowledge. Overall, emerging economies present a powerful challenge to the
traditional strategies engaged by many MNEs from developed economies. MNEs
competing within emerging economies face an environment of rapid political, economic,
and institutional changes that are accompanied by relatively underdeveloped factor and
product markets (Khanna and Palepu 2000). These environmental uncertainties with which
MNEs must deal if they want to survive in the long run create the need for upgrading and
re-configuring existing resources, capabilities and strategies.
Institutional constraints and lack of developed factor markets limit the applicability of
strategic options of MNEs in emerging economies, and new theoretical perspectives
relevant to this speciﬁc environment are urgently needed (Hoskisson et al., 2005). Taking a
cue from such scholars, this study aims to examine the contextual factors in emerging
economies that may also contribute to explanations of strategic decisions of MNEs. These
factors include the development of market institutions, high levels of government
involvement, industry structures, ownership patterns, and enforcement of business laws
(Filatotchev et al., 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 1997, Peng, 2000, 2003).
IT has indeed risen, as predicted by Hoskisson et a1. (2000), to become a new dominant
theory guiding strategy research on emerging economies. Despite IT's growing importance,
a number of important theoretical issues remain within IT. Peng (2003) has observed that
existing IT literature is largely based on developed economies and tends to ﬂow from a set
of known institutional 'rules of the game' and then explores strategic responses. As a result,
it does not provide enough insightful answers to new questions, such as “How do
organisations play the new game when the new rules are not completely known?” (Peng,
2003: 283). Future research will deﬁne the new “Rules of Engagement” and current
research on emerging economies has pushed the frontier of IT research, by providing a
variety of initial answers to these relevant but largely unresolved questions (Meyer and
Peng, 2004). Similarly, while few scholars would debate the basic proposition that
'institutions matter', how they matter remains a subject of considerable debate (Peng et al.,
2008). This study aims to address the how question to contribute to the knowledge of IT
based research in emerging markets.
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2.3 The three pillars of Institutional Theory
In IB, institutional environments are based on Scott's (1995) three pillars: regulatory,
normative, and cultural-cognitive. These three ‘pillars of the institutional framework”
provide a broad basis to differentiate aspects of countries’ institutional proﬁle (Kostova,
1998; Busenitz, 2000) and of institutional distance (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Institutions
are complex and interlocking sets of beliefs, values, norms, rules and laws concerning what
is appropriate behaviour in a given context and the contextual factors include all those
elements of the environment that impact upon the performance of a ﬁrm and include both
the formal (regulatory) and the informal (normative and cultural-cognitive) institutions
(Scott, 1995).
These three pillars can also be individually utilized to assess the impact of institutional
distance on ﬁrm operations and performance. The regulatory pillar of the institutional
framework lays out the ground rules for doing business, reﬂecting the laws and regulations
of a region or country and the extent to which these rules are effectively monitored and
enforced. The regulatory pillar refers to the formal rules and regulations as sanctioned by a
state (North, 1990). The cognitive pillar rests on the beliefs and value system of a society
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and refers to the cognitive structures embedded in a society;
that is, the widely shared social knowledge and cognitive categories. The normative pillar
consists of beliefs, values, and norms that deﬁne expected behaviour in a society. It refers
to legitimate means to pursue goals (Scott, 1995).
2.3.1 Regulatory pillar
According to Scott (1995, 2001), the regulatory pillar of institutions consists of rules and
regulations and the extent to which these rules are monitored and enforced. The regulatory
dimension of distance concerns laws and other rules that inﬂuence business strategies and
operations. Regulatory elements include formal regulations and rules for governing
behaviour such as constitutions, laws and property rights (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). The
regulatory pillar as explained by Scott (2001) is distinguished by a prominence given to
explicit regulatory processes: rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities. In this
view, regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect another’s
conformity to them, and, as needed, manipulate sanctions, rewards or punishments in an
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attempt to inﬂuence future behaviour. Regulations may be created and maintained by
trans-national authorities, nation-states, or provinces and local regimes with power to
create rules and sanction deviators. MNEs and unions also issue rules, monitor behaviour
and attempt to enforce compliance. Thus, Scott's deﬁnition incorporates all possible
aspects of regulation. The Economic Freedom Index published by The Heritage
Foundation covers the key aspects of the regulatory pillar. This index includes six sub-
indices (Beach and Miles 2003):
> Licensing requirements to operate a business
> Ease of obtaining a business license
> Corruption within the bureaucracy
> Labour regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental
leave, as well as selected labour regulations
> Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations
> Regulations that impose a burden on business
In emerging markets, each of the above creates a certain degree of difﬁculty as they are
different from the business environment in the home country of the MNE.
2.3.2 Normative pillar
The normative pillar of a country’s institutional proﬁles consists of values and norms.
“Emphasis here is placed on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and
obligatory dimension to social life. Normative systems include both values and
norms.”(Scott, 2001: 54). Values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable. Norms
specify how things should be done; they deﬁne legitimate means to pursue valued ends.
Normative systems deﬁne goals and objectives (eg. winning the game, making a proﬁt) but
also designate appropriate ways to pursue them (e. g. rules specifying how the game is to be
played, conceptions of fair business practices). Many occupational groups, both
professional and craft-based, generate and enforce work norms and actively promulgate
standards and codes to govern conduct (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Van Maanen and
Barley 1984). As discussed above, values deﬁne what is preferred or desirable, while
norms specify how things should be done and therefore delineate what a society perceives
as accepted behaviour. The issues are captured by Hofstede’s four dimensions of culture.
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Three out of the four cultural dimensions deﬁned by Hofstede (1980) capture aspects of
expected social behaviour: Power Distance describes the expected behaviour toward higher
and lower rank people, Individualism/Collectivism depicts people’s attitude toward the
group, and Masculinity/Femininity captures the status of values traditionally associated
with male and female role models. In addition, the normative dimension encompasses
beliefs and assumptions about human nature, which are reﬂected in an individual’s attitude
and quest for truth. Individuals from some societies believe in an ultimate truth and adhere
to strict laws and rules that lead them to it. Unusual situations make them feel
uncomfortable and so they rather avoid them. However, in other societies people are
relativist, have as few rules as possible, and feel at much more case in unstructured
situations. These aspects are captured by the fourth dimension of Hofstede’s culture
constructs — Uncertainty Avoidance.
2.3.3 Cultural-cognitive pillar
The cultural-cognitive pillar comprises frames, routines and scripts used by individuals in
one society to judge and to assign meaning to a phenomenon and to solve problems. The
existing cognitive frames held by employees in organisations determine what information
is retained and how it is processed, organised and interpreted. They also shape the preset
routines developed by organisations to provide guidance and reduce the discretion of the
individuals when attempting to solve problems. The cultural—cognitive element--“the
operating mechanisms of the mind” (North, 2005)——includes shared beliefs, categories,
identities, schemas, scripts, heuristics, logics of action and mental models (Scott, 2001).
These elements are cultural in the sense that social reality is referenced and rationalized
against external symbolic frameworks and cognitive in the sense that social reality is
interpreted and constructed through intemalised frames of meaning-making (Scott, 2001).
Thus, both external cultural benchmarks and intemalised interpretive processes shape
perceptions and explanations of social reality. Some of the most important cultural-
cognitive elements provide archetypes for dividing labour, constructing organisations and
project teams, and crafting recipes and routines for conducting work (Greenwood and
Hinings, 1993; Whitley; 1992).
The future operations and performance of foreign subsidiaries are affected by the way that
managers and other employees’ process new information and the relevance of developed
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and adopted routines. This is a different paradigm to the one an MNE is familiar with in
the home country and therefore presents its own set of challenges.
2.4 Institutional Distance
The concept of ‘distance’ has been used by international business scholars to explain
variations in international business strategies and operations across countries. Institutional
distance is the extent of similarity or dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and
normative institutions of two countries (Kostova, 1996). Institutional distance is based on
the institutional proﬁle construct. According to Kostova (1997), “A country's institutional
proﬁle reﬂects the institutional environment in that country deﬁned as the set of all
relevant institutions that have been established over time, operate in that country, and get
transmitted into organisations through individuals.”
Using Hofstede’s (1980) classiﬁcation of culture, Kogut and Singh (1988) offered a
cultural distance index that has become the “proxy of choice for national differences”
(Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Li, Lam and Qian, 2001). This
index, however, does not capture the complexity of cross-country differences. In particular,
it neglects the critical role of societal institutions in articulating and disseminating cultural
and social cues. Although cultural distance contains elements of both the normative and
cultural—cognitive pillar within institutional theory, cultural distance lacks the essential
elements of the regulatory pillar (Dean et al., 2004).
Institutional distance is of particular concern for Western MNEs operating in emerging
economies, where idiosyncratic regulatory environments may inhibit international business
(Henisz, 2003). For instance, legal codes governing market transactions may be less
extensive, and judicial systems may be less efﬁcient, for instance with respect to
intellectual property rights or contracts enforcement. The challenges of adaptation may be
less serious for MNE from developing countries, e.g. Asia, but not so for Western MNEs
who are used to operating in a different institutional environment. MNEs must develop
managerial and commercial practices and routines for ﬁltering and processing information
that suit the variations in institutions. Institutional differences between home and host
countries affect investors’ internal transfer of knowledge and practices, and their external
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quest for legitimacy in the local context, and therefore these aspects have to be
accommodated when designing business strategies (Luo, 2001; Meyer, 2001).
Very often the interaction of the foreign parent and the local afﬁliate is inhibited by their
embeddedness in different national contexts. Institutional distance may thus inhibit internal
coordination and integration, notably the transfer of knowledge and practices. Secondly,
the MNE afﬁliate is subject to institutional pressures from both its parent and from the
local environment (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Its ways of doing business may thus differ
from that of local organisations, which may inhibit the interaction between the foreign
afﬁliate and local organisations and individuals. Thus, MNE afﬁliates may be constrained
in developing the external relations that could allow them to gain legitimacy in the local
environment. It can be concluded that the more different the MNEs origins are from the
context that they enter, the greater will be the obstacles to attaining local legitimacy and to
practice transfer of knowledge and practices.
The international business literature has developed the concept of “psychic distance” to
address some of these issues and has analysed the adaptation of business to foreign
institutions with reference to “psychic distance”. This concept captures “the sum of factors
preventing the ﬂow of information from and to the market” and, among other aspects,
encompasses “differences in language, education, business practices, culture and industrial
development” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977: 24). This is usually narrowed down in
empirical studies by employing an index ﬁrst developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) on the
basis of Hofstede’s (1980) work on national culture. For Hofstede, culture mainly
encompasses the norms and beliefs held by individuals in a country. Several studies use the
Kogut-Singh index to show that the distance between host and home countries inﬂuences
strategies pursued by MNE, for example entry mode choice (Agarwal, 1994; Anderson and
Gatignon, 1986; Kogut and Singh, 1988). However, psychic distance is a broad concept,
and aspects other than cultural norms inﬂuence business strategies (Ghemawat, 2001;
Shenkar, 2001). When entering a foreign market, MNEs interact with a complex local
context that also includes regulatory and cognitive institutions (Scott, 1995/2001). As
discussed earlier, MNEs have to adjust to the multifaceted institutional environment of
each country where they operate (Meyer, 2001; Henisz, 2003; Peng, 2003), and this
adjustment is more challenging if the foreign environment differs signiﬁcantly from the
MNE’s home territory.
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The obstacles to business vary across different elements of the institutional framework.
Kostova and Roth (2002) show that internalisation of organisational practices by MNE
afﬁliates is facilitated by favourable cultural-cognitive and normative institutional factors.
Yet, in a favourable regulatory environment, a parent’s request to adopt a speciﬁc practice
may be perceived as an external coercion and impede its intemalisation. With respect to
afﬁliates’ quest to establish and maintain legitimacy, the normative and cultural-cognitive
dimensions of institutions pose a greater challenge because regulatory institutions are more
formalised and thus easier to understand by newcomers (Kostova and Zaheer,l999)
The differences in institutional environments necessitates learning about the new
environments (Benito and Gripsrud, 1992). MNEs’ unfamiliarity with new environments
causes competitive disadvantage and additional costs of doing business abroad (Eden and
Miller, 2004; Mezias, 2002). In the existing literature, these costs have been classiﬁed into
two categories: unfamiliarity hazards and relational hazards. Unfamiliarity hazards arise
from lack of knowledge of the host environment (Caves, 1971). Relational hazards are
associated with problems in managing relationships at a distance and include costs of
monitoring, dispute settlement, opportunistic behaviour of local partners, and lack of trust
in unknown partners (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Henisz and Williamson, 1999).
By deﬁnition, a ﬁrm is most familiar with its domestic institutional environment. But this
does not necessarily mean that the home institutional environment is most favourable for
all kinds of activities. Dunning’s (1980) ownership—location—internalisation framework
suggests that economic systems and environmental conditions of some locations may
provide better opportunities for exploitation of certain types of ownership advantages. For
particular activities along the value chain, the institutional environment, either regulatory
or normative, of a different country could be more favourable. For example, it is common
for many MNEs to set up their research and development centres in Australia or the United
States because of a more advanced regulatory regime for copyright protection in both
countries.
However, there are instances when even if institutional distance is low between two
countries, a ﬁrm might not invest in a particular industry because it perceives certain
political risks. For example, in a recent article in the Sydney Morning Herald titled
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“Perfect storm for gold as mines were left empty” dated 17 November 2007, Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard quotes Kevin McArthur Chief Executive of Goldcorp, an Australian
mining ﬁrm, “ we won't build a mine where we won't go on holiday. We are even tending
to stay out of the US because that has some of the highest political risk in terms of mining
investment.” The gripe is that revisions to the 1872 Mine Act will add to royalty costs and
allow regulators to shut down projects on a whim.
When institutional distance is low, these costs of doing business are marginal or even
negligible because of minimal requirements for learning. However, as the institutional
distance between the home country and the host country increases, the costs increase (Eden
and Miller, 2004) In highly uncertain environments, MNEs may even face the risks of
complete appropriation by governments or locally based hostile pressure groups such as
nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, and so on (Delios and Henisz, 2003) thus
increasing marginal costs in countries with large institutional distances.
When the institutional distance is small to medium, the potential beneﬁts arising from
location advantage in the new institutional environment should outweigh the costs of doing
business in a different institutional environment, contributing to a foreign subsidiary’s
survival. However, as institutional distance and the subsequent level of unfamiliarity with
host country environment increase, costs accelerate at a rate higher than that of beneﬁts
(Davidson, 1980; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and in host countries with large institutional
distance from home countries, costs may eventually exceed beneﬁts, making it difﬁcult for
MNEs to sustain their operations.
The more distant a host country is from the head ofﬁce of a MNE, the more it has to
manage cultural, regulatory and cognitive differences and develop appropriate strategies to
overcome the challenges of institutional distance. The MNE has to adapt its entry
strategies, organisational forms, and internal procedures to manage these differences
(Johansen and Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002).
2.5 Institutional Uncertainty and Liability of Foreignness
Institutions are complex and inter—locking sets of beliefs, values, norms, rules and laws
concerning what is appropriate behaviour in a given context. Institutions contain
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mechanisms that associate non-conformity with increased costs in several different ways:
“economically (it increases risk), cognitively (it requires more thought), and socially (it
reduces legitimacy and the access to resources that accompany legitimacy)” (Phillips,
Lawrence, and Hardy, 2000: 28). The challenges facing MNEs in emerging markets do not
simply stem from the fact that particular structures are not in place; it may also be the case
that those institutions that are in place are not deeply institutionalised. The low degree of
institutionalisation results in a high degree of uncertainty and requires careﬁal responses
from potential MNEs which may not be able to rely upon the core institutions - both the
formal regulatory and legal frameworks and the informal industry norms and patterns of
behaviour. It is well known in international business that the regulatory, cognitive, and
normative dimensions all inﬂuence strategies and operations ofMNEs in foreign countries.
They moderate the acceptance of MNE’s norms and practices within the socially
constructed system of rules, norms, and cognitive frames in different host environments
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).
MNE theorists have long argued that foreign subsidiaries face disadvantages in a host
country, compared to domestic ﬁrms (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). Zaheer referred to this
phenomenon as the “liability of foreignness,” deﬁning it as “the additional costs of doing
business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE subunit” (1995:
342). These costs are incurred not only at the time of the initial entry into a foreign market
but can persist throughout the duration of the MNEs foreign operations. When a MNE
elects to make a foreign direct investment (FDI), it enters a new environment that presents
unique challenges stemming from external and internal stimulants culturally different from
those existing in the ﬁrm's native country (Calhoun, 2002). LOF refers to the additional
costs that a ﬁrm operating in a market overseas incurs, which a local ﬁrm would not
(Hymer, 1976). Zaheer (1995) further elaborates that these costs may arise from at least
four, not necessarily independent, sources:
(1) Spatial distance (travel, transportation and coordination costs),
(2) Unfamiliarity with local environment,
(3) Discrimination faced by foreign ﬁrms and
(4) Restrictions from the home country.
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She also contends that though LOF may vary by industry or country, foreign ﬁrms, all else
being equal, will have lower proﬁtability than local ﬁrms and perhaps even a lower
probability of survival. This results from the differences between the institutional
environment of the home and host countries. Zaheer (2002) later included
structural/relational costs and institutional costs in the concept of LOF. She explains
structural/relational as the costs associated with a foreign ﬁrm’s network position in the
host country and its linkages to important local actors. In both cases, the MNE will be
disadvantaged when compared with a local ﬁrm, resulting in poorer access to local
information and resources. The institutional costs are costs associated with a foreign ﬁrm’s
distance from the cognitive, normative, and regulatory domains of the local institutional
environment (Kostova, 1999; Scott, 1987, 1995). The ﬁrm will need to develop and be able
to rely on a number of new external stakeholder relationships in the host country with
suppliers, vendors, distributors, customers, and government ofﬁcials in order to be
successful. Institutional costs also affect the legitimacy or acceptance of the foreign ﬁrm
relative to a local ﬁrm, as well as the extent of local learning the foreign ﬁrm has to engage
in (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). In addition, because such liability of foreignness (LOF)
stems from institutional differences, the larger these differences, the greater the liability is
likely to be (Miller and Parkhe, 2002).
In other words, there are several factors that contribute to the cost of doing business abroad
(Hymer, 1976) that may result in a liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). These costs of
doing business abroad could arise from a number of sources, such as higher coordination
costs, the foreign ﬁrm’s unfamiliarity with the local culture and other aspects of the local
market, a lack of networks and relationships in the host country or the regulatory
restrictions. The “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer 1995) lowers the proﬁtability of foreign
investors compared to their local competitors. To compensate for this, MNEs must transfer
their organisational practices that constitute an important source of competitive advantage
to their afﬁliates (Kogut, 1991; Grant, 1996). In addition, MNEs will also have to
accommodate isomorphic pressures and earn legitimacy in order to ensure their survival
and success in the new context (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
MNEs therefore need to devise strategies to compensate for this liability and gain
legitimacy in the host country. This study will explore the strategies of Australian service
MNEs in India to gain an understanding of how they mitigated this liability and gained
legitimacy of their operations.
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2.6 Resource-based view
The resource—based theory is concerned with the inﬂuence of ﬁrm resources and
capabilities in explaining why ﬁrms differ and how they achieve and sustain competitive
advantage (Barney et al.,2001). It views the ﬁrm, not the industry, as the source of
competitive advantage which resides in the resources (assets and capabilities) available to
the ﬁrm (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1997). The theory recognises the fact that resources
are both heterogeneous across ﬁrms and imperfectly mobile (Barney, 1991). Multinational
enterprises often focus on the revenue generating potential of emerging economies and
have often focused on the marketing challenge of creating and capturing the huge latent
value associated with large emerging economies like India and China. Firms that are
successful in managing the challenging circumstances in emerging economies gain from
the beneﬁts of ﬁrst mover advantage and these include being the ﬁrst participant in this
new market, building brand and reputation and the advantage of pre-emptive domination of
the distribution and the networks channels.
The resource-based view assumes sole ownership to be the default entry mode; it is the
preferred entry mode until proven otherwise. Sole ownership is an ideal mode of operation
(Stopford and Wells, 1972). This assumption is consistent with empirical research that
found that US ﬁrms preferred sole ownership entry mode (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986;
Erramilli and Rao, 1993) for managing post entry operations successfully. There is also
documented evidence that Japanese ﬁrms View alliances as a second—best alternative to
sole ownership
(Hamel, 1991). However in these studies the ﬁrms that were investigated were from the
developed markets entering and operating in developed markets. This research will
examine if the above assumption is consistent in an emerging; market context by studying
ﬁrms from a developed market (Australia) operating in an emerging market (India) and
overcoming institutional challenges. It will also highlight how the resources and
capabilities of ﬁrms might play an important role to mitigate the institutional challenges in
emerging markets.
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2.6.1 Firm-specific resources and strategic issues
Firm-speciﬁc resources include a ﬁrm’s capabilities, organisational culture, specialised
assets, large size, reputation, and business experience (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993;
Barney, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984). Company executives cite these resources as the drivers
of a ﬁrm’s competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984). Strategic issues emanate from ﬁrm-
speciﬁc resources; they refer to marketing options open to a ﬁrm because of its resources
as well as constraints that the ﬁrm faces because of a lack of certain resources. A ﬁrm may
adopt a collaborative mode of entry, such as joint venture, in order to enhance its
capabilities or to develop new capabilities (Kogut, 1988). Also, a ﬁrm can use
collaborative modes of operation to gain new knowledge where the ﬁrm lacks the requisite
level of knowledge and cannot develop such knowledge within an acceptable period of
time. Hence, strategic considerations play an important role in the selection of entry modes
in foreign markets (Hill et al., 1990) which in turn impact the operations of a ﬁrm.
2.6.2 Firm speciﬁc capabilities
Firm-speciﬁc capabilities refer to what a ﬁrm can do with its assets. They include the
cognitive processes by which the ﬁrm understands and translates its valuable tangible
assets into action; they are superior managerial skills and knowledge often embodied in
and jointly provided by employees of the ﬁrm (Hall, 1992; Hofer and Schendel, 1978).
Firm-speciﬁc capabilities set employees of a ﬁrm apart from those of other ﬁrms and make
it possible for a ﬁrm to perform activities in its business process advantageously (Day,
1994). Firm-speciﬁc capabilities include proprietary technology, tacit know-how, business
experience and complementary resource (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli and
Rao, 1993; Hill et al., 1990).
2.6.3 Proprietary technology
Proprietary technology normally resides in a ﬁrm’s product, process, or management
technology. To be a competitive advantage, technology innovations must be held
proprietary through a patent, trademark, brand image or copyright, or trade secrets.
Wemerfelt (1984) characterises such assets as blueprints that play a signiﬁcant role in
strategy formulation after initial entry has been made. The need to protect a proprietary
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asset that is a sustainable competitive advantage in a foreign market and to control the use
of the asset in the market will discourage a ﬁrm from using a collaborative mode to
manage its operations in a host country.
2.6.4 Tacit knowledge
Tacit knowledge refers to routines of a ﬁrm that drive the ﬁrm’s competitive advantage
but are difﬁcult to articulate, teach or transfer to another business entity. Tacit knowledge
has been deﬁned as one’s personal, internal or interior knowledge as opposed to the
external, physical knowledge that has been written down or recorded as an artifact.
Gourlay (2002) deﬁnes tacit knowledge as a form of knowledge that is highly personal and
context speciﬁc and deeply rooted in individual experiences, ideas, values and emotions.
Tacit knowledge is usually lodged in the ﬁrm’s employees. Since another ﬁrm is unable to
duplicate tacit knowledge in a foreign location, this provides the MNE with an advantage
with which it can manage its operations more efﬁciently when compared to its competitors.
According to Baumard (1999), tacit knowledge is important because expertise rests on it,
and because it is the source of competitive advantage, as well as being critical to daily
management activities
2.6.5 Business experience.
Extensive experience in international business can be a potential source of competitive
advantage for a ﬁrm. Some studies also found that sole ownership of a foreign subsidiary is
associated with high levels of international business experience (Anderson and Gatignon,
1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Two types of experience are
useful in international business, namely, geographic experience and industry experience
(Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Geographic experience comes from a ﬁrm’s familiarity with the
region of the world in which the target foreign market is located. Industry experience is a
function of a ﬁrm’s age in its industry and the extent of the ﬁrm’s familiarity with how its
industry functions in other countries. A ﬁrm that possesses both substantial industry
experience and geographic experience will be able to use this resource to have an
advantage over its competitors.
33
2.6.6 Complementary resources.
It has been suggested that a collaborative mode of operation can be used to enhance
marketing capabilities. For example, a ﬁrm may own a valuable asset, say a patent, and
needs another co-specialized resource in order to leverage the asset in a foreign market, but
the co-specialized resource belongs to another company. Wernerfelt (1984) characterises
market entries involving the need for complementary skills from another business
organisation as a paired application. According to Wernerfelt (1984), if a new foreign
market entrant has an asset but lacks appropriate production or marketing skills to leverage
the asset in a foreign market, a collaborative mode could ensure successful post entry
operations. MNEs often ally themselves with other entities that are familiar with the
foreign market in order to have successful post entry operations. Local agents often
provide foreign entrepreneurial businesses with complementary skills, such as market
speciﬁc sales expertise, distribution channels or easy access to local authorities.
2.7 Knowledge based View
Knowledge based View is based on the assumption that knowledge is the most strategically
signiﬁcant resource of a ﬁrm and hence forms the source of competitive advantage
(Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). This perspective views a ﬁrm as a body that ‘generates,
integrates and distributes knowledge’ (Lopez, 2005: 663). The proponents of the KBV
argue that because knowledge-based resources are usually difﬁcult to imitate and socially
complex, heterogeneous knowledge bases and capabilities among ﬁrms are the major
determinants of sustainable competitive advantage and superior corporate performance
(Grant, 1996b, Lopez, 2005).
In particular, the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge. has proven to be
important in the dominant knowledge-based approach to strategy (Grant, 1996b,
Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). The KBV argues that because of its inimitability based on its
intangible, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and socially complex nature, tacit knowledge is considered the
most important strategic resource of ﬁrms and is likely to constitute the basis of sustainable
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996b, Spender and Grant, 1996, Hatch and Dyer, 2004).
Furthermore, it has been noted that even when employees defect to competitors, the ﬁnn-
speciﬁc tacit knowledge embodied in them may not be able to add similar value in a
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different work environment because it is speciﬁc to the original work environment (Hatch
and Dyer, 2004: 1 174).
Within the KBV, an organisational learning perspective focuses on accumulation,
codiﬁcation of valuable knowledge, and identiﬁes past experience, routines and
organisational memory as sources of organisational learning (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002:
141). It has been suggested that knowledge accumulated from experience or
articulated/codiﬁed through deliberate learning facilitates ‘development of effective
routines and policies to manage corporate development activities’ (Gary, 2005: 661). It is
said that routines capture the experiential lessons of history, and are ‘transmitted through
socialisation, education, imitation, professionalisation, personnel movement, mergers and
acquisitions’, and recorded in ‘a collective memory’ (Levitt and March, 1988: 320).
Therefore, an organisational learning perspective Views the ﬁrm as ‘a repository of
knowledge’ which is represented by routines that take the form of ‘executable capabilities
for repeated performance’ and guide organisational action (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002:
141).
2.8 Deﬁning Emerging Markets
Emerging markets are gaining an increasingly prominent position in the global economy.
The terms “emerging markets” and “developing countries” are sometime used
interchangeably. Generally deﬁned, emerging markets are countries that are experiencing
rapid economic growth and ﬁnancial and economic liberalisation prompted by policy
reforms. Hoskisson et al., (2000) deﬁned emerging markets as “low-income, rapid-growth
countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth”. Therefore, not
all developing countries can be called emerging markets. Cavusgil, Ghauri and Agarwal
(2002) have argued that only those developing countries can be “truly “classiﬁed as
emerging markets that:
(1) are undertaking a process of economic reform designed to address poverty and improve
the living standards of their inhabitants; and
(2) have an economy that has recorded positive economic growth over a sustained period.
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There appears to be broad agreement among key scholars (e.g., Arnold and Quelch, 1998;
Cavusgil et al., 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003) as well as international
development agencies such as the World Bank, that emerging markets include the
transition economies of East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union, in addition to many of the economies in the Middle East,
Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa. Cavusgil et al., 2002 have emphasised the
importance of these countries, by highlighting that approximately 75% of the world’s
population lives in emerging economies and the population growth rates of emerging
economies are the highest of all countries.
A notable characteristic of these economies is that the institutions which underpin them are
not very stable. Indeed, “[t]he essence of economic transition is the replacement of one
coordination mechanism by another. Yet efﬁcient markets depend on supporting
institutions that can provide... the formal and informal rules of the game of a market
economy” (Meyer, 2001: 358). This process of institutional transformation can produce
signiﬁcant changes over relatively short periods, but the transformation process in its
entirety is likely to span many years. For example, prior to the 1990’s it was unthinkable to
see MNEs operating in India because of the protectionist policies in the country. This
situation has altered dramatically in recent years because of the structural reforms
introduced in India due to economic liberalisation since the 19905. Over the past decade,
emerging markets have become major recipients of FDI as multinational enterprises have
expanded their global strategies to take advantage of business opportunities. Emerging
economies are attractive for business because of their sometimes large and often fast
growing markets, and because they provide access to resources, notably raw materials and
labour not available at the same cost, in mature market economies.
2.9 Challenges in emerging markets
Emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) are today attractive
investment destinations for MNEs. What is unique about these markets vis-a‘-vis
industrialized economies is the transitional nature of their industrial and institutional
environments. This transition brings enormous market opportunities to investors while
creating numerous challenges and uncertainties for business operations. LOF are high
because uncertainties in the industrial environment are largely structural, and challenges in
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the institutional environment are normally unpredictable, making it very difﬁcult for ﬁrms
to manage their operations.
2.9.1 Institutional constraints
In spite of their attractions, emerging markets pose particular challenges to investors
because of weaknesses in the institutional environment. Khanna et al., (2005) argue that
part of the difﬁculty in emerging markets is the absence of specialised intermediaries,
regulatory systems and contract enforcement mechanisms. The legal framework
concerning business law tends to be less developed with respect to competition policy,
regulatory policy, corporate taxation, and deﬁnition and enforcement of property rights
(not just intellectual property). Moreover, even where the necessary laws are in place, their
implementation and enforcement may be inhibited by, among other causes, lack of
qualiﬁed bureaucrats and lawyers. This creates “institutional voids” which make it difﬁcult
for MNEs to operate efﬁciently.
Several distinctive institutional challenges faced by MNEs operating in these contexts have
been identiﬁed. For example, Peng (2000) distinguishes between formal institutional
constraints in emerging markets such as the lack of credible legal frameworks, the lack of
stable political structures and the lack of strategic factor markets, and informal institutional
constraints such as the prominence of deeply embedded networks and personalized
exchanges, both of which make it difﬁcult for “outsiders” to engage in commercial
activity. In a similar vein, Khanna and Palepu, (2000) have concluded that network
strategies are much more widely employed in the emerging markets because of the lack of
formal legal and regulatory frameworks - known as “institutional voids.” From the above
discussion, it can be inferred that networks assume a very important role in overcoming the
institutional constraints in an emerging market.
2.9.2 Role of Networks
Peng and Zhou (2005: 323) have noted that during the early phase of institutional
transitions, when formal rules that are supportive of market systems have not been well
established, “ﬁrms’ strategic choices will be network-centered, heavily relying on strong
personal ties (see also Peng and Heath, 1996).” Most scholars agree that the importance of
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cooperative relationships for businesses in Asia and other emerging economies is due to
the underdevelopment of institutions and markets rather than to cultural factors (Buckley,
2004; Fukuyama, 1995; Peng, 2002). It can therefore be concluded that networks assume a
greater importance in cases where a foreign market is perceived as complex, different and
distant. Many empirical studies have shown that Chinese people were good at establishing
and operating through personal networks, known as “guanxi”, when they were still in
planned economic times (Peng and Heath, 1996). Guanxi became a substitute for formal
institutions as it served two major functions in China: protection against environmental
hazards and access to resources (Xin and Pearce, 1996). In China, even when laws are
there to protect foreign investors, still guanxi is essential to get these laws enforced
(Ahlstrom et al., 2003). It would be interesting to study if networks played a similar role in
India. In the existing literature, insufﬁcient attention has been given to the fact that “no
ﬁrm is an island” and that its past, its present activities, and its future potential for strategic
responses is largely a reﬂection of its links to other actors (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989).
According to the network perspective, the knowledge a ﬁrm has about foreign markets and
the opportunities open to the ﬁrm in these markets, extends beyond the boundaries of the
ﬁrm itself and are contained in the network that the ﬁrm has been developing over a period
of time (Benito and Welch 1994). This is true for all countries, but in the emerging market
context where institutional distance is large, networks are strongly relied upon at the
beginning of a ﬁrm’s internationalisation, as they facilitate the acquisition of experiential
knowledge about these markets (Freeman et al., 2007). Further, they gain strategic
signiﬁcance for a MNE post-entry as they potentially provide access to information and
resources which are relatively inimitable (Gulati, 1999). It has been argued by Salmi
(2000) that although the importance of networks in emerging markets has been recognised,
it is still under researched. This study will examine the signiﬁcance of networks in an
emerging market context in India.
2.9.3 Corruption
In addition, Cavusgil et al., (2002) highlight other challenges such as high levels of
corruption which often represent major barriers for MNEs in emerging markets. Corruption
is a phenomenon found in virtually all countries and is particularly widespread in transition
and less-developed economies (Hellman et al., 2000). When MNEs enter emerging
economies, they frequently confront challenges associated with corruption in governments.
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Uhlenbruck et al., (2006) have observed that political and economic risks have received
substantial attention from management practitioners and scholars but the risk of
government corruption has received much less interest. Generally, in the literature on
management and international business it is assumed that government and its ofﬁcials
operate so as to maximize public wellbeing (Dunning 1993, Lenway and Murtha 1994). As
a result of this common presumption there is a dearth of research on how ﬁrms adjust their
strategies in response to governments and ofﬁcials that engage in self-serving behaviour
and there is little evidence on how MNEs deal with corruption (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). A
growing body of research has shown that corruption signiﬁcantly reduces direct investment
ﬂows into an economy (Lambsdorff, 1999; Mauro, 1995, 1998; Wei, 1997). Habib and
Zurawicki (2002) argue that corruption reduces aggregate FDI into a country even when
controlling for political risk, cultural distance, and level-of-corruption between the home
and host countries. To contribute to our understanding of MNE behaviour when corruption
is pervasive, this study explores the post entry operations of western MNEs in an emerging
market.
The profound nature of these challenges suggests that operating in many emerging markets
is quite uncertain and fraught with difﬁculties. Emerging markets vary a great deal in their
political realities, their cultural and national identities, and their legal and economic
institutions. With developed world markets becoming increasingly saturated, multinational
corporations turned to emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) as
key locations for future growth. This study will contribute to the understanding of how
MNEs meet the institutional challenges in an emerging market context. A forecast by the
ﬁnancial house Goldman Sachs suggests that in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies
together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms (Dreaming with the BRICs: Path to
2050, 2003). Some of the reasons for expecting sustained growth in these emerging
economies are:
. Deregulation of key industries ( transportation, oil )
. Privatization of key industries ( airline, telecom, banking)
0 Introduction of ﬁscal prudence
. Removal of price subsidies
. Reduction of trade barriers
0 Introduction of tight ﬁscal and monetary policies
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. Enhanced international competitiveness
. Stabilization of exchange rates
. Manageable inﬂation
. Increased resources available to the private sector
0 Decreasing foreign debt burden
o Reliable and viable investment alternatives
. Expanding consumer base
. Skilled and competitive labour force
Source: Emerging Markets Companion (1996)
The growing importance of emerging economies is reﬂected in an upsurge of strategy
research on this topic in recent years. Since the ﬁrst major overview of the ﬁeld by
Hoskisson et al., (2000), numerous publications and a series of perspective papers have
appeared to push the boundary of this research. In the most recent perspective paper, Peng,
Wang and Jiang (2008) have emphasised the importance of the institution-based View of
international business strategy with a focus on emerging economies. In addition to journal
articles, books which cover more than one country or region in this area include Cavusgil
et al., (2002), Estrin and Meyer (2004), Hooke (2001), Mathews (2002), and Peng (2000).
Hoskisson et al., (2000) have pointed out that the focus of research on enterprise strategies
in emerging economies to date has been China and some countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. However, they have identiﬁed 64 countries in four regions (Latin America, Asia,
Africa, Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe) as emerging economies. Ghemawat
(2001, 2003) has observed that countries may differ along distinct types of dimensions:
cultural (religion, race, social norms, language), administrative (political and economic
relationships), geographic, and economic (wealth and income). There is, therefore, a need
for considerable broadening of the research agenda to embrace developments in different
countries in the emerging markets. The emerging market selected for the purpose of this
study is India which has not received as much attention as compared to China or Central
and Eastern Europe. The structure of the Indian economy has undergone considerable
change in the last decade and has made it an attractive destination for foreign capital
inﬂows. The net capital inﬂows that were 1.9 per cent of GDP in 2000-01 increased to 9.2
per cent in 2007-08 (Economic Survey 2008—2009, Ministry of Finance, Govt of India). Its
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complex and dynamic environment provides a rich context for examining the LOF and
MNE strategies.
This study will lead to a better understanding of the institutional challenges in India and
will offer strategies to navigate through such challenges. Strategy research with a focus on
these emerging economies is challenging conventional wisdom in academic thinking and
theories in several important ways (Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. 2000). To the extent that
emerging economies are fertile grounds not only for testing existing theories but also for
developing newer ones, these endeavours are likely to enrich the strategy research (Wright
et al., 2005) and this study endeavours to add to the knowledge of successfully operating in
emerging markets using an institutional perspective.
2.10 Strategic responses to institutional distance
Existing literature suggests that LOF varies across host countries and that the greater the
liability of foreignness, the worse should be foreign subsidiary performance - unless a
parent MNE engages in offsetting activities or has superior resources to overcome these
additional costs (Dunning, 1977; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Eden and Miller (2004)
argue and that institutional distance (regulatory, normative and cognitive) between the
home and host country is the key driver behind LOF. Although the costs of doing business
in institutionally distant countries could be high, there are strategies to mitigate such costs.
LOF is an inherently dynamic concept (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997).
As the ﬁrm becomes more of an insider in a particular host society (Ohmae, 1990),
developing linkages and aligning its values and actions to the institutional requirements of
the host environment, its LOF should decline and perhaps even disappear. Peterson and
Pedersen (2002) opine that local adaptation is better for success of a local subsidiary and
have suggested that MNEs must engage in high velocity learning to mitigate the LOF.
However, they do not give details of how MNEs might do this. To succeed in a target
foreign market, ﬁrms need to mitigate LOF while beneﬁting from opportunities of
foreignness (Dunning, 1995) such as superior technology/processes or brand recognition.
In search of effective strategies to overcome such challenges, Luo et al., (2002) suggested
defensive and offensive/proactive mechanisms as shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 General mechanisms mitigating LOF
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Under defensive mechanisms, they included contract protection and under offensive
options, they proposed local networking and legitimacy improvement as the more
important strategies to overcome LOF. Local networking can improve the adaptability of
the MNE to the business environment in the host country as it can help build and maintain
interpersonal networks with decision makers. Salmi (2000) argues that although the
importance of networks in emerging markets has been recognised, it is still under—
researched. This study will contribute to a better understanding of the advantages of local
networking in emerging markets.
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Ownership strategy has been identiﬁed as another useful tool in this regard as it offers a
critical control mechanism. According to existing literature, a higher level of ownership in
foreign subsidiaries provides MNEs with a larger degree of control over subsidiary
operations and enables the MNEs to guard against the relational hazards and opportunistic
behaviour of partners in unknown environments (Gaur and Lu, 2007). With more efﬁcient
monitoring and control, MNEs can make quick decisions to tackle exigencies arising in
unfamiliar conditions. They can also alleviate unfamiliarity hazards with the help of local
partners (Makino and Delios, 1996). With superior local knowledge and local connections,
local partners can help foreign subsidiaries reduce unfamiliarity with the local environment
and enhance their local legitimacy. This argument makes good sense in theory. In practice,
however, the choice of a local partner in unfamiliar environments is itself a challenge
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986) because as institutional distance increases, it becomes
more difﬁcult to ﬁnd trustworthy local partners.
In the process of joint ventures, local partners may act opportunistically, requiring higher
levels of monitoring and coordination efforts (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). As this happens, the
increase in costs related to relational hazards may exceed the reduction in costs stemming
from unfamiliarity hazards. It is therefore argued in line with Gaur and Lu (2007) that as
the institutional distance increases, it is more effective for MNEs to have higher levels of
ownership so as to have tight control over their subsidiaries, which will subsequently
improve performance of foreign subsidiaries.
The regulatory aspects of institutions are more formal in nature and more clearly stated
(Scott, 1995). Even when regulatory distance is large, foreign MNEs can easily ﬁnd
information about these aspects on their own, using secondary sources. Thus, compared to
normative distance, regulatory distance causes less of an unfamiliarity hazard for foreign
MNEs. As foreign MNEs do not need to rely on local partners for overcoming
unfamiliarity with regulatory aspects, they can choose to enter foreign markets through
wholly owned modes. In this way, they will not encounter relational hazards related to the
use of local partners. The subsequent reduction in costs should lead to enhanced survival
chances of foreign investments.
In contrast, the normative aspects of institutions are usually informal and embedded in the
social environments (Scott, 1995). In the context of foreign subsidiaries, the normative
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aspects of institutions relate to softer issues in subsidiary management, such as
understanding the aspirations of each partner, transferring organisational routines between
the partners, efﬁcient monitoring, managing conﬂict, and adapting to local environment
(Kostova, 1999). These aspects are more relevant in the case of international joint ventures
(Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano, 2000) but their importance can also be valuable in
managing wholly owned subsidiaries.
When normative distance is large, it can be quite challenging for a foreign ﬁrm to ﬁnd
information about these aspects, and local partners can be helpful in overcoming
unfamiliarity arising from large normative distance. However, it has been well documented
that local partners can be difﬁcult to work with (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). The difﬁculties
of working with local partners will be heightened in countries with large normative
distance. For example, in some countries, contracts are expected to be renegotiated on an
ongoing basis, and bribery is a common way of getting things done. In the presence of such
normative differences, the use of local partners would be beneﬁcial only if the design of
the governance structure of a joint venture can take care of the potential problems arising
from large normative distance.
Prior studies have emphasised the use of a higher level of equity ownership for more
control and inﬂuence in joint venture operations to overcome these problems (Anderson
and Gatignon, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Killing, 1983). With enhanced control and
inﬂuence over the joint ventures in institutionally distant countries, MNEs can protect their
interests in case local partners act opportunistically and can ensure that the joint ventures
are operated in a way that is consistent with the parent MNEs’ objectives
Another way to overcome the problems associated with unfamiliarity and relational
hazards is to develop new knowledge and capabilities for operating in the new
environments (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Luo and Peng, 1999). Host country
experience plays an important role in the development of such capabilities. With host
country experience, MNEs develop more social knowledge and rapport with the local
businesses and governments. A longer presence in local markets helps in more prudent
market-segment selection, in product differentiation, and in establishing superior
marketing channels and corporate image (Mitchell, Shaver, and Yeung, 1992). In addition,
local knowledge gained through host country experience helps in obtaining local
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legitimacy (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Host country experience also helps in more
effective transfer of ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources and strategic organisational practices across
borders (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Kostova, 1999). Strategic organisational practices
reﬂect the core competencies of a ﬁrm and provide differentiation and competitive
advantages (Kostova, 1999). However, the successful transfer of strategic organisational
practices between related organisations located in different nations is challenging, as the
effectiveness of transfer depends on the adoption of formal and informal rules and
procedures and on institutionalising these rules and procedures in the subsidiary (Jensen
and Szulanski, 2004). With longer experience in operating in a host country, MNEs
develop more knowledge about the culture and institutional environment of that country
and this makes it easier to adapt strategic organisational practices to the local environment.
In emerging economies, problems of law enforcement can be challenging, bringing into
question the ability of new entrants to enforce contracts. Skills and practices developed
through prior experience in developed countries are also often inappropriate or impossible
to apply in an emerging markets context (Tallman, 1992). The MNE may instead develop
speciﬁc business concepts and methods to serve the needs and abilities of customers in an
emerging market, and subsequently transfer them to other similar emerging economies
(Prahalad, 2004).
MNEs face liabilities of foreignness due to the lack of local knowledge, which can lead to
disadvantages in competing with local ﬁrms who are familiar with the local environment.
The MNEs face a series of challenges such as ﬁnancing, stafﬁng, securing relationships
with suppliers and buyers, attracting local customers and establishing their legitimacy (Lu
and Beamish, 2006). Researchers have examined how MNEs can address gaps in the
business environment through forming alliances (Hitt et al., 2000), joining networks
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), using interpersonal ties (Peng and Luo, 2000), or managing
ﬁrm boundaries (Delios and Henisz, 2000) in order to overcome liabilities of foreignness.
Organisations choose a particular form of structure and practice either because it would
receive regulatory and normative approval as is necessary due to their reliance on
resources from these environments, or because it is taken for granted that doing so is the
proper way to organise (DiMaggio and P0well,1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). These
theorists have argued that ﬁrms may use alliances to enhance their legitimacy. Thus, they
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search for partners with strong intangible assets, such as strong reputations and networks.
To obtain knowledge of local business institutions and practices, however, the MNE needs
to cooperate with local partners (Beamish, 1984) in the form of joint ventures, or acquire
an existing ﬁrm with local staff (Barkema and Vermulen, 1998). The above discussion
offers some insights from the existing literature on how MNEs can mitigate the LOF.
2.11 Research questions and Propositions
The exploration of location-speciﬁc advantages and exploitation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources
have been identiﬁed as the key motives for internationalisation for many MNEs (Delios
and Beamish, 2001). In the process MNEs are faced with different institutional challenges
which they need to overcome. Certainly, given the key role that institutions play in
building stable structures for economic activity (Meyer, 2001), the ambiguous nature of the
institutional arrangements in emerging markets has a major impact on the operations and
performance of a ﬁrm. There has been little analysis of how unfamiliar elements and
dynamics in emerging markets context can lead to emergent uncertainties and LOF and
how different types of ﬁrms actually learn to cope with a local knowledge deﬁcit in an
unfamiliar business environment.
Managing operations successfully in an emerging economy after the entry strategy
decision has been made is dependant on the MNEs capabilities to bridge the institutional
distance. The literature suggests that this is one of the keys to overcoming the LOF and
obtaining sustainable competitive advantage. In line with recent attempts to develop
institutional theory in the international arena (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Davis et al.,
2000; Hoskisson et al., 2000) this study will bring out the nature of the dynamic
relationship between host country institutions and the operations of a MNE.
In international business research, institutions have been regarded as part of the country
level environment. Scholars have emphasised the effects of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995),
culture (Hofstede, 1980; Kogut and Singh, l988) and institutional distance (Kostova, 1996)
on ﬁrm survival and success. However, MNEs' responses to different institutional
pressures in an emerging economy at the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive level
have not been studied systematically - a gap I seek to ﬁll here. Understanding what
additional activities and/or superior resources can help to overcome LOF is an important
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research problem not only for international management scholars, but also for corporate
executives and subsidiary managers of MNEs. To address this practical need, this research
is organised around two research questions:
1. What are the post entry institutional challenges for service sector MNEs operating in an
emerging market, and
2. How do ﬁrms respond to institutional distance following their initial entry into an
emerging economy?
The review of existing literature has led to the following four broad propositions within the
institutional framework. The ﬁrst proposition examines the rationale behind the entry mode
choice based on the perceived challenges of operating in an emerging market and sets the
context for the other three propositions which speciﬁcally look at the challenges of
operating in an emerging market and how the MNEs respond to institutional distance
following their initial entry.
1. If the extent of institutional distance is perceived to be high, a JV would be the most
likely choice, followed by merger/acquisition of a host country ﬁrm, while a sole venture
mode of entry would be least likely.
2. Corruption represents major barriers for MNEs in emerging markets and signiﬁcantly
reduces direct investment ﬂows into an economy.
3. The ability of a MNE to operate effectively in a host country decreases as the cultural
distance increases because of inconsistencies in values and institutions between the home
and host country.
4. Firms that are better connected through their networks and relationships have a
competitive advantage in the regulatory environment of an emerging market.
2.12 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the dominant explanations for institutional challenges faced by
MNEs in an emerging market context. The ﬁrst part of this chapter focused on the
growing body of work on the institution-based view of international business strategy
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which suggests that institutional theory has emerged as a leading theoretical foundation for
research in emerging economies. It identiﬁed a range of contextual factors which result in
the liability of foreignness and explored existing literature to identify how ﬁrms might
mitigate the liability of foreignness. The resource-based view exempliﬁed by Barney
(1991), knowledge based View and the network perspective were also examined in this
section to gain an understanding of how MNEs sustain a competitive advantage in a
foreign market. The second part of this chapter has argued that despite the attraction of
investing in emerging markets, there are many challenges at the regulatory, normative and
cultural-cognitive level which a ﬁrm needs to manage in order to be successful. Finally,
the propositions that emerged from the review of the literature in this chapter were
identiﬁed to answer the key research questions relating to the post entry challenges for
Australian service sector MNEs in an emerging market and the strategies they actually use
to cope with the different challenges.
The study aims to examine the impact of institutional distance on the operations of service
MNEs from a developed economy (Australia) as they compete in an emerging market
(India) and goes beyond the scope of cultural distance as it allows for other societal
institutions and regulatory considerations to be taken into account in addition to culture.
The ﬁndings and discussions are organised around four core chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and
8) of this thesis which focus on the institutional elements in India, and in particular, the
challenges that Australian service sector MNEs face in manoeuvring effectively and
efﬁciently within the tangle of locally-devised institutional elements. The next chapter sets
the context of this study by describing the evolution of FDI in India and analyses the
business environment in India from an institutional perspective.
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Chapter 3: Economic transition and doing business in India
“15 Years, 6 governments, 5 prime ministers, ONE DIRECTION"
India’s billboard at World Economic Forum, Davos, 2006
3.1 Introduction
Long closed to foreign competition, India has now opened up its market to MNEs. The
liberalisation and globalisation of the economy was attempted in a major way beginning in
1991 to modernise the country's economy and actualise India's economic potential to a
competitive market economy. But what are the characteristics of the Indian business
environment in the context of reforms initiated since 1991? And what types of problems
does it pose for foreign ﬁrms that plan to do business there? This chapter examines India’s
economic transition from a mixed economy with some socialist goals to an economy that
has increasingly adopted neo-liberal policies. It then looks at the challenges of doing
business in India and brieﬂy analyses the institutional environment in India based on
Scott's (1995) three pillars: regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive. Finally, a
comparison is made between Australia and India on different dimensions of doing business
to highlight the challenges that Australian service MNEs might face whilst operating in
India.
3.2 Emergence of India
In recent years, scholars and managers have taken great interest in emerging markets and
how they are transforming international business (Jain, 2007). One of the important
countries attracting the attention of multinational executives is India. Multinational
enterprises are using India for outsourcing value-added services as well as for
manufacturing. Foreign direct investment is growing rapidly. India's image has been
transformed from the land of snake charrners and witch craftsmen to the land of
opportunities and intellect as a result of the remarkable change in the Indian economic
landscape since 1991. The Indian economy has primarily been an agrarian economy, but a
metamorphosis is taking place, and India is gaining prominence as a knowledge-driven
economy. India has the world's second largest pool of English-speaking scientiﬁc and
technical manpower and this provides it with a unique competitive advantage--especially
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when the raw material for the knowledge businesses is people (Kapur, D. and Ramamurti,
R. 2001). India has ﬁnally emerged as a new player on the international arena. India is a
country with an immense economic potential. In 2008 the GDP growth was an impressive
9% (World Bank Report, 2009). In purchasing power parity terms, the World Bank has
estimated the size of its economy in 2008 at US $ 3388 billion (World Bank Report, 2009).
Figure 3.1 displays India’s GDP growth compared with US and G6 nations.
Figure 3.1: India’s GDP growth projections
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Rapid growth is expected to continue, at least in the near term, putting India among the
fastest growing countries in the world (International Monetary Fund, 2006). Goldman
Sachs emerging markets group highlighted the special importance of the BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) markets over the next 50 years in an article in 2003, titled
Dreaming with BRICS: the path to 2050 in which they modelled the 50-year growth
projections for each of these key emerging markets, mapping out gross domestic product
(GDP) growth, income per capita and currency movements. Goldman Sachs predicts that
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India’s GDP will rise above US$ 27 trillion, making it one of the world’s largest
economies in 2050 (Refer Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2:BRICs and emerging markets long—term trend
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India's attractiveness to MNEs is mainly in anticipation of its future potential, which they
see as very promising (Huang and Khanna 2003). In order to better understand the
economic transition of India, the next section examines the pre-1991 state of the economy
and the economic liberalisation after 1991 which led to the impressive growth in the
economy. The year 1991 marks a watershed in the economic history of India.
3.3 Pre - 1991 phase
The economic strategy of India after she gained independence in 1947 was distinctly
socialist. Its main thrust was production of capital goods, rather than consumer goods, to
develop an industrial base. The 17 most important industries, the ‘commanding heights’,
were reserved for state ownership and control, much as in the USSR. The private sector
had to obtain manufacturing licenses for the remaining industries. Job creation was to be
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encouraged by promoting small ﬁrms using labour-intensive techniques. Imports were
limited to encourage local production. Foreign investment was discouraged
It is undeniably true that for many years India’s role in international affairs was marginal.
Its image was poor; the economy was plodding along at the “Hindu growth rate” of 3.5 %
for much of the time after the country gained its independence in 1947. Foreign investment
in India in the pre—l991 phase was strictly controlled by extensive regulation in trade and
investment. There was speciﬁcation of sectors in which both foreign ﬁnancial and
technical participation were allowed, those in which only technical collaboration was
permitted, and those in which neither technical nor ﬁnancial participation was allowed.
This reﬂected the desire to restrict foreign ownership and control to sectors of the economy
in which its contribution was deemed to be essential. The preference was for technical
collaboration agreements as opposed to foreign equity ownership. All these reﬂected the
desire to promote the twin objectives of freedom from foreign control and utilisation of
foreign technology and know-how (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare, 2002).
Foreign companies came under the Monopolies and Restrictive Policy (MRTP), Act 1969,
during this period which restricted foreign companies on the size of operation and the
pricing of products and services. In 1973, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)
came into legislation, which required foreign companies to include Indian equity in their
companies with the aim of reducing foreign control over the economy. In the 19705,
multinationals were forced to partially divest their holdings and reduce foreign ownership
levels to below 40% unless they were exporters or in high-tech industries (Encarnation and
Vachani, 1985).
As a result of these legislations, many companies that did not want to increase Indian
equity in their companies decided to cease their operations in India. 54 companies applied
to wind up their operations by 1977-78 since the implementation of the FERA in 1974 and
9 companies applied to wind up their operations in 1980-81 (Annual Reports, Reserve
Bank of India, 1977, 1978, 1981: cited in Nayak, 2000). During the period 1967-79 the
total number of collaboration agreements reached an all time low of 242. Foreign
companies like Coca Cola in 1977 and IBM in 1978 are some of the well-known cases of
this period which wound up their operations in response to these legislations
(Balasubramanyam and Mahambare, 2002).
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However, from the 1980’s, liberalisation of policies and globalisation of FDI was observed
in India. This change of attitude towards FDI mainly began from the tenure of Rajiv
Gandhi as the Prime Minister of India. For example, there were relaxations in the
remittances of proﬁts, royalties, dividends and repatriation of capital of foreign companies
in Industrial Policy Statement and the Industrial Licensing was streamlined and made
easier (Nayak, 2000). The number of industries subject to government capacity licensing
was reduced from seventy seven to twenty seven in 1988 (Delong, 2001). The provisions
in MRTP Act (1969) were simpliﬁed which provided a great relief for foreign companies.
Export and Import norms were also changed to encourage FDI in India (Nayak, 2000). And
most importantly, policy concerning foreign equity participation was made ﬂexible, and
exceptions from the general ceiling of 40 % on foreign equity were allowed on the merits
of individual investment proposals (Kumar, 1995). Due to all these liberalised policies, the
total number of collaboration agreements approved each year increased from 242 during
the period 1967-79 to 744 during the period 1980-88 (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare,
2002).
While some contend that growth picked up in the 1980s, Panagariya (2005) points out that
growth was patchy. Growth was strong over 1988—89 to 1990—91, but this was largely a
reﬂection of the liberalisation and deregulation measures under Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi as well as expansionary policies that ended in the economic crisis of June 1991. It
was the more systematic and deeper reforms commencing in 1991 that helped sustain
India’s economic growth. The Indian economy reached a crisis point in mid-1991, when
for the ﬁrst time ever India seemed on the verge of defaulting on its international loans.
The credit rating agencies had drastically lowered the country’s ratings. Excessive
government control had limited economic growth for decades to the ‘Hindu rate of growth’
of 3.5% per year, while China and some other Asian countries surged ahead. Exports could
not cover imports, and with little investment inﬂow India relied on foreign debt. Short-
terrn liquidity was severely hurt by the Gulf war as oil prices rose, exports to West Asia
fell and remittances from the Indian diaspora in the Middle East dropped. Inﬂation
exceeded 15%. India’s foreign debt rose to $70 billion and its foreign currency reserves
were rapidly drying up. It was forced to approach the IMF for help. There was a serious
foreign exchange crisis and the situation became such that for the ﬁrst time in modern
history, India was faced with the prospect of defaulting on external commitments as the
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foreign currency reserves fell to a mere $1 billion by mid-1991 (Bajpai, 2002). The
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank agreed to provide loans to India on the
condition that it would make necessary changes to liberalise its trade and investment. Thus
due to the pressure to meet the imports of essential commodities and external pressure of
IMF and World Bank, the government initiated the liberalisation process in India (Nayak,
2000).
3.4 Post-1991- The road to economic transformation
The major changes initiated by the Indian government from 1991 onwards were aimed to
remove many archaic and burdensome regulations and create a business-friendly
environment for domestic and international business. These included macroeconomic
reforms, tax reforms, ﬁnance reforms and freeing of capital markets, reforms in the
regulation of business ﬁrms, revitalisation of the Indian private sector, removal of
exchange controls and convertibility, trade reforms, and foreign direct investment.
In 1991 the new foreign trade policy came up with wide ranging liberalisation policies
such as relaxation of import controls across the board, substantial reduction in import
duties and devaluation of the Indian currency (rupee). The socialist ideals of the failed past
were discarded; capitalism, proﬁts, privatisation, and consumption were no longer
considered dirty words. The disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that India could no
longer rely on subsidised handouts from its former ally; socialism as an ideology was in
serious disrepute. It ﬁnally dawned on Indian politicians that in a rapidly globalising world
economy, India would lag far behind other developing countries unless it took drastic
steps, According to Landau (1994), India’s isolationist policies now appeared misguided.
As a result, the New Industrial Policy in 1991 made automatic approval for projects with
foreign equity participation up to 51 % in high priority areas. It abolished industrial
licenses for all industries except 18. Later they were further reduced from 18 to 6. The
asset limits for MRTP were totally removed. Another highlight was the reduction of
industries reserved for public sectors from 17 to 8. Subsequently they were reduced to 4
(Sury, 2004). These new policies allowed freedom of location, choice of technology and
repatriation of capital and dividends. All these new policies substantially liberalised the
economy since 1991 with a View to bring rapid and substantial economic growth and move
towards the globalisation of the economy. In view of further liberalisation, apart from
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relaxed restrictions on foreign investment, industrial licensing and foreign exchange, the
capital market was also opened to foreign investment and controls on the banking sector
were eased (Bhasin, 2005).
The structural adjustment had several components that made the economy far more
competitive and turbulent than before 1991 (Ahluwalia, 1996). These included graduated
deregulation of industry through substantial but phased elimination of licensing for setting
up industries and for expanding capacity, abolition of the ofﬁce of the controller of capital
issues, drastic reduction in the number of industries reserved for the public sector,
liberalisation of corporate access to foreign technology, phased elimination of import and
export controls, and phased reduction in import duties (from an average of around 100 %
in 1991 to about a third of this by 2000 - 2001). There was a rationalisation of taxes and
duties and the government also stepped up investment in infrastructure. The economy's
response to liberalisation and structural adjustment appears to have been quite effective
(Jain, 1996). Private FDI has risen remarkably in both manufacturing and services
industries. Foreign collaboration approvals were around 1600 during 1991-1995,
compared to around 700 in 1980-1990. In June 2000, the Government replaced the Foreign
Exchange Regulations Act (FERA) of 1973 with the Foreign Exchange Management Act
(FEMA), which simpliﬁed foreign exchange regulations and made capital transactions
easier. This constituted a major change, as FERA had been instituted in a wave of
nationalism to reduce foreign control over the economy. In the early 2000s, the Indian
economy seemed to have ﬁnally taken off (See Tables 3.1—3.2 for economic data).
Between 2003 and 2006 growth averaged 8.4%. The IT sector has enjoyed solid growth as
US and European companies aggressively outsourced services that extend beyond call
centres to higher value-added activities. Reforms provided the momentum for a major
reduction of the role of the public sector in the economy, a degree of deregulation, and
greater integration of India’s economy into international markets. The result has been a
shift from India’s traditional annual GDP growth rates of around 3.5 % to a much faster
growth trajectory resulting in 9% in 2008.
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Table 3.1 Economic indicators: India
 Year (Fiscat'J-ear begn‘ts Aprii I) 2002—3003 2003—2004 3004—3005 3005—2006 3006—200?
GDP (Sb) 508 596 693 806 923
Real GDP growth (3'6) 3.? 8.4 8.3 9.2 9.4
Consumer price inﬂation (3'21) 4.3 3.8 3 .8 4.2 6.2
Population (111} 1034 1049 1065 1080 1095*
Exports of goods ($0) 51 61 78 102 122
Imports of good (Sh) 41 46 —106 —149 —186
Current account balance ($19) 7.1 8.8 0.8 —7.8 —10.0
Foreign exchange reserves ($13)“ 68 99 127‘ 132 171
Total external debt ($b) 105 1 13 124 123 130
Debt-service ratio (”t-b) 17.3 18.8 13.7 149* 79*
Exchange rate (avg) RsS 48.6 46.6 45.3 44.1 45.3
 
*Estimates **Excluding gold
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 2007
Table 3.2 Sectoral growth rate: Indian economy
2004—2005 2005—.2006 2006—2-00?
Agiiculmre 0.0 6.0 2.7
Industr}r 9.8 9.6 10.0
Mining 7.5 3.6 4.5
Manufacuiring , 8.? 9. 1 1 1 .3
Electricity= gas and water supply 7.5 5.3 7.7
Construction 14.1 14.2 9.4
Sen-ices ' 9.6 9.8 11.2
Trade, hotels, transport and communications 10.9 10.4 13.0
Financial, real estate and business sewices 8. 7 10.9 11.1
Community. social and personal services 7.9 7.7 7.8
 
Source: Government of India (2007)
3.5 Investment climate
In terms of attracting FDI, India ranks second in the world according to AT Kearney’s
2005 FDI Conﬁdence Index. UNCTAD’S World Investment Report, 2005 had also
suggested that India is considered as the second most attractive FDI destination among
multinationals. Local regulations are continually evolving as the Government gradually
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liberalises the economy to make the business environment more investor friendly. For
some investments there is an automatic investment approval with up to 100% foreign
ownership, which simply requires that the Reserve Bank of India be notiﬁed within 30
days of inward remittances of investment funds and the company ﬁle appropriate
documents within 30 days of issuing stock to foreign investors. For others, depending on
the level of foreign ownership sought, approvals are needed from government departments
such as the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) or ministries that oversee speciﬁc
industries, such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, whose permission is
needed to set up an FM radio station (Government of India, 2006).
Investment is prohibited in a few industries: retail trading (except single brand trading),
atomic energy, lottery and gambling. In other industries, foreign ownership is allowed to
varying degrees: up to 26%, 49%, 74% or 100% (Government of India, 2007). (See Table
3.3 for more information).
Table 3.3 Level of foreign ownership allowed in different Indian industries
 Level qfforeign
own21'5th allow-"ed Iridmtﬁes
None allowed Retail industry (except single brand retailing), atomic energy, gambling
Up to 269%: Broadcasting, print media, defence, insurance, petroleum and gas
Up to 493-3 Cable networks, airlines, telecom services, infrastructure
Up to 74% Development of existing airports, ISPs, satellites, single brand retailing
Up to 100%-b Development ofnew airports, wholesale trade, coal mining, courier
services, power trading
Source: Government of India (2007)
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3.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment
The government liberalised the laws of foreign investment and established two routes for
approval: one through the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, and the other through
the newly created Foreign Investment Promotion Board. As a result of the liberalisation
policies, India has attracted FDI inﬂows from most of the developed countries as exhibited
in Table 3.5. The country-wise FDI inﬂows to India are dominated by Mauritius (34.49 %),
followed by the United States (17.08 %) and Japan (7.33 %). A useful view of the future of
FDI ﬂows is provided by AT. Kearney’s FDI Conﬁdence Index, which tracks the impact
of likely political, economic and regulatory changes on the foreign direct investment
intentions and preferences of CEOs, CFOs and corporate strategists of the leading
companies around the world (Kearney, 2005). In 2007, they ranked India as the second
most attractive FDI location in the world as shown in (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: Foreign Direct Investment Conﬁdence Index, 2007
Country Rating (1) Ranking
China 2.21 1
India , . 2.09 2
United States 1.86 3
United Kingdom 1.81 4
Hong Kong SAR 1.78 5
Singapore 1.75 7
Germany 1.70 10
Australia 1.68 11
France 1.67 13
Source: FDI Conﬁdence Index, AT. Kearney, December 2007.
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Table 3.5 Share of top investing countries in FDI inﬂows (August 1991 to November
2004) Amount in rupees crores (Millions of US$)
 
 
Rank Country August 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Total percent-1991 to (up to Nov.) inflows age of
March 2000 total
Inflows
1 Mauritius 13,272 4,111 10,063 3,766 2,609 3,730 37,551 34.49
(3,608) (942) (2,182) (788) (567) (811) (8,898)
2 USA 8,956 1,544 1,748 1,504 1,658 2,401 17,811 17.08(2.450) (356) (332) (319) (360) (522) (4,389)
3 Japan 3,314 977 809 1,971 360 466 7,897 7.33
(898) (224) (178) (412) (78) (101) (1,891)
4 Netherlands 2,260 706 890 836 2,247 906 7,845 7.16
(628) (162) (196) (176) (489) (197) (1,847)
5 UK 2,286 303 1,673 1,617 769 361 7,009 6.56
(670) (70) (366) (340) (167) (78) (1,692)
6 Germany 2.396 540 519 684 373 553 5.066 4.86
(672) (123) (113) (144) (81) (120) (1,254)
7 France 1,002 455 499 534 176 165 2,822 2.63
(280) (104) (108) (112) (38) (36) (679)
8 South Korea 2.094 90 5 188 110 115 2,601 2.64
(572) (21) (1 ) (39) (24) (25) (682)
9 Singapore 1.244 502 251 180 172 225 2,573 2.48
(344) (117) (54) (38) (37) (49) (639)
10 Switzerland 948 71 180 437 207 287 2,130 2.04
(269) (16) (40) (93) (45) (62) (525)
TOTAL FDI INFLOWS " 60,604 12,645 19,361 14,932 12,117 11,726 1,31,385 -
(16,701) (2,908) (4,222) (3,134) (2,634) (2,549) (32,290)
Source :SIA, FDI Data Cell, Ministry of Commerce 3 Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotlon.Note : ‘ Includes Inflows under NRI Schemes of RBI, stock swapped and advances pending issue of shares.   
Investment opportunities are emerging in both manufacturing and services sectors. The
infrastructure sectors such as roads, ports, tele—communication and power present immense
opportunities for foreign investors.
3.6 Growth of services sector
As this research focuses speciﬁcally on service sector MNEs from Australia doing business
in India, it is pertinent to present a brief overview of the service sector’s development in
India. The central importance of services to India’s current economic expansion is well
recognised. Whereas the East Asian economies” success has largely been built on the
development of export-oriented manufacturing, India’s recent growth has been led by the
dynamism of its services sector — particularly high-end, knowledge-intensive services
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exports. Services have consistently grown at a faster pace than the economy as a whole
since 1991, when the reform effort was initiated. They now occupy some 60 % of India’s
GDP, based on the WTO deﬁnition of services which includes construction.
Manufacturing, by contrast, has maintained a stubbornly static share in the economy at
around 20 %, while that of agriculture has dwindled. Productivity growth in India, unlike
virtually all other regions of the world, has been strongest in services (IMF 2006). Figure
l
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3.3 displays how the services sector gained the share of the economy since 1991.
Figure 3.3 Increasing share of services sector in India
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Broadly speaking, the better performing services sub-sectors either have not been subject
to significant amounts of regulation (notably IT—ITES) or have been deregulated and
opened up to competition (most prominently, telecommunications and domestic air travel).
Increased
inward investment ﬂows stemming from a relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment
and particular inducements such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have helped underpin
the performance of some of the faster growing services sectors.
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Knowledge-based industries have been prominent among the fastest growing services. The
relative lack of regulation and modest capital requirements in these industries have enabled
them to capitalise on the advantages of a low—cost, educated workforce, technological
advances and widespread English language capabilities. The rapid expansion of the export-
oriented IT—ITES sector is well recognised, but several other key services are also growing
strongly, including telecommunications, ﬁnancial services, consulting services, private
healthcare, and biotechnology services. Reform measures within these ‘enabling’ sub-
sectors vary considerably, although most services have been, and remain, less regulated by
comparison with manufacturing. Australian companies also have signiﬁcant expertise that
could augment India’s capabilities or meet India’s needs. Relevant areas include
infrastructure development and related consultancy services; information technology;
telecommunications; ﬁnancial services; tourism and travel-related services; ﬁlm and
television; sports and related infrastructure, healthcare services; biotechnology; mining
services; retail and logistics; and legal and accountancy services (Economic Analytical
Unit, DFAT, 2007). The growing FDI in services is concentrated in a few sectors as shown
in Figure 3.4
Figure 3.4 Breakdown of FDI inﬂows in Indian services industry
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According to the Reserve Bank of India’s Annual Report 2007-2008, the services sector
continued to record double digit growth. The reforms process and liberalisation of the
Indian economy set the stage for the business environment in which the MNEs operate in
India. The next section highlights the business environment in India from an institutional
perspective.
3.7 Business environment in India - An institutional perspective
This section analyses the Indian business environment from an institutional perspective
and explains the dynamics of the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive environment
in India. As stated in the previous chapter on the literature review, the three ‘pillars of the
institutional framework’ provide a broad basis to differentiate aspects of countries’
institutional proﬁle (Kostova, 1998; Busenitz, 2000) and of institutional distance (Kostova
and Roth, 2002). Institutions are complex and interlocking sets of beliefs, values, norms,
rules and laws concerning what is appropriate behaviour in a given context and the
contextual factors include all those elements of the environment that impact upon the
performance of a ﬁrm and include both the formal (regulatory) and the informal
(normative and cultural—cognitive) institutions (Scott, 1995).
3.7.1 Regulatory Environment in India
Historically, the regulatory environment in India has not been conducive to promoting
business activity (e.g.. Das 2001; Kumar, 2000). Indian ﬁrms as well as foreign investors
faced a multitude of restrictions that constricted the pace of economic activity. As stated in
section 3.3 of this chapter, during the 19605 and the 19705 the Indian economy grew at an
abysmal rate of 3-3.5%, a rate that came to be pejoratively labelled as the "Hindu rate of
growth." Economic reforms began in India with some earnest in 1991 when the country
faced a severe balance of payments crisis. Restrictions on foreign investors were eased.
Although some progress has undoubtedly been made by streamlining procedures and
making the environment more business friendly, analysts note that the pace of reform has
nevertheless been slow (e.g., Ferguson, 2002; Pearl, 2000). As Ferguson (2002:47) notes,
"India's post 199l-liberalization has sped along at the pace of the glacier. At times, such as
now, the glacier has played hare to India's turtle. To foreign observers the nation can
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sometimes seem paralysed, unable to move forward and in danger of stumbling
backwards". The key implication of this is that while change may be afoot in India, change
is not proceeding at a rate fast enough to cope with the imperatives of a globalising world.
Several observers have noted that policy implementation is a major problem in the political
and bureaucratic culture of India (Ruﬁn et al., 2003; Weiner, 1985). Implementation is
either slow, inconsistent, or bogged down as bureaucrats seek to iron out all the wrinkles in
the new policy or argue about what the new policy actually means. There may also be a
delay between the time that the policy is formulated and the time that it is implemented due
to slow or ineffective communication. Compounding the problem is the fact that there are
few incentives for bureaucrats to display bold, innovative behaviour. The fact that Indians
do not work well as part of a larger group only exacerbates the problems of policy
implementation (Das, 2001; Gupta, 2002). Bureaucratic inﬁghting, which is a
commonplace feature in India, has slowed down the timely and meaningful formulation
and/or implementation of policy (Saez, 1998).
Although India does have a functioning judicial system, its efﬁciency and effectiveness
have also been called into question by observers (Bhamch, 1998). Delays are an endemic
feature of the system. Ferguson (2002) notes that the Indian judiciary has been considering
the possibility of allowing foreign law ﬁrms to open liaison ofﬁces in India, but several
years have gone by and there is as yet no indication that the issue will be resolved any time
SOOI].
3.7.2 Normative Dimension
The normative dimension highlights the dominant societal values and beliefs that are
extant in a given society. Values and beliefs inﬂuence the way that individuals perceive the
world around them, i.e. they shape their mindset. Organisational and cross-cultural
scholars have begun to document the pervasive impact of values and beliefs on how
individuals in different cultures conceive of the social reality (e.g., Hofstede, 2001;
Triandis, 1995). While cultural values are by no means immutable, and while there may
well be intracultural variation, there is an impressive body of evidence demonstrating the
impact of culture (Barkema et a1., 1996; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001)
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The discussion about the normative dimension in India is organised around three sets of
issues, namely (a) the Indian mode of thinking; (b) dominant behavioural patterns; and (c)
perceptions of justice. These three issues were chosen because they encapsulate the key
aspects of culture that are particularly relevant for studying IB. Culture has been deﬁned
by Hofstede (2001:9) as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one group or category of people from another". Implicit in this deﬁnition is the
idea that culture inﬂuences how we perceive the world, how we behave, and the standards
that we use for assessing the fairness of a particular outcome.
3.7.2.1 Indian Mode of Thinking
Psychologists have drawn a distinction between a holistic versus an analytic mode of
thinking (Nisbett et. al., 2001). A holistic way of thinking is an experiential mode of
thinking which seeks to reconcile multiple perspectives. Analytical thought, by contrast,
separates the object from its context and relies on formal logic in deriving propositions. A
number of scholars have noted that the Indian way of thinking is analytical rather than
holistic in character (Lannoy, 1971; Nakamura, 1964). This suggests, ﬁrst of all, that there
is a general tendency among Indians to strive to solve problems through the use of logic
rather than relying on ﬁnding some common middle ground. Reliance on logic as the
governing principle is only natural because the actors will have sought to obtain the best
possible solution and not the solution that may be more easily attainable (Kumar, 2004). A
related implication is that this mode of thinking fosters never ending debate and
argumentation. Individuals ﬁnd it all too easy to ﬁnd ﬂaws in the other actors' argument in
their search for a mythical ideal that in practice is all but impossible to attain. Although
analytical thinking is widespread even within the West, what makes the Indian approach
somewhat distinct is an uncompromising approach to problem solving that is rather
expansive in nature. In other words, aspiration levels are rather high, shaped as they are, by
a grandiose approach to problem solving (Nakamura, 1964) that may only be imperfectly
related to empirical reality.
An analytical mode of thinking also fosters a strong moralistic orientation towards problem
solving. If the logical solution is indeed the ideal solution then by the same token it also
represents a principled solution, deviations from which would not be acceptable.
Consistent with this, theorists point out that Indians tend to be highly moralistic in problem
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solving (Cohen, 1997; England, Dhingra and Agarwal 1974; Sinha and Kanungo, 1997).
Logical solutions tend to be seen from the prism of morality that imbues rationality with an
affective element. In other words, the most logical solution is also the one which generates
considerable emotional commitment.
This is a deductive mode of theorising in which experiential knowledge has a lesser status
compared to knowledge derived on the basis of logical principles (Nisbett et al., 2001). A
major consequence of this is that the decision makers are unlikely to engage in experiments
even when experimentation may well be a prelude to learning. While it is undoubtedly true
that not all experiments lead to learning and that people may learn incorrectly, it is likewise
the case that without experimentation, opportunities for learning may be missed.
Exploratory learning (Levinthal and March 1993) may well be a major casualty here.
3.7.2.2 Dominant Behavioural Patterns
Sinha and Kanungo (1997) note that while Indians may be collectivistic, this collectivism
goes hand in hand with a strong individualistic streak. The idea that Indians may embody
both individualistic as well as collectivistic tendencies, which may be manifested
differently in different contexts, is gaining increasing acceptance in the literature on Indian
organisational behaviour (e.g., Chatterjee and Pearson, 2000; Deme 2000; Roland, 1988;
Sinha and Kanungo, 1997). Conventional wisdom says that Indians exhibit a collectivistic
self when they interact with their family members, but exhibit an individualistic self when
interacting with non—family members (Sinha et.al., 2002). While it is true that collectivistic
societies draw a sharp distinction between members and non-members of the group and
behave differently when interacting with a member of the group as opposed to a non-
member, some scholars maintain that individualistic tendencies may well be present even
in interaction with group members (Das, 2001 ).
These conﬂicting behavioural tendencies have a number of implications. First, they
suggest that, while personal relationships may be important in India, as they are in other
collectivistic societies, they may not be as resilient as may well be the case in other
collectivistic societies (Kumar, 2000). Trust among individuals may be based more on
cognition than on emotion (McCallister, 1995) and may be more fragile than resilient
(Ring and Van De Ven, 1992).
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Scholars have also been quick to point out that the Indian temporal orientation is oriented
towards the past rather then the present or the future (Gopalan and Rivera, 1997; Saha,
1992). Past achievements are valued whereas present and future achievements are devalued
since India has already passed through its ”golden period." A key implication of this line of
thinking is that Indians may often be passive in coping with the external environment. In a
study of Indian civilization, Nakamura (1964) noted that while Indians were prone to
excessive fantasising, they were much more reluctant to act upon their fantasies. The
notion of Indian passivity was also highlighted recently in a study of problem solving
approaches used by Indian and German students (Strohschneider and Gusch, 1999). The
authors assessed how the students in these cultures would resolve a complex computer
simulated interactive problem. One key ﬁnding in this study was that the Indian
participants, unlike their German counterparts, were not proactive enough and/or
responsive enough to the problem at hand. As Strohschneider and Gusch (1999: 249) note,
"they are more likely to ignore key aspects of the scenario, rely on a purely feedback-
controlled strategy, make decisions without having the necessary information available,
fail to adapt their interventions to changing circumstances, and forget about effect control".
3.7.2.3 Perceptions of Justice
Organisational scholars note that perceptions ofjustice are critical in shaping relationships
among individuals as well as the level of satisfaction of individuals with the organisation
(e.g., Brockner and Wiesenfleld, 1996; Tyler, 1994). Theorists have drawn a distinction
between two different types of justice, namely distributive and procedural. Distributive
justice refers to the perceived fairness of the outcomes, whereas procedural justice refers to
the process through which outcome allocation occurs and/or disputes are resolved. The
former refers to the way that the decisions are made while the latter deﬁnes the way that
individuals are treated. Procedural justice has both a structural as well as an interpersonal
component.
It is now recognised that justice norms vary across cultures (Leung and Bond, 1984). A
major ﬁnding in the literature has been that in individualistic societies the equity principle
is the preferred principle for distributive justice, whereas in collectivistic societies it is
need or the equality principle that is the operative norm. Studies conducted within the
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Indian cultural context have clearly highlighted the importance of need or the equality
principle in India (Murphy-Berman et al, 1985; Krishnan, 1987). A study conducted by
Pillai, Williams, and Tan (2001) suggests that distributive justice concerns may be more
important than procedural justice concerns in India. The idea that distributive justice
concerns are salient in the Indian sociocultural context is also illustrated in a study of
Chinese and Indian preschool children conducted by Rao and Stewart (1999). The authors
found that the Indian children, relative to their Chinese counterparts, were much less
inclined to engage in spontaneous sharing. The interpretation is that spontaneous sharing
did not occur because of a reluctance to share resources in a cultural context where scarcity
is ever so prevalent. In India, the interpretation and implementation of the law could create
legal challenges which a western MNE might be completely unfamiliar with and therefore
they will need to exercise caution when engaging with the legal system.
3.7.3 Cognitive Dimension
The cognitive dimension, which highlights the implicit assumptions governing economic
activity, has two major components, namely (a) the valuation of economic activity; and (b)
the attitudes towards business people, and foreign investors in particular. Business activity
has traditionally not been highly valued in India (Chaudhari, 1985). This is mainly a
product of the Brahmanical worldview, which holds that the deepest level of reality is non-
material (Embree, 1989; Jain and Kussman, 1994). The most important goal is to attain
liberation, or moksha, from rebirth, which is attained through the purity of one's actions.
Wealth maximisation (artha) may be important, but its importance is only transient and
work has traditionally been valued less, relative to leisure (Garg and Parikh, 1995).
It may be argued that some of these values may be in the midst of transition as a
consequence of globalisation, technological changes, and economic reforms which began
in 1991. While there is merit in this argument, and changes may well be underway, it needs
to be understood that while values do change, the change is not necessarily rapid or
irreversible. The more central a given set of values is, the greater the possibility that this is
likely to be true.
Although there is scope for debate about the valuation of economic activity in modem day
India, there is little debate about the scepticism with which Indians View foreign
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investment and foreign investors. The predominantly negative attitude towards foreign
investments stem, to a great extent, from India's colonial legacy. The negative attitude
towards foreign investors has been reinforced in modem day India by some well-publicised
disputes between the Indian government and foreign investors. A high proﬁle public
dispute between the state government of Maharashtra and the now bankrupt energy
producer Enron is one salient example. While formal barriers towards direct foreign
investment have been reduced, there are continuing concerns about transparency and the
vigour with which the new laws are being implemented. Analysts note that second
generation reforms are meeting resistance from workers and domestic businesses in India,
which may well explain why the government is taking small steps that at times are
contradictory (Pearl, 2000). Majumder (2002) notes that xenophobia has shaped Indian
policy making towards direct foreign investment.
The next section highlights the level of economic freedom present in India and compares it
with Australia based on the ﬁndings of The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage
Foundation’s 2009 Index of Economic Freedom.
3.8 Economic Freedom - Comparison of Australia and India
In this section, a comparison has been made between Australia and India based on the
Index of Economic Freedom, an annual guide published by The Wall Street Journal and
The Heritage Foundation which outlines the level of economic freedom present to do
business in 183 countries. This index measures ten components of economic freedom,
assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum
freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom
score for each country. The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom,
Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Size, Monetary Freedom, Investment
Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption and Labour
Freedom. The scores of Australia and India are shown in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6 Comparison of Economic Freedom for Australia and India according to The
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal
 
 
——-—- '
Trade Freedom 84.8 5]
Fiscal Freedom 61.4 73.8
Government size 64.3 77.8
Monetary Freedom 84.7 69.3
Investment Freedom 80 30
Financial Freedom 90 40
Property Rights 90 50
Freedom from Corruption 86 35
Labour Freedom 94.7 62.3   
Source: 2009 Index of Economic Freedom
The overall economic freedom score for Australia is 82.6 and for India it is 54.4 as
indicated in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 Economic Freedom Score
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A comparative analysis of these ten components of economic freedom in respect of
Australia and India is given below to set the context for the next section on the ease of
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doing business in India. This evaluation is compiled from the information available from
the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom and presented in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 Comparative analysis of Australia and India based on the ten components of
economic freedom
 
  
Economic Australia India
Freedom
Business Overall freedom to start, operate, Overall freedom to start, operate,
Freedom and close a business is strongly and close a business remains
protected under Australia's restricted by India's regulatory
regulatory environment. Starting a environment. Starting a business
business takes only two days, takes an average of 30 days,
compared to the world average of compared to the world average of
38. Obtaining a business license 38 days. Obtaining a business
requires less than the global license requires about the world
average of 18 procedures and 225 average of 18 procedures and 225
days. Closing a business is very days. Bankruptcy procedures are
easy. difﬁcult.
Trade Weighted average tariff rate was Weighted average tariff rate was
Freedom 2.6 % in 2006. Stringent sanitary 14.5 % in 2005. Large differences measures, a burdensome quarantineregime, subsidies and other supportprograms for agriculture andmanufacturing products, somebarriers to trade in services, andstate trading of wheat and otheragriculture products raise the costof trade. Ten points were deductedfrom Australia's trade freedomscore to account for non-tariff  between bound and applied tariffrates, import and export restrictions,services market access restrictions,import taxes and fees, complex andnon—transparent regulation, onerousstandards and certiﬁcations,discriminatory sanitary andphytosanitary measures, restrictivelicensing, domestic bias ingovernment procurement,
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 barriers. problematic enforcement of
intellectual property rights, export
subsidies, inadequate infrastructure,
counter—trade policies, and complex
and non-transparent customs add to
the cost of trade. Twenty points
were deducted from India's trade
freedom score to account for non-
tariff barriers.
 Fiscal
Freedom
Moderate corporate tax rate and a
high income tax rate that continues
to be reduced. The top corporate
tax rate remains 30 %. The top
income tax rate is 45 %, down from
47 % as of July 1, 2007. Additional
income tax cuts will be phased in
gradually starting July 1, 2008,
with a goal of reaching 42 % by
July 2010. Other taxes include a
goods and services tax (GST), and
an excise tax. In the most recent
year, overall tax revenue as a %age
of GDP was 30.5 %.
Tax rates are high. The top income
and corporate tax rates are 33.99 %
(30 % plus a 10 % surcharge and a 3
% education tax on that total). Other
taxes include a value-added tax
(VAT), a dividend tax, and a tax on
insurance contracts. In the most
recent year, overall tax revenue as a
%age of GDP was 17.7 %.
  Governmentsize  The total government expenditures,including consumption and transferpayments, are moderate. In themost recent year,spending equalled 34.5 % of GDP.government  The total government expenditures,including consumption and transferpayments, are moderate. In the mostrecent year, government spendingequalled 27.2 % of GDP. The statestill plays a major role in over 200public-sector enterprises.
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Monetary Inﬂation is very moderate, Inﬂation is moderately high,
Freedom averaging 2.7 % between 2005 and averaging 6.1 % between 2005 and
2007. The government does not 2007. The government subsidises
impose national price controls on agricultural, gas, and kerosene
goods, but states retain the power to production; applies factory,
impose their own controls, although wholesale, and retail price controls
the range of goods actually subject on “essential” commodities, 25
to control is diminishing as crops, services, electricity, water,
competition reforms are some petroleum products, and
implemented. Retail gas and certain types of coal; and controls
electricity prices are regulated, the prices of 74 bulk drugs that
causing 5 points to be deducted cover 40 % of the market. Another
from Australia's monetary freedom 354 drugs are to be brought under
score. controls by a new pharmaceutical
policy. Domestic price and
marketing arrangements apply to
commodities like sugar and certain
cereals. Fifteen points were
deducted from India’s monetary
freedom score to account for
policies that distort domestic prices.
Investment Foreign and domestic investors Foreign direct investment is limited
Freedom receive equal treatment. Proposals by law. Foreign investment is to start new businesses with aninvestment of A$10 million ormore must be reported to thegovernment, which accepts most ofthese proposals routinely but mayreject those it deems inconsistentwith the “national interest.” Foreign  prohibited in most real estate,retailing, legal services, agriculture,and railways.security services,Procedures do not discriminateagainst foreign companies in sectorswhere licensing is required, butcertain industries are subject to
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 investment banking,
shipping, real
in media,
airlines, airports,
estate, and telecommunications is
subject to limitations. Foreign
investors may own land, subject to
a number of restrictions. Residents
and non-residents have access to
foreign exchange and may conduct
international payments and capital
transactions. There are no controls
on capital repatriation. Private
property can be expropriated for
public purposes in accordance with
established
international law, and
principles of
compensation is paid.
export obligations and local content
requirements. Bureaucracy is non-
transparent, potentially corrupt, and
burdensome. Residents need central
bank approval to open foreign
currency accounts domestically or
abroad. Non-residents may hold
conditional foreign exchange and
domestic currency accounts. Capital
transactions and some credit
operations are subject to restrictions
and requirements.
  FinancialFreedom  Well-developed and highlycompetitive ﬁnancial sectorprovides a wide range of productsand services through advancedbanking,industries. Government regulationinsurance, and equityof banks is minimal, and foreignbanks,subsidiaries, offer a full range oflicensed as branches orbanking operations. As of October2007, Australia had 55 licensedﬁnancial institutions: 14Australian-owned banks and 41banks. Anadditional 20 foreign banks haveforeign-ownedmaintained representative ofﬁces.  Financial sector includes 28 state-owned banks (which control about71 % of commercial banking), 29private banks, and 31 foreign banks.Access to ﬁnancial services variessharply around the country. Highcredit costs and scarce access toﬁnancing still impede developmentof the private sector. Foreign banksaccount for about 8% of totalcommercial bank assets. Along withother restrictions, foreign banksoperating in India may not directlyor indirectly retain more than a 5 %equity stake in a domestic privatebank. The insurance sector is
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 Though it has regulatory power to
set lending policies and interest
rates, the central bank has not
exerted this authority since the
deregulation of ﬁnancial markets in
the 1980s. There are no
government-owned banks, and
banks are highly
Foreign insurance companies are
competitive.
permitted, and regulation is focused
on capital adequacy, solvency, and
prudential behaviour. With 1,900
entities listed and their total market
capitalization of over $900 billion,
the Australian Stock Exchange is
the world's eighth largest.
partially liberalised. Capital markets
are relatively well developed, and
the stock market is one of Asia's
largest, but foreign participation
remains limited.
  PropertyRights  Property rights are well protected.The government respects theindependence of the judiciary.Protection of intellectual propertyrights meets or exceeds worldstandards. Contracts are secure andgovernment expropriation is highlyunusual. The rule of law is seen asfundamental to the functioning ofgovernment, and enforcement iseven-handed.  Because of large backlogs, courtstake years to reach decisions, andforeign corporations often resort tointernational arbitration. Protectionof property for local investors isweak, and protection of intellectualproperty rights is problematic.Proprietary test results and otherdata about patented productssubmitted to the government byforeign pharmaceutical companieshave been used by domesticcompanies without any legalpenalties.
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 Freedom
from
Corruption
Corruption is perceived as minimal.
Australia ranks 11th out of 179
countries in Transparency
Intemational’s Corruption
Perceptions Index for 2007 and the
government actively promote
international efforts to curb the
bribing of foreign ofﬁcials.
Corruption is perceived as
signiﬁcant. India ranks 72nd out of
179 countries in Transparency
Intemational's Corruption
Perceptions Index for 2007.
Corruption continues to be a major
concern, especially in government
procurement of
andtelecommunications, power,
defence contracts.
  LabourFreedom  market underﬂexiblethatLabourhighlyregulations operatesemploymentenhanceandemployment creationproductivity growth. The non-salary cost of employing a workercan be moderate, and dismissing aredundant employee is costless.  India's informal economy remains alarge, source of employment. Thenon-salary cost of employing aworker is moderate, but dismissinga redundant employee is costly. Thedifﬁculty of laying off a workerjobcreates a disincentive forcreation creation.
Source: 2009 Index of Economic Freedom
The differences outlined above are signiﬁcant to imply that the business environment in
Australia and India is considerably different suggesting that Australian MNEs are most
likely to face challenges in the regulatory and cultural domain in India. The next section
will assess the World Bank Report (2007) on the ease of doing business in India.
3.9 Ease of doing business
The World Bank ranks India 134 out of 175 countries in terms of ease of doing business
(World Bank, 2007). Comparative data are provided in Table 3.8 for BRIC and includes
Singapore and the USA as these two nations provide one of the most hospitable business
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environments. Of the twelve areas in which countries are ranked India does especially
poorly in ease of dealing with licenses, tax payments, international trade, contract
enforcement, closing a business, hiring workers and property registration. An area in which
it does well is investor protection, for which it is ranked 33. It takes much longer to register
a new company in India than in most countries; as much as 35 days in Mumbai (52 days in
New Delhi), but this is a great improvement over the previous year when it took 71 days
(World Bank, 2007). An example of the regulatory challenges is the time taken to complete
the 20 or so procedures necessary to obtain licenses to set up a warehouse, which can take
between 159 days (in the city of Bhubaneshwar) to 522 days (in Ranchi) depending on the
location (World Bank, 2007). An important constraint is regulations pertaining to
employment, especially difﬁculty in ﬁring workers, which requires state government
approval. Companies have to pay 56 weeks wages to lay off workers, compared to 31
weeks in the OECD. It is more difﬁcult for companies with greater than 100 workers to lay
off workers. Furthermore, companies have to deal with the complexity of labour laws that
sometimes conﬂict with each other. The number of laws and regulations is inordinately
large — 47 at the national level and 157 at the state level (World Bank, 2007).
Table 3.8 Comparative ranking by World Bank on ease of doing business 2007
 Item India China Russia Brazil USA Singapore
Overall rank 134 93 96 1’21 3 1
Starting a business 88 138 33 115 3 11
Dealing with licenses 155 153 163 139 22 8
Employing workers 1 1 2 318 S 7 99 1 3
Registering property 110 21 44 1'24 10 12
Getting credit 65 101 159 83 '1‘ 7
Protecting investors 33 83 6D 60 5 2
Paying taxes 158 168 98 151 62 8
Trading across borders 139 38 143 53 1 1 4
Enforcing contracts 1 73 63 25 120 6 23
Closing a business 133 75 81 13 5 16 2.
 
Source: World Bank (2007)
76
Many great investment opportunities are coupled with signiﬁcant challenges and India is
no exception. According to the Global Competitiveness Report (2008- 2009) of the World
Economic Forum, the most problematic factors for doing business in India included
inadequate infrastructure, government bureaucracy, corruption, restrictive labour
regulations and tax regulations (See Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6 The most problematic factors for doing business in India
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3.10 Conclusion
India has turned the corner as a destination for FDI. The reform process initiated by the
government of India since 1991 has contributed to the increased inﬂows of FDI by creating
the enabling conditions needed for MNEs to operate productively. However, just like other
emerging market economies, there are many challenges faced by MNEs when doing
business in India and these have been identiﬁed in this chapter. An institutional
perspective of the Indian business environment was developed to explain the dynamics of
the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive dimensions and these three pillars of the
institutional framework (Scott, 1995) were adopted to set the context in which businesses
are required to operate in India.
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At the regulatory level, bureaucratic bottlenecks seem to affect business decisions. The
Indian legal system is based on common law, but the interpretation and implementation of
the law could create legal challenges for MNEs. The normative dimension suggests that the
Indian mode of thinking and the dominant behaviour patterns are quite different from those
in the developed countries and could therefore be a potential source of management
challenge. At the cognitive level it can be summarised that a predominantly negative
attitude towards foreign investments probably arose from India's colonial legacy and to a
certain extent this explains why the government has been slow in introducing reforms.
Following this analysis, a comparison was drawn between Australia and India in terms of
the economic freedom present in both countries to assess the differences and similarities
between the two countries and ﬁnally this chapter concluded with a discussion on the ease
of do business in India. The question of how Australian service sector MNEs respond to
these institutional challenges following their initial entry into India, an emerging economy,
will be the main focus of this exploratory study. The methodological considerations for this
study are outlined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this exploratory study is to investigate the institutional challenges faced by
Australian service MNEs in the Indian business environment and examine the strategies
they adopt to effectively overcome their liability of foreignness (LOF). The previous
chapter reviewed the literature on institutional theory and emerging markets and outlined
the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive challenges ﬁrms face in an emerging
market context. Four propositions aimed at answering the research questions emerged from
the review of literature. The focus of this chapter will be to select a research approach that
would allow for sufﬁcient and appropriate data to be collected and analysed. The ﬁrst part
of this chapter establishes the appropriateness of the use of qualitative research to answer
the research questions raised in this study. In particular it shows how a comparative,
qualitative case study approach is able to provide insights into the challenges that impact
on the operations of a MNE in an emerging economy. The second part of the chapter
provides details about the research design and an explanation of data collection and
analysis.
4.2 Qualitative Research Methods
Van Maanen (1983: 9) has explained qualitative methods as procedures for ‘coming to
terms with the meaning not the frequency’ of an observable fact by studying it in its natural
setting or social context. Early contribution on ﬁrms’ internationalisation processes, such
as the Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) and regional management (Daniels
1986), typically drew upon a range of techniques, including qualitative methods, in order
to generate theory and new insights. This study aims to generate new insights into
managing operations successfully in an emerging market context by overcoming the LOF
with regards to the institutional challenges. Marschan—Piekkari and Welch (2004) have
highlighted certain arguments in favour of qualitative research proposing that international
business requires more exploratory and theory generating research rather than empirical
testing because it lacks the sophisticated theory development of an established discipline
and that qualitative research is lesslikely to suffer from cultural bias of the researcher
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compared with survey instruments used in quantitative studies (Osland and Osland 2001;
Wright 1996).
When compared with quantitative methods, qualitative research takes a more holistic
approach (Stake, 1994) to the research object and studies a phenomenon in its context. In
this research the context is the emerging market (India) within which the strategies of
Australian MNEs will be studied to understand how they successfully manage their
operations. This study is consistent with the assertion of Vernon (1994: 144-145) that
‘some of the most proactive work of researchers has come from those who have
plumbed in depth the behaviour of individual ﬁrms, or the interplay of a limited cluster of
ﬁrms competing in a well-deﬁned product market’. In line with this view, this research
seeks to examine the behaviour of the Australian service MNEs in an institutionally distant
host country, India.
Marschan—Piekkari and Welch (2004: 8) have also noted that ‘qualitative research may be
preferable in developing countries, where the secondary data required for random samples
may be lacking and respondents may be unfamiliar with questionnaires, and in those
cultures in which particular emphasis is placed upon the development of social, face-to—
face relations and trust’. As the context of this study is India, a developing country,
qualitative methods will therefore be more suited for this study.
Qualitative research goes beyond the measurement of observable behaviour (the ‘what’),
and aims to understand the meanings behind the action: the ‘why’ and ‘how’ (Yin 2003). It
can explain complex issues and provide answers to ‘messy’ problems that are typical for
international management research (Wright, 1996: 70). As Yin (2003:13-14) explicates,
case study inquiry ‘copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be
many more variables of interest than data points’. In such studies, concepts and variables
are difﬁcult to quantify since there are too many variables to be considered and this makes
experiment and survey methods inappropriate in such situations (Ghauri and Gronhaug
2002; Yin 1994). Other research approaches based on statistical and quantitative methods
may not capture the complete picture of factors that impact on ﬁrm performance (Yin,
2003). Most quantitative methods, such as surveys and experiments, propose certain
hypotheses, examine them in relation to data and derive some ﬁrm conclusions in the form
of probabilistic statements of likelihood (Orum et al., 1991). For example, an experiment
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deliberately isolates a phenomenon from its context, so that attention can be focused only
on certain variables. Similarly, although surveys may attempt to'deal with phenomenon
and context, their ability to investigate the context is said to be extremely limited (Yin,
2003: 13). This is in part because the questions on a random-sample survey are created in
advance by the survey researcher to measure dimensions of belief or action reported by
decontextualised respondents (Orum et al., 1991). Qualitative research is based on ‘a
holistic view that social phenomena, human dilemmas, and the nature of cases are
situational and inﬂuenced by happenings of many kinds’ (Stake, 1998: 91).
A qualitative approach is particularly valuable, where the kind of control present in the lab
is not feasible and not even justiﬁable (Yin, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). In this
study, the processes of interaction between the managers of MNEs and the internal and
external environment are set in the context of the emerging market environment, and
therefore require the collection of rich empirical material. A very important advantage of
qualitative data lies in the richness of its detailed understanding of reality. Zonabend
(1992) explains that such studies give a special attention to the complexities in analysis,
and that this analysis is achieved in a way that it incorporates the views of the "actors". The
question of how ﬁrms cope with the liability of foreignness is clearly a key element in this
study and requires an understanding of the process. Unlike the extensive research approach
of quantitative methods, intensive research uses qualitative methods for the purposes of
causal analysis. The interpretation of causal relationship in extensive research is based on
statistical association of formal properties. However, in intensive research these
interpretations are based on observable concrete interconnections between actual properties
and people (Stoecker, 1991). Yin (2003) highlights that when the research includes
answering “why” and “how” questions this will lead to a qualitative research, because such
questions deal with events that need to be linked rather than observed as mere frequencies
or incidence.
In view of the above discussion, qualitative research methods are the preferred choice to
address the research questions raised in this study. This study employs an inductive,
theory-building research design because the purpose of the research is to develop a better
theoretical understanding of the interplay between ﬁrms’ competence and the institutional
factors that inﬂuence operations in emerging markets. A theory-building orientation to
research allows unknown attributes and groupings to emerge and permits a better
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understanding of such complex phenomena as performance in emerging markets, hence
deliberately allowing for emergent hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989). Whereas traditional
hypothesis-testing research can limit “what can be learned from a project’ and researchers’
contribution to the body of literature, theory—building research can prevent preordained
theoretical perspectives or propositions from biasing and limiting the ﬁndings (Hitt et al.,
1998: 94). It has also been noted that relationships uncovered in the hard data can often
only be explained through the use of the soft data from theory-building research which
produces rich description (Mintzberg, 1979: 587).
Although there are advantages associated with the emergent approach to research, it can be
argued that a research project with no assumptions lacks clarity and focus and will
encounter difﬁculties. And so in line with Eisenhardt (1989), a research problem — why
and how some ﬁrms are more successful than others in an emerging market — was
formulated and potentially important factors that may inﬂuence strategy and successful
operations were speciﬁed with reference to existing literature. The review of pertinent
literature was used as a guide to identify a wide set of institutional practices that appear to
interact with the business environment in an emerging market to inﬂuence operational
performance.
4.2.1 Why Case Studies?
A case-based method was chosen for this study for several reasons. First, it provides a
level of in-depth scrutiny that survey methods omit, thus offering a prospect of new
insights into links among variables (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin,
2003). Second, we seek to address research questions that begin with the word “how” and
“why”. This type of question, with a focus on processes in naturally occurring events over
which a researcher has no control, is ideally suited to a case-based research strategy, with
primary data collection by observation and open—ended interview (Yin, 2003). The focus is
on contemporary phenomena within a real-life context and according to Yin (2003: 1), case
studies are generally “the preferred strategy
when “how” or “why” questions are being posed,
when the investigator has little control over events, and
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when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”.
The study seeks to address the key research question of ‘how MNEs respond to unfamiliar
institutional contexts and ‘how’ they navigate through the challenges thrown up in an
emerging market context. The phenomenon is the successful operations of the ﬁrm and the
context is the emerging market business environment. In such a complex phenomenon the
boundaries cannot be identiﬁed easily, due to the presence of several factors, both tangible
and intangible, that impact on a ﬁrm’s performance, more so when the ﬁrm is operating in
a new institutional environment and interacting with different stakeholders (i.e. local
competitors, government agencies and regulatory bodies). The choice of case study is
made because it is expected to advance our understanding of the research phenomenon
(Ghauri and Gronhaug 2002; Stake 1994). Therefore a case study’s holistic approach to the
complexities of action and meaning can offer two main advantages. First, the complexities
associated with the phenomenon of study within its context can be examined. Second,
researchers can discover complex sets of decisions and recount the effect of those
decisions over time. As discussed earlier, a case study is a useful method when the area of
research is relatively less known, and the researcher is engaged in theory-building types of
research. Eisenhardt (1989: 548—9) argues that case studies are:
“Particularly well-suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing
theory seems inadequate. This type ofwork is highly complementary to incremental theory
buildingfrom normal science research. The former is useful in early stages ofresearch on
a topic or when a ﬂesh perspective is needed, while the latter is useful in later stages of
knowledge development. ”
Since managing operations successfully in India, an emerging market, is a relatively less
known area of research, the case study method will be well suited to this study. In this
research, a fresh perspective is needed to understand the dynamics of achieving successful
operations in an emerging market and India offers a new context for this study. The nature
and context of the research problem favoured the adoption of a case study approach. The
strategies that new entrants adopt to manage their operations in an emerging market are
often too complex to study empirically. The strategic choice ﬁrms make on how to run
their overseas operations is driven by various elements of the business environment in the
host economy. These include the level of institutional development, the legal structure, the
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policy framework and the physical infrastructure. A crucial question for entrant ﬁrms
concerns the balance of advantage and disadvantage resulting from these factors in the host
location. It is this complexity that calls for a rich, in-depth case study into organisational
life, which incorporates relevant context. Yin (2003) also suggests that the case study
approach is appropriate if the researcher wants to cover contextual conditions that are
believed to be highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study. Similarly, Orum et al., (1991:
8) argue that the tools of qualitative research and the case study are appropriate when one
assumes that “belief or action removed from its immediate (personal and social) context is,
in one sense, no understandable action at all.’ Managing operations in an emerging market
involves complex processes among various stakeholders, therefore requiring close
examination of the impact of the institutional factors on beliefs and decisions of the
managers. A qualitative case study approach provides the opportunity to “‘get inside the
minds” of subjects and see the world from their point of view’ (Ticehurst and Veal, 2000:
20).
A case study is particularly well suited to international business research, where data is
collected from cross-border and cross-cultural settings. This is perhaps the most frequently
used approach for thesis and dissertation in international business research (Ghauri 2004)
because it provides excellent opportunities for respondents and researchers to check their
understanding and keep on asking questions until they obtain sufﬁcient answers and
interpretations. In-depth interviews are particularly suitable when a researcher wants to
understand the behaviour of decision-makers in different cultures.
Case studies have the potential to deepen our understanding of the research phenomenon.
Another strength of case studies is, as Yin (1994) has observed, their contextuality. In
business studies, case study research is particularly useful when the phenomenon under
investigation is difﬁcult to study outside its natural setting, and this happens quite often in
IE research because researchers are often studying the impact of different national
contexts. Ghauri and Holstius (1996) have mentioned that when they tried to understand
the effect of turbulent business environments in Eastern Europe on foreign ﬁrms’ entry
strategies, case studies were an effective way of understanding the links between macro-
environmental factors, industry—level relationships and ﬁrm decision—making. Case study
research relies on prior development of theory to construct its inquiry and often uses its
multiple data sources to ﬁnd redundancies that narrow the focus from a large ﬁeld of
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variables (Yin, 1994). This study relies on institutional theory for its conceptual framework
and uses multiple data sources such as in-depth interviews, documents and archival
material to conduct the investigation.
4.2.2 Multiple case study approach
This study invokes a multiple case study design. Orum et al., (1991) highlight that a
multiple case study approach, using several case studies in a comparative framework offers
a number of beneﬁts. First, constructs and relationships that are not yet well deﬁned in the
literature can be speciﬁed and elaborated upon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Second,
idiosyncratic aspects of the cases can be seen in perspective, and the risk of self-delusion
about conclusions can be minimised (Miles, 1979). Third, ‘the evidence from multiple
cases is often considered more compelling’ than a single case and hence makes the overall
study more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983, cited in Yin, 2003: 46).
A multiple case study approach requires a ‘replication logic rather than a random sampling
logic’ (Yin, 2003: 47) because the events that represent the phenomenon of interest are
selected ‘to ﬁll conceptual categories and extend emerging theories’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:
537). On the other hand, a random sampling logic, with statistical generalisation of the
ﬁndings from quantitative research, involves the extrapolation of ﬁndings from a small
random sample to a larger population within certain statistical parameters. However, Orum
et al., (1991) argue that the degree of generalisability is not merely a question of how many
units are examined but rather what kind of unit one is studying. In this research project, the
cases were chosen from the Australian service sector in such a way that they were likely to
replicate or extend the emergent theory, in accordance with the goal of the theoretical
sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Bryman (1988: 18) suggests that case studies are ‘capable of addressing generality if it is
understood in theoretical rather than statistical terms’. The current research is interested in
generalisation to theoretical and analytic concerns through theoretical sampling with
replication logic, rather than statistical generalisation with a random sampling logic.
Therefore, it is expected that an Australian service MNEs intending to operate successfully
in India may face challenges similar to those encountered by the 16 cases studied and that
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the ﬁndings about the planned/emergent strategies from the current research can be
generalised to them.
Yin (1994: 45-50) advises that “multiple cases” should be regarded as “multiple
experiments” and not “multiple respondents in a survey”, and so replication logic and not
sampling logic should be used for multiple-case studies. That is, representativeness is not
the criteria for case selection (Stake, 1994), rather the guarded choice of each case should
be made such that it either predicts similar results for predictable reasons (that is, literal
replication) or produces contrary results for predictable reasons (that is, theoretical
replication) (Yin, 2001). Other researchers support this method of case selection and
highlight the inappropriateness of random sampling. For example, Eisenhardt (1989, 537)
states that the “random selection of cases is neither necessary, nor even preferable”. It is
expected that in this multiple-case study, each individual case study might reveal a
discovery and replication across cases will add up to a better understanding of how MNEs
can overcome the LOF in an emerging market. A total of 16 cases were selected to conduct
this research. The logic underlying the use of multiple cases in this study is replication.
According to Yin (2003), each case must be carefully selected so that it either predicts
similar results to enhance reliability of the ﬁndings (a literal replication) or produces
contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). The 16 ﬁrm
sample was designed to generate instances of literal replication. By adopting qualitative
data collection from interviews, a choice was made to sacriﬁce sample size for depth of
analysis in order to gain a more detailed and subtle picture of the organisational context of
the research.
4.3 Sampling design
In multiple case studies, purposeful sampling should be used rather than random sampling
in order to select units with characteristics that will provide the optimal variety of data
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). In this study, the main concern with regards to the sample
selection is that it is based on the characteristics of a population and is not intended to be
statistically representative. In the context of the current research questions and the
propositions derived from these questions, a representative sample would preclude the kind
of intensive analysis necessary for a study of this nature. Therefore a non-probability
sample was used for this study. The distinction between the two are well developed in the
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literature on qualitative research, the vital one being that non-probability samples contain
individual units of analysis, deliberately selected by the researcher to reﬂect certain
features of the sample population (Bryman, 2001; Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004).'This
approach is labelled purposive (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004) or criterion—based
sampling (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993), where participating cases, people or settings are
chosen with the purpose to represent a type in relation to some pre-determined criteria.
The selection of participants or settings is set to be criterion-based or purposive (Mason,
2002; Patton, 2002). This approach can be distinguished from probability samples in that
the evaluation is "judged according to the richness of the data and the quality of concepts
and theories generated"(Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004281)
4.3.1 Purposive sampling
In this case study research, sampling is purposive rather than statistical. Cases are selected
for theoretical reasons that enable the researcher to follow experiment-like replication logic
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). The objective is to achieve ( 1) literal replication, whereby
similar results across cases are observed for predictable reasons (e.g., all MNEs are
operating successfully); (2) theoretical replication, whereby contrary results are observed
but, again, for predictable reasons (e.g., differences emerge between successful and
unsuccessful MNEs) and (3) analytic generalisation, whereby the researcher is able to
generalise a particular set of results to a broader theory. This is in contrast to statistical
generalisation in which results are generalised to a particular population. Thus, a small
sample of cases is sufﬁcient as long as theoretical saturation is achieved. The sampling in
this study follows a purposive rather than statistical logic because the main issue under
consideration here is the generalised ability of the cases to relate to theoretical
propositions, rather than to populations (Silverman, 2005). The logic of this approach to
sampling is explained by Mason (1996: 93-94), " sampling means selecting groups... to
study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical positions...
and the account which you are developing... sampling is concerned with constructing a
sample... which is meaningful theoretically, because it builds in certain characteristics or
criteria, which help to develop and test your theory and explanation.” Although pre-
existing theory and literature provides the set of propositions developed in this study, this
research seeks to provide new, more in-depth insights into managing operations effectively
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in an emerging market context. This is necessary to effectively answer the how and why
questions inherent in the research problem under investigation in this study.
The aim of qualitative research is to gain understanding of the nature and form of
phenomena, to unpack meanings, to develop explanations or to further develop concepts
and theories (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004). Samples created for qualitative research
must therefore be selected to ensure that they can effectively inform such understanding.
The sample is selected to represent the features relevant to this study. This highlights the
crucial difference between qualitative and quantitative inquiry in that the former is
concerned with purposive representation of character, and the latter with random selections
to represent population distribution (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2004). For this study,
maximum variation sampling was used because apart from studying ﬁrms that were
successful, studying ﬁrms that failed could also provide valuable insights into the
successful performance process. The underlying principle was to select information rich
cases.
4.3.2 Sample selection
Eisenhardt (1989) and Wilson (1997) have suggested that there are two steps which need to
be considered in the selection of the cases. Firstly, the population of interest needs to be
speciﬁed, and secondly, one must determine the sample of interest based on its theoretical
usefulness. It is important to identify the unit of analysis which will be examined to
produce sufﬁcient and appropriate data to address the research objectives. Yin (2003: 23)
has advised that the tentative deﬁnition of the unit of analysis is related to the way the
initial research questions have been deﬁned. The research questions in this study are
organised around the institutional challenges faced by ﬁrms in an emerging economy, and
how ﬁrms cope with these challenges. Therefore the unit of analysis in this study is the
ﬁrm. The information about how ﬁrms navigate through these challenges would be
collected from the senior executives of these case study ﬁrms who were responsible for
managing the operations of the ﬁrm in the emerging market context.
In this study the focus is on Australian MNEs from the services sector because the Services
industries accounted for 83 per cent of the 1,963,907 Australian businesses operating as at
June 2007 (Background paper 3, Australian Services Sector Trends, 2007, Australian
Government). This government paper further highlights that between 1984 and 2006, total
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services industry value added in Australia increased by an average of around 3.5% a year
to around $780 billion. The services sector is acknowledged as a diverse and dynamic
sector, with many sub-sectors growing at a rapid pace and at the forefront of innovation
and development.
In comparison, the manufacturing sector’s share of the Australian economy has been
steadily declining as the economy has grown, and the sector accounts for 12.5 per cent of
the national economy or output of $96 billion and averages around 1.5 per cent growth per
annum; this could be attributed to the rise of low cost production centres emerging around
the world. (Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, March 2007) At the same
time, India is experiencing a boom in its services sector as highlighted in Section 3.6 in
Chapter 3, Therefore the focus on studying MNEs from the Services sector is very relevant
in today’s international business environment.
The criteria for the process of purposeful sampling consisted of selecting Australian MNEs
from the service sector representing medium (21-199 employees) and large (over 200
employees) organisations. These MNEs must have operated in India for at least 3 years
during which period it is assumed that they would have experienced the institutional
challenges. The time limit was speciﬁed to reduce the memory loss effect. Such a sample
would enable us to ﬁnd the answer to the research question - how do ﬁrms successfully
manage to overcome the liability of foreignness in an emerging market. In this study,
managing successfully implies that these MNEs did not ﬁnd the challenge overwhelming
and were able to navigate through them without too many difﬁculties.
The ﬁrst stage of the empirical study involved compiling a database of the Australian
service MNEs based on the criteria discussed above. The main sources for this database
included the Australia India Business Council, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), Austrade, Australian High Commission in India and the personal network of the
researcher in the corporate world. However, the major difﬁculty encountered to prepare
this database was the absence of a comprehensive list of Australian MNEs doing business
in India. Neither the Australian Bureau of Statistics nor the Austrade had a complete list of
Australian MNEs operating in India. Senior bureaucrats, public servants and senior
executives in Australia were contacted to gain leads and access to the most appropriate key
executives of the Australian MNEs who had experience of managing operations in India.
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The researcher also attended business conferences to network with corporate executives
and this strategy led to the participation of the Executive Director of BANK 1 and the
General Manager of AIR 1. The researcher made extensive use of the network approach to
recruit potential respondents and this approach worked most effectively and efﬁciently
because of the researchers 10 years experience working in the corporate sector in Australia.
4.3.3 Number of cases
There are no precise guides as to the number of cases to be included - “the literature
recommending the use of case studies rarely speciﬁes how many cases should be
developed. This decision is left to the researcher ...” (Romano, 1989: 36). In a similar
vein, Eisenhardt (1989) recommends that cases should be added until “theoretical
saturation” is reached and Lincoln and Guba (1985: 204) recommend sampling selection
“to the point of redundancy”. Similarly, Patton (1990: 181) does not provide an exact
number or range of cases that could serve as guidelines for researchers, claiming that
“there are no rules” for sample size in qualitative research. However, the views of these
writers ignore the real constraints of time and funding in postgraduate research, that is,
postgraduate students need some guidelines to plan their program around. Some authorities
on case study design have used their experience to recommend a range within which the
number of cases for any research should fall. Eisenhardt (1989) postulates that while there
is no ideal number of cases, a number between four and ten cases often works well. With
fewer than four cases, it is often difﬁcult to generate theory with much complexity, and its
empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing. Patton (1990:185) pointed out the
‘validity, meaningfulness and insights generated from qualitative inquiry have more to do
with the information-richness of the cases selected and the observational/analytical
capabilities of the researcher than with sample size’.
After spending three months trying to identify Australian service MNEs which were
operating in India for at least three years, a total of 24 MNEs were identiﬁed for the
database. Contacts were established with the key senior executives, meetings were
arranged to discuss this research project and after all efforts, ﬁnally 16 ﬁrms volunteered to
participate. From this sample, 8 belonged to technical consultancy, 2 were in hospitality, 2
were in information technology, 2 were in management consultancy, 1 was in banking and
1 from the airlines industry. In this exploratory study, this form of “maximum variation”
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sampling captured shared patterns as well as uniqueness and was therefore considered
appropriate for sampling design (Patton, 1990). Given the limited resources it was also
important that the choice of cases provided for cross-case variation (Patton 1987). To
achieve this, the selection of ﬁrms was made on the basis of differences with regards to
industry, size and international experience. The use of maximum variation criteria when
choosing cases also enhances external validity (Yin, 1994). When selecting cases, due care
was taken to ensure that the key respondents had direct experience of managing the
operations of the ﬁrm in the India.
4.3.4 Interviewee selection
Many factors were considered in the selection of respondents. Individuals with direct
responsibility of the overseas venture who agreed to have the interview recorded were
selected. To reduce recall biases, data collection was limited to respondents on active
assignments in India or those who had returned to Australia within the last 3 years. All the
interviewees were very senior executives. MacDonald and Hellgren (2004) have informed
that because interviewing is so resource intensive it is important to recognise when returns
begin to diminish. Two such resource considerations are those of time and access, both of
which are often organisational constraints imposed on the researcher by the availability of
respondents. Access issues were complicated by the fact that most interviewees could be
categorised as “corporate elites" because of their status and international exposure (Welch
et al. 2002). Gaining access to these type of respondents is far more time-consuming and
resource intensive than making contacts with non-elites and often involves negotiating
access over months (Welch et al. 2002).
Concerted efforts were made to gain access to multiple respondents for this study but only
in three cases was the researcher successful in getting access to more than one respondent.
In the other cases, either the target respondents had resigned from the company or were
unavailable due to their frequent interstate/international movements in course of their
work. Therefore the use of single respondents could be viewed as a limitation of this study.
Once the appropriate respondents were identiﬁed, they were invited to participate in this
research by meeting them face to face to build rapport and then setting a date and time for
the interview.
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In their discussion of the difﬁculty of interviewing in international business research,
Daniels and Cannice (2004) address the issue of persuading potential respondents to
participate, highlighting that a common reason why managers are willing to participate is
that the topic is of interest to them and anonymity is assured. In this study, the topic of
managing in an emerging market was of interest to these managers as was the assurance
that conﬁdentiality will be maintained and they will get a copy of the summary ﬁndings.
These senior managers were contacted by telephone to arrange a face-to-face meeting to
discuss the research project and to invite them to participate. Snowballing occurred when
participants were requested to suggest others managers they might know who were
responsible for the operations of an Australian MNE in India. Interviewees were recruited
as the interviews progressed and the recruitment stopped once the theoretical saturation
was achieved after the nineteenth interview. The selection was purposive to take
advantage of the information rich interviewees, who were also asked to suggest other
potential respondents from Australian ﬁrms doing business in India. The selection
followed the principles of maximum variation and snowballing (Patton 1990). A key issue
in qualitative studies is to maintain a small manageable sample size so that it affords the
opportunity to do the kind of in-depth study required. Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, (2004)
suggest that in qualitative studies it is better to retain depth of data collection, rather than
breadth in terms of sample size, even if this enforces greater limits to the claims of your
study. A total of 19 interviews were conducted for this study.
Multiple sources of evidence were accessed to help inform the ﬁndings and to strengthen
construct validity. This is in line with Yin’s (2003: 85) suggestion that “the various
sources (such as documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations,
participant observation, and physical artefacts) are highly complementary, and a good case
study will therefore want to use as many sources as possible’. The main sources of
information for the case studies were semi-structured interviews, company documents and
newspaper articles.
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4.3.5 Reliability and validity
In designing the research approach, steps were taken to ensure the reliability and validity
of the research ﬁndings. First, reliability is ensured when the same ﬁndings and
conclusions can be replicated by a later investigator following the same procedures and
repeating the same case study (Orum et al., 1991, Yin, 2003). The research addressed the
issue of reliability by establishing an audit trail through careful documentation of the
research within an established protocol and through development of a case study database,
separate from the research report (Yin, 2003).
Second, the issue of construct validity is addressed in part by the case study’s unique
strength, which allows researchers to assemble complementary and overlapping measures
and accounts of the same phenomena by dealing with a full variety of evidence —
documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations (Orum et al., 1991, Yin, 2003).
Therefore, while data collection for this research is predominantly based around in-depth
interviews, a range of other sources has also been employed to ensure that organisational
information (as distinct from individual perceptions) has been obtained and conclusions are
drawn from multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The triangulation of
multiple sources and perceptions ranging from newspaper reports and magazine articles to
in-depth interviews with participants from the case study organisation enabled the
researcher to clarify meaning, verify the repeatability of an observation or interpretation,
cross-check and thereby validate observations, as well as claims based on those
observations (Orum et al., 1991, Stake, 1994). This variety of sources allowed a range of
perspectives to be collated, compared and cross-referenced, providing a detailed account of
the challenges and strategies: the events, activities, problems (and how they were
addressed) and outcomes. Furthermore, in an attempt to improve construct validity, the key
respondents were given the opportunity to review and verify the information contained in
the draft case study report (Yin, 2003) and interviews were supplemented with media
reports and company reports wherever available.
4.4 Starting-point of investigation
Although the researcher had institutional theory in mind as a conceptual guide for
ﬁeldwork and a good understanding from reviewing the literature that institutional gaps
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would lead to conﬂicts and costs impacting operations, it was not known how these
situations actually unfold. Thus, every attempt was made to begin the interviews with a
tabula rasa, an open mind, as recommended by established methodology gurus. However,
this contradicts Yin’s (1989) position that case studies should start with a priori theoretical
propositions. Far too often, it seems, researchers engage in unproductive debate over the
level of theoretical purity that a researcher should possess when data collection begins.
One camp argues that the tabula rasa blank theoretical mind is effectively impossible to
achieve (e.g., Parkhe, 1993). The other camp contends that avoiding a priori theoretical
constructs prevents conceptual contamination and theoretical capitalism (e.g., Glaser,
1992). However, this debate loses centrality when we recognise that Cressey, Eisenhardt,
Glaser and Strauss, Lindeman, and Yin all subscribe to slightly different variations of the
same fundamental inductive approach to theory building and that each methodological
variation can have a proper place and a proper time. While it may be sensible to begin with
a priori constructs if a researcher intends to challenge or reﬁne an existing dominant theory
(e.g., Yan and Gray, 1994), this may not be sensible for an exploratory study in a novel
domain (e.g., Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001). Rather than justifying whether one method is
right, and one is wrong, it seems fruitful that researchers take a contingency approach to
select a starting point for inductive study based on the attributes of the research situation.
Such attributes include: characteristics of the research, maturity of extant theory,
researcher preference, researcher strengths and researcher domain experience. Such an
approach shifts discussion away from right versus wrong towards more or less appropriate
given the situational attributes. Following this logic, the present study started by looking
for institutional challenges, but effort was made to avoid any predetermined notion of how
these situations would look or transpire. Glaser and Strauss (1967:37) advise, “An effective
strategy is, at ﬁrst, literally to ignore the theoretical and empirical literature on the area
under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not be contaminated
by concepts more suited to different areas. Similarities and differences with the literature
can be established after the analytic core of categories has emerged.”
4.5 Data Collection
The primary mode of data collection was by interview (See Appendix 1). The 19 in-depth,
semi-structured interviews were conducted with at least one senior manager from each of
the 16 MNEs. The interviews lasted for one to two hours, were digitally recorded for
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subsequent transcription and review and conducted during 15 months period between April
2007 and July 2008. Respondents were also requested for secondary archival data to enrich
the contextual background surrounding many of the incidents involved in the operations of
the ﬁrm. These included newspaper articles and other company documents.
4.5.1 Respondents
A total of 19 senior managers of the sixteen Australian service MNEs were interviewed.
Fifteen interviews were held in Australia and four in India. The respondents were senior
managers with roles and responsibilities in strategic management of the business
operations in India. The position title of the respondents included Managing Director,
CEO, Vice President, Executive Director and General Manager. Most interviewees could
be categorised as “corporate elites" because of their status and international exposure
(Welch et al., 2002). This sample represented 16 distinct organisations ranging in size from
SMEs to large Australian service MNEs who have operations in India. The goal of
interviewing respondents from both SMEs and MNEs in different industry sectors was to
develop a general descriptive model and achieve maximum variation. A list of the
interviewees is at Table 4.1. The real names of the participants and the MNEs have been
concealed for conﬁdential reasons. A brief proﬁle of the participating MNEs is at
Appendix 4.
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Table 4.1: List of interviewees
 
 
 
 
        
Face-
HOSPII Gen Manager Hospitality Delhi to-face Large Yes
Chief Executive Face-
HOSPI2 Ofﬁcer Hospitality Sydney to-face Large Yes
MGMTCON Management Face-
1 Chairman Consultancy Sydney to-face Medium Yes
MGMTCON Director India Management Face-
2 Business Services Consultancy Sydney to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical Face-
1 Principal Consultancy Sydney to-face Large Yes
TECI—ICON Executive Director— Technical Face-
1 India Consultancy Delhi to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical Face-
2 Gen Manager-ED Consultancy Sydney to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical
3 Project Director Consultancy Perth Phone Large Yes
TECHCON Managing Director- Technical Face-
4 India Consultancy Delhi to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical Face-
5 Project Director Consultancy Delhi to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical Face-
6 Director Consultancy Sydney to-face Medium Yes
TECHCON Asia Manager Technical Face-
7 Infrastructure Consultancy Sydney to-face Large Yes
TECHCON Technical Face-
8 Principal Consultancy Sydney to-face Medium Yes
SOFTWARE Information
1 Vice President RandD Technology Brisbane Phone Medium Yes
SOFTWARE Vice President Information
1 Sales&Support Technology Perth Phone Medium Yes
SOFTWARE Information Face-
2 Channel Manager Technology Sydney to-face Medium Yes
Face-
BANKI Executive Director Banking Sydney to-face Large Yes
Face-
AIRI General Manager-Asia Airlines Sydney to-face Large Yes
Face-
AIRI Commercial Manager Airlines Sydney to-face Large Yes
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4.5.2 Interview questions
The interviews were conducted using the template shown in Appendix 3. While the
protocol or framework was well deﬁned based on clear research questions and relevant
theories, the interview questions were not identical to the research questions and were
constructed in a way that encouraged the participants to lead the investigator to data (Yin,
1994). The interview guide was based upon the following considerations:
0 It should be suitable for all the respondents within the sample population
0 It should cover all important issues and should be able to produce sufﬁcient data for
a meaningful analysis and interpretation
0 It should be easily understood.
0 The length of completion of the questionnaire should be around 75 minutes on
average
Rather than having a ﬁxed design, the data collection method remained ﬂexible throughout
the research process, while building on the key research question and the inﬂuential factors
that were identiﬁed in the existing literature. For example, interview questions were
reﬁned and adjusted after the ﬁrst case study: minor additions and removal of some
interview questions. These adjustments enabled the study to probe emergent themes
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The ﬂexibility ensured that the uniqueness of a speciﬁc case and the
emergence of new themes were captured to improve resultant theory.
The interviews followed an open-ended format. Respondents were encouraged to talk
about challenges their organisation had faced in India. These interviews began with
introductory questions to familiarise with the respondent and then asked open-ended
questions such as, “Why don’t you share some institutional differences that you
experienced in the Indian business environment?” or “Tell me about the challenges that
were surprising”. There are two key points to note about these broad questions. First, by
requesting a grand-tour including many challenges beyond the scope of the study, such as
challenges with an unfamiliar natural environment or a new technology, the researcher
could direct latter stages of an interview toward speciﬁc challenges that had arisen from
the unfamiliar social world such as differences in beliefs, taboos, protocols or rules.
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Second, these general questions created opportunities for spontaneous discussion around
emergent topics. Therefore, despite the emphasis being on organisation and structure,
ﬂexibility was emphasised to allow the interviewer to follow the lead of participants and
draw out relevant information as the conversation proceeds (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
During the interview, lines of discussion that deviated from the prepared questions were
also pursued although the interviewer ensured that all lines of inquiry were pursued by
returning the interviewee to the interview protocol.
In accordance with the conditions of the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics
Committee, individual interviewees were given ‘Participant Consent Form’ to sign and
‘Participant Information Statement’ to read about the nature of the research and their rights
(Appendix 2). Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim so that the raw data
could be systematically analysed. The researcher also generated notes immediately after
each interview, capturing impressions and contextual information relevant to the interview.
The ﬁrst set of interviews was conducted with the respondents in Australia and the second
set of interviews was carried out in India. In Australia, 12 interviews were face-to-face and
3 over the phone. In India, all four interviews were conducted face-to-face. These
respondents in Australia had been selected because they had recently returned from India
after completing their assignment of managing the operations of their respective ﬁrms. The
ﬁrst segment of the interview guide focused on interviewee information: his/her position
within the organisation and how he or she was involved in the overseas operations
management decision. The second segment covered the critical factors in the regulatory,
cultural-cognitive and normative domain that could impact on the effectiveness of the
business operations and also included questions seeking to understand how they managed
to mitigate the LOF. The ﬁnal segment had concluding questions. The literature review
was used as a guide to form the interview questions. For example, the questions in the
second segment of the interviews were drawn from the institutional perspective and
contextual factors that could impact upon‘the operations of a MNE as identiﬁed in the
literature review. It was also designed to fully capture their ﬁrst-hand experience in dealing
with the operational challenges in India. The interview guide at Appendix A contains the
original list of questions used for interviews. However, this was modiﬁed in an iterative
process as the study proceeded, although the general content remained consistent
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throughout. The prepared questions formed a discussion framework which was able to
accommodate and stimulate discussion around the key areas of interest.
4.6 Data analysis
Analysis consists of a data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and veriﬁcation
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). The data analysis in this study entailed the intertwining of
iterative analysis and data collection (Miles, 1979) until adequate conceptual categories
were developed (Harris and Sutton, 1986, Sutton, 1987, Sutton and Callahan, 1987).
However, in contrast to the works by Sutton (1987), and Sutton and Callahan (1987) which
focused on the constant elements and commonality across the cases studied, this research
also looked for differences across the 16 cases to identify reasons for differential outcomes
leading to success and failure in India. After the data collection, detailed case study write-
ups were produced and veriﬁed by the key respondents to check for accuracy (Greenwood
et a1., 1994; Miller, 1997; Nutt, 1987; Yin, 2003). This was done to enhance construct
validity (Yin, 2003). Analysis involved the reduction of the large quantity of textual data
through coding, pattern matching and categorising within themes, displaying this reduced
data so that it could be easily accessed and arranged according to the themes and
interpretation of the data within the overall framework of the research propositions.
As a result of the variety of data sources available and the personal involvement of the
researcher in gathering and analysing all of the data, software programs were not used to
aid in the search for patterns in the transcribed interviews. Instead, the transcriptions of
individual interviews were entered into a case study database in the form of spreadsheet for
each case study. These data were then sifted through to identify ‘similar phrases,
relationships between variables, patterns, themes, distinct differences between subgroups,
and common sequences’ (Miles and Huberrnan, 1994: 9). The text was reduced to sentence
level by close iterative reading and coded into sections based on the contextual factors and
institutional challenges extracted from the literature review that may have inﬂuenced the
business outcome. Consolidation of all individual responses in coded sections into one
spreadsheet ﬁle for each case study enabled triangulation of the analysis, through similar
evidence from different sources (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 267).
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The coding of interview transcriptions followed a cumulative process from basic pattern
analysis of the interview data to descriptive coding of what the respondents mentioned
about the ways in which they managed the institutional challenges in India. The ﬁnal part
of this process involved more interpretive coding which focussed on abstract concerns like
how ﬁrms used networks, managed cultural differences, reduced knowledge deﬁcits and
employed other strategies to overcome the liability of foreignness. Data coding and
making memos was done on an ongoing basis from data collection to write up stage and
was in line with the best practices advised in the literature on analysing qualitative data
(Punch 1998).
The reduced text was then examined through another iterative round of reading and word
search to identify common patterns and themes that were consistent or inconsistent with
the factors from the literature review. These were then categorised by a second level of
coding that gathered themes such as collaborative strategies to manage LOF, corruption,
cultural differences, regulatory issues and networks and relationships. The text was then re-
sorted and consolidated under these themes.
Each case study write-up from the analysis above formed within-case analysis and
explored the strategies adopted by these MNEs to mitigate the LOF. Doing separate
within-case analyses helped the researcher to become intimately familiar with each case as
a stand-alone entity, and allowed the unique patterns of each case to emerge before the
researcher pushed to generalise patterns across cases. Case analysis should always precede
cross-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990). After completion of each
case analysis, once the categories had emerged and integrated, illustrative quotes were
selected from the interview transcripts to provide telling examples to justify conclusions
and to develop generalisations that are consistent with both ﬁndings and prior knowledge
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Yin (1994) emphasised that while tools can be useful in
manipulating or reshufﬂing data, it is most important to have a general analytic strategy to
guide the process. The general strategy followed here was to relate ﬁndings to the
theoretical propositions stated in the research purpose and questions.
When analysing qualitative data, the analytical process must take into account the
researcher as the instrument for devolving theory (Strauss, 1987). In view of this the
analysis provides a confessional account of how data was interpreted, which is a technique
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used to provide transparency of the role of the researcher in the analysis of qualitative
research (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). Through this process the question of what is known
and what is new is consistently considered with a view to integrating appropriate literature.
This analytical process included the integration of literature that was not conceived of at
the outset of the study. That is, when issues of signiﬁcance arose in the data that could not
be explained by the literature discussed in the conceptual framework, other literature which
was now shown to be relevant because of the emergence of new themes, was integrated
into the analysis.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the research design and the methods used to explore strategies
employed by Australian service MNEs to mitigate LOF in an emerging market. The
complex nature of the research problem calls for a rich, in-depth study that incorporates the
' relevant context. Therefore, a qualitative case study of the phenomenon has been adopted
to allow the researcher to grasp the total complex world of social action in its most
complete form. This chapter reviewed qualitative research traditions and explained why
case study is the most appropriate model for this study. A multiple-case study design was
applied in a comparative framework to enhance the quality and robustness of the ﬁndings
and to provide the thick description needed to understand the strategies employed by the
Australian service MNEs to overcome the LOF in an institutionally distant emerging
market. Data were gathered from multiple sources within each participating MNE. Data
gathering protocols and data analysis were driven by propositions derived from the
theoretical bases established in the literature review. As is standard with multiple case
studies, propositions and themes were expected to evolve as data gathering and analysis
proceeded. The ﬁndings will emphasise cross-case analysis organised around the research
propositions. The ﬁndings and discussion that arose from the processes of data collection
and analysis outlined in this chapter are detailed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis.
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Chapter 5: Collaborative strategies to reduce Liability of
Foreignness
When you hear hoofbeats, think Horses, not Zebras unless you are in Africa.
- Anonymous
5.1 Introduction
The choice of entry mode of multinational enterprises at the time of their entry into new
host countries has been well researched (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Caves and
Mehra, 1986; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Park, 1993; Kogut and
Singh, 1988; Luo, 2001). Research on foreign entry and ownership modes has largely
followed two lines of argument: the transaction cost — intemalisation theory perspective
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley and Casson, 1976;
Delios and Beamish, 1999; Rugman, 1982; Williamson, 1975) and the experiential or
learning perspective (Barkema, et al., 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Delios and
Beamish, 1999; Makino and Delios, 1996). There are others who have taken an eclectic
approach (Hill, et al., 1990) or focused on cultural distance as a major determinant of entry
mode choice (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The study of post-entry strategies to overcome the
liability of foreignness (LOF) is an under researched area. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyse the strategies adopted by Australian ﬁrms in India to mitigate the LOF after an
entry has been made employing either a joint-venture or a sole venture mode.
It is well understood that the choice of entry mode has an impact on the operations of the
MNE in the host country. This chapter therefore brieﬂy discusses the literature on the
rationale behind entry mode choice to better understand the linkage with post entry
strategies. In this study, an institutional perspective on foreign entry mode choice has been
included. The institutional perspective suggests that the choice of organisational structure
can be viewed as the consequence of organisational responses to isomorphic pressures
arising from both a ﬁrm's external environment and its internal organisational practices and
routines (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 1995). Unlike the
other perspectives that focus on economic rationales for entry mode choice decisions, the
institutional theory contends that ﬁrms choose organisational practices and structures such
as entry mode primarily to gain legitimacy from both internal and external sources.
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The transaction cost-internalisation theory perspective is concerned with the most efﬁcient
form of governance and Williamson (1975) suggests that this should minimise transaction
costs. The choice between wholly owned subsidiary and joint venture can also be seen as a
question of to what extent a ﬁrm should internalise its activities in order to minimise
transaction costs and to maintain a level of equity ownership and control over its
subsidiary. Empirical studies have generally supported transaction cost-based explanations
of mode choice (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991).
The transactions cost approach takes into account the potential or anticipated costs
encountered by a MNE at the time of its operation in a host country.
According to the experiential or learning perspective, the biggest disadvantage facing the
MNE in a host country is its lack of local knowledge as well as the difﬁculty in
transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge to the foreign subsidiary. Therefore, modal choice
should be aimed at optimising learning and knowledge transfer (Makino and Delios, 1996).
To facilitate the transfer of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge to the foreign subsidiary, for instance,
the MNE should ideally establish an operation by sending over expatriates who carefully
select and hire local employees (Hofstede, 1991) and gradually build up the business. To
obtain knowledge of local business institutions and practices, however, the MNE needs to
cooperate with local partners (Beamish, 1988) in the form of joint ventures, or acquire an
existing ﬁrm with local staff (Barkema and Vermulen, 1998).
The transaction cost and learning perspectives also constitute the theoretical basis for those
who focus on culture as a determinant of modal choice. Cultural distance is an important
barrier to learning (Barkema, et al.,1996) and makes it difﬁcult for MNEs to manage their
foreign subsidiaries by themselves or to enlist the help of a local partner efﬁciently
(Hennart and Larimo, 1998). It therefore increases transaction costs. Besides these, cultural
differences also inﬂuence the perception of managers regarding the costs and uncertainty
of alternative modes of entry into foreign markets.
In the context of an emerging market, given the degree of complexity associated with the
rules of the game in such markets, an MNE’s entry mode decision is likely to be affected to
a large extent by its expectations about the local institutions and business environment
(Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997; Gatignon and Anderson,
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1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001). Most previous studies based on transaction-cost
theory have tended to understate the signiﬁcance of contextual factors in the choice of
entry mode (Erramilli 1996; Shane 1994), and such a neglect of contextual factors is a
signiﬁcant drawback in past research (Henisz 2000; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Westney
1993). Institutional theory provides a new conceptual foundation for studying entry mode
choice decisions. The MNE literature has shown “a growing appreciation of the
importance of the institutional context and of the patterns in the way MNEs respond to that
context” (Westney, 1993: 60). Institutional distance is the extent of similarity or
dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two countries
(Kostova, 1996). It is derived from institutional theory - a non-efﬁciency perspective in
which institutional environment is seen as the key determinant of ﬁrm structure and
behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). If an MNE expects the institutions
and business conditions of a host country to be inadequate in comparison with the home
country or if the MNE feels that the rules and regulations governing business practices are
unstable, the likelihood of entering the emerging market in cooperation with a local ﬁrm
will increase because the local ﬁrm will have some embedded intangible assets that
address the institutional challenges. Accordingly, this leads to an observable hierarchy with
respect to the three alternatives available to an MNE:
Proposition: If the extent of institutional distance is perceived to be high, a JV would be
the most likely decision, followed by merger/acquisition of a host countryﬁrm; whereas
a sole venture mode ofentry would be least likely.
Hymer (1976) ﬁrst observed that foreign entrants incur unfamiliarity costs due to
differences in home and host countries” economic, social, legal, political and cultural
systems. In addition, because such liability of foreignness (LOF) stems from institutional
differences, the larger these differences, the greater the liability is likely to be (Miller and
Parkhe, 2002). LOF has been broadly deﬁned in the literature as additional costs that a
ﬁrm operating in a market overseas incurs, which a local ﬁrm would not (Hymer, 1976).
Zaheer (1995) further elaborates that these costs may arise from at least four, not
necessarily independent, sources: (1) spatial distance (travel, transportation and
coordination costs), (2) unfamiliarity with local environment, (3) discrimination faced by
foreign ﬁrms and (4) restrictions from the home country. She also contends that though
LOF may vary by industry or country, foreign ﬁrms, all else being equal, will have lower
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proﬁtability than local ﬁrms and perhaps even a lower probability of survival. This results
from the differences between the institutional environment of the home and host countries.
Scott and Meyer (1991) have deﬁned institutional environments as those that are
characterised by the detailed rules and requirements to which individual ﬁrms must
conform if they aim to achieve legitimacy. Emerging market governments often have FDI-
related regulations that prevent certain modes of entry (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). During the
initial stages of liberalisation of the Indian economy, for example, it was difﬁcult for a
MNE to enter India except by way of a JV, especially in the consumer goods sector.
Although this is not so in the present times, there are other regulative and normative
aspects of the institutional environment which impact on the choice of the entry mode.
These are discussed in the subsequent sections which incorporate the ﬁndings from this
study.
The ﬁndings from this study are not entirely consistent with the proposition which states
that MNEs will operate as a JV if the institutional distance between the home country and
the host country (emerging economy) is perceived to be high. The ﬁndings suggest that
although the institutional distance between Australia and India is considered large with
reference to Hofstede’s framework, the operational modal choice preferred by the majority
of Australian service MNEs was a sole venture and not a joint venture. Based on the
existing literature, in cases where the institutional distance is high, ﬁrms will opt for a JV
followed by merger/acquisition of a host country ﬁrm. A sole venture mode should be the
least preferred choice. However, the results from the 16 case studies indicate that the
majority of Australian service MNEs preferred a sole venture mode in an institutionally
distant host country. Table 5.1 is a summary of the FDI modes that were chosen by
responding Australian ﬁrms for their operations in India.
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Table 5.1: FDI Modes by responding Australian ﬁrms
 FDI Entry mode N %
Sole Venture 10 62.5
Joint Venture/Merger 6 37.5
 Total 16 100     
N: number of ﬁrms; %: percentage within total number of responding ﬁrms.
 
  
  
 
37.50%
62.50%
 
J:Sole Venture l Joint Venture/Merge—LI   
The ﬁndings indicate that regardless of entry mode choice, all of the ﬁrms displayed
nevertheless a concern for gaining legitimacy and the need for collaborative strategies to
overcome the challenges of the institutional environment and the LOF. This suggests that
although the results do not appear at ﬁrst sight to support the existing literature on modal
choice, the major concern for all ﬁrms was to gain the ability to overcome the LOF
through local actors and gain legitimacy. The ﬁndings reveal that while MNEs which
operated as a JV relied upon their local JV partner to overcome institutional challenges,
those ﬁrms that operated as sole ventures used the services of local Agents/Consultants or
employed highly networked retired professionals who had access to the “corridors of
power” and were well connected in the government.
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5.2 Reliance on local joint venture partners
To address the uncertainty in an emerging market, MNEs entering these markets look for
ways to overcome limitations in the business environment and look for partner
organisations that wield substantial capability to ﬁll voids in the business environment
(Dunning, 1988; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Researchers have examined how MNEs can
address gaps in the business environment through forming alliances (Hitt et al., 2000),
joining networks (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), using interpersonal ties (Peng and Luo,
2000), or managing ﬁrm boundaries (Delios and Henisz, 2000) in order to overcome the
liability of foreignness. MNEs face liability of foreignness due to their lack of local
knowledge, which can lead to disadvantages in competing with local ﬁrms who are
familiar with the local environment. MNEs face a series of challenges such as ﬁnancing,
stafﬁng, securing relationships with suppliers and buyers, attracting local customers and
establishing their legitimacy (Lu and Beamish, 2006).
According to the existing literature, pressure from host-country institutions may induce
ﬁrms to trade their ownership for legitimacy in the local environment, and hence, joint
venturing with local partners is likely to be the preferred mode. Past studies have argued
that foreign ﬁrms are more likely to form a joint venture with local partners than establish
a wholly owned subsidiary as the degree of regulative and normative pressures in a host
country increases. Transaction-cost theory posits that the choice of organisational structure,
including the mode of foreign entry, is based on "efﬁciency" criteria. In other words, ﬁrms
choose organisational structures that will economize on transaction costs. Most previous
studies of entry-mode choice use this perspective. On the other hand, the institutional
theory posits that the choice of organisational structure is based on "legitimacy" criteria
which means that ﬁrms choose organisational structures as a way to respond to
isomorphism in both external and internal environments (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Institutional theory takes into account the uncertainty that arises from changes in
institutional conditions such as political and economic stability, legal ground rules, and
cultural and social relations embedded in national environments. In the transaction-cost
perspective of multinational enterprises, researchers have not clearly speciﬁed what
country-speciﬁc conditions and attributes might inﬂuence entry-mode choice decisions
(Erramilli 1996, Kogut and Singh 1988, Ramanathan et al., 1997, Shane 1994).
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Firms entering a new host-country market also suffer from disadvantages over local ﬁrms
with regard to market-speciﬁc knowledge and access. Such knowledge is often tacit, and
therefore its acquisition is subject to high transaction costs (Hennart 1988, 1991).
Consequently, foreign ﬁrms' dependence on local ﬁrms with regard to local knowledge and
access is relatively great, and they tend to acquire local knowledge and access from their
local joint venture partners. Organisations choose a particular form of structure and
practice either because it would receive regulatory and normative approval as is necessary
due to their reliance on resources from these environments, or because it is taken for
granted that doing so is the proper way to organise (DiMaggio and Powelll983; Meyer and
Rowan 1977).
A total of ﬁve Australian service MNEs in this study opted for a JV and one chose the
Merger option. The Director of MGMTCON 1, a consulting ﬁrm based in Sydney
explained his rationale for a JV in India:
It can help to have local partner who already has the infrastructure, who
already has the networks that you can use. We joint ventured with a ﬁrm
called Dua Associates, probably the largest law ﬁrm in India. So we joint
ventured on a 50-50 basis to do mergers and acquisitions and corporate
advisory work.
He also offered his views on why most Australian service MNEs prefer a JV mode. His
observation and experience led him to believe that:
...barring the top companies in Australia, the rest don 't have the money to
do it 100% by themselves. They do not have the money or the risk capital.
Then you go to the biggerﬁrms and they are worried about risking in India,
so ajoint venture is a way to minimise the risk The joint venture also helps
you to inculcate a new way ofdoing things, incorporating the Indian way.
A similar view echoed from the comments the Executive Director of BANK 1 when he
said:
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In India we launched a fund called BANK 1 India Infrastructure
Opportunities Fund, a JV with State bank ofIndia. Wefoundfor instance in
Korea and India that in certain industries in different parts ofthe economy,
you need to have contacts and connections and long-standing business
relationships, and some cultures it is very important to have that long-
standing relationship. You cannotjust walk into the market and create it. So
it is better to team up with someone who has the long-standing relationships
and the local bank brought relationships and local knowledge, we brought
in technology and sophisticated processes to do business and you marry
them up and the work very well. We thought we 'd rather have a partner who
has extremely good connections local understanding and knowledge of the
home market. The State Bank ofIndia has the largest number ofbranches in
the world and tying up with them also gives the business local presence and
legitimacy.
The remarks of the Director of MGMTCON 2 were in line with the above two views:
For most Australian companies thefamiliarity has been historically with the
West and so when they invest in western countries like the UK or US, they
prefer a Sole Venture model and there is more comfort with the market out
there, whereas in India they do not know the market very well and go for a
joint-venture partner and see what the partner can bring to the table.
These ﬁndings are in agreement with transaction cost theory with regards to minimizing
risk and the Institutional Theory when highlighting how the “JV helps inculcate a new way
of doing things, incorporating the Indian way.” The comments of the Executive Director of
BANK 1 on gaining legitimacy through a local partner also supports the institutional
theory argument about ﬁrms’ trying to gain legitimacy in an emerging market.
The General Manager of TECHCON 3 also agreed that in emerging markets, it is
important to have a joint venture partner. TECHCON 3 which operates as a sole venture in
India has had difﬁcult times and is currently going through litigation with Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC), a large Indian public sector oil and gas company. They lost
several millions of dollars in India in the contract they had with the ONGC. Prior to joining
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TECHCON 3, he had worked for other companies which operated in India as JVs. This
General Manager believed that in a country like India it is very important to partner with a
local ﬁrm to overcome the lack of local knowledge. He added:
I had always worked with companies which were there as a joint-venture,
with an Indian partner who has been able to be the intermediary between
the end user and the Western world and he 'd be able to sort out, I mean,
absorb a great many ofthe shocks which come to any business. The Indian
partner has the ability to absorb shocks, has local knowledge and networks
to deal with tricky situations which the Western company might be totally
baﬂled with. I think you need to be born and brought up in that part ofthe
world to clearly understand what is going on.
When asked what it is that he would do different if he was to do it all over again, his
response was immediate:
I will have preferred to have a strong presence in India but with local
participation and by building up those relationships that I think are so vital
so that business can absorb shocks as I mentioned earlier.
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) have argued that ﬁrms may use alliances to enhance
their legitimacy. Thus, they search for partners with strong intangible assets, such as strong
reputations and networks. The comments of the respondents support the argument that in
institutional settings of emerging economies, the presence of a local JV partner is
extremely important to gain access to local knowledge about the institutional framework
within which businesses operate as well as to gain legitimacy. The data also revealed
another insight into why some ﬁrms opt for JVs. MNEs that bid for international tenders in
India preferred a JV because partnering with a local ﬁrm helps them to overcome the
challenge of competing against local ﬁrms which get a preferential treatment in
government contracts. In order to overcome this regulatory challenge,the JV mode was
found to be the most practical. Although TECHCON 3 operated as a sole venture, its
General Manager remarked:
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The tenders have a 10% global preference capability. This means that say
an Indian company bids and its bid is 10% higher than the foreigner, they
will still get the tender or contract and this is probably another reason why
a lot ofcompanies need ajoint-venture partner.
This point about preferential treatment to local ﬁrms in major bids was also highlighted by
the Executive Director of BANK 1 when he spoke about the bid for the modernization of
Delhi Airport. He informed that after several rounds of discussions and negotiations, the
bid for the modernization of Delhi Airport was eventually won by an Indian group called
GMR which had partners from overseas.
5.3 Partner selection in Strategic Alliances
After a ﬁrm has made the decision to engage in a joint venture, its selection of an
appropriate partner is the next critical decision (Hitt et al., 1998). Although strategic
alliances have become increasingly important, there is a high level of dissatisfaction with
actual outcomes relative to expectations and many are not successful (Madhok and
Tallman, 1998; Park and Russo, 1996). Although it is difﬁcult to identify precise failure
rates, Hennart, Kim, and Zeng (1998) argued that international strategic alliances are likely
to have high dissolution rates. Therefore, the decision to select a suitable partner is a very
critical one. Some insights on partner selection emerged during the interviews which
appear to be very valuable and pertinent. One such insight that emerged related to the role
of global relationships of the CEOs of MNEs in the selection ofjoint venture partners. This
was evident during the interview with the Director, MGMTCON 2:
When the initial entry is made, it is made because ofconnections, like CEO
of one company has a chemistry going on with CEO of another company,
with a lot ofthese large companies in two or three years, CEOs change, and
the reason or drivers of the relationship which were agreed earlier on are
now diﬂerent. To give you an example, recently an MOU was signed
between an Australian and Indian company. The lawyers and consultants
could not come to an agreement and spent almost 2 years negotiating the
MOUand then the CEOs cameface-to-face and reached an agreement, One
CEO has since retired and the new one does not share the same passion as
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the one who had retired and that adds tremendous stress in a joint-venture
situation. A change in the top management changes the equation and
chemistry at the top and this can tremendously impact the joint-venture
because the structure which was set up was notfor one or two years butfor
a decade or so. No matter how much of structure you've put in a joint-
venture or the number of legal agreements that you have, the bottom line is
to get a communication going on and get a level ofchemistry happening in
the business. Beyond the business plan and beyond the x and y axis, it boils
down to individuals. In most cases in the emerging markets, firms have
entered because, yes, this is on the agenda and then perhaps of a chance
meeting somewhere between the two top people. There are other cases
where a firm decides to enter into a market and you don't know how to go
about it, so they get hold of consultants to do a beauty parade. This is the
other model but most successful operations/models are where people have
global relationships.
The Director of MGMTCON 2 made the above conclusion based on his past experience in
consulting to corporate clients. This aspect of the role of global networks of the MNEs was
clearly evident in case of HOSPI 2. The chance meeting of two top executives resulting in
a successful JV is an example of the importance of the role of personal global networks in
international JVs. The Managing Director of HOSPI 2 shared his story:
The joint-venture partner ofFosters Brewery in India happened to be in my
business partner's board room. He said it would be great to take my
business to India and 1 said yes sure it would, English Raj, biscuit eating is
common, they speak English, they have Westminster system ofgovernment,
it would be interesting. Why don't we give it a go, and this was in a very
short conversation and he said “I'll pay to ﬁt out the premises andyou give
me an oven and if it all does not work you take the oven back and we will
close the shop. ” So there was very short lead time in between actually
saying we ’re going to do it and actually doing it.
After the chance meeting, the MD made a trip to India in 1999 and the ﬁrst store was
opened in January 2000 in Spencer Plaza in Chennai. It was an instantaneous success. He
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was excited when he said, “In fact this is still the largest volume store for us today and
Friday and Saturday and Sunday nights you just can’t get to the counter, it is so busy.”
HOSPI 2 today has over 37 outlets in different parts of India since it started operations in
India in 2000. When asked what made his business so successful, the Managing Director
emphasised:
Obviously getting a goodpartner is one ofthe most critical issues. You need
to do your homework, check the references and check them inside out. In
our view a master license is certainly not as good as a joint-venture where
you can retain certain control over the partner andyou can inﬂuence what
is happening there as opposed to just advising. Ijust think the success rate
is better because you have vested interest. I think a lot offranchisors see
that big pot ofgold andjust go upfront with the licensee and do not realise
how much time needs to be put in to make the business successful. Ijustfelt
that licenses were not that successful. You need a lot ofcommitment in a JV,
you have your money involved and obviously your commitment will be much
higher.
Clearly the Managing Director had a strong reason to believe that in the franchising
business, it is better to operate as a JV instead of using the licensing mode. The ﬁndings
reveal that partner selection is a critical factor in the success of a joint-venture. Prior
research has demonstrated the importance of partner selection for the viability of joint
ventures (Geringer, 1988). The choice of the right partner can yield important competitive
beneﬁts whereas the failure to establish compatible objectives, or communicate effectively
can lead to insurmountable difﬁculties. Hitt et al., (1998) have argued that a critical step in
the success of an alliance is the selection of a partner, but there has been little past research
on this phenomenon. They have mentioned that some recent research has linked partner
characteristics with strategic alliance success (e.g., Saxton, 1997). The importance of this
aspect needs to be factored in the strategy of the ﬁrm once the decision is made about a
joint venture being a preferred mode of choice. Partnering with a local ﬁrm may provide a
multinational ﬁrm with access to customers and channels of distribution and with better
knowledge of the customers, local markets, local culture, and local government policies
and regulations. Beamish (1994) suggested that a primary criterion for partner selection for
an MNE is market knowledge and access to networks. A partner’s unique competencies
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and market knowledge and access to networks is of immense value in deciding partner
selection. Most of these capabilities are intangible resources and are based on tacit
knowledge and so are hard to imitate, thereby providing a basis for a competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). The responses from the interviews conducted in this study are
consistent with the view that the key deciding factor in partner selection was the
competencies and the local knowledge of the partner.
While strategic alliances have become an increasingly popular strategy, many are not
successful (Park and Russo, 1996). It has been estimated that 50-70 % of all alliances fail
(Dacin, Hitt and Levitas, 1997; Harrigan, 1988). According to this study, in the cases
where the JV failed, it was clear that after some time, the local JV partner had other
priorities or strategic orientations. This was evident in the case of TECHCON 6. The
Director of TECHCON 6 indicated that although there was a huge demand for his product
in India, the local JV partner’s motivation took a different direction after couple of years
and so the venture became unsuccessful. Therefore, the knowledge of the strategic
orientations of the partners may be a particularly important factor in the selection of
partners. This view resonated in the comments of the Director of MGMTCON 2:
A joint venture has a limited life unless the joint venture takes on a new
entity of its own. To a certain point in time one partner will have different
motivations than the other at which point there is a buyout or a breakdown.
The ﬁndings of this study agree with the View that a problem in international strategic
alliances can be the different strategic orientations of the partners (Dacin, Hitt, and Levitas,
1997; Hitt et al., 1995). In other words, partners' different reasons for entering strategic
alliances and different approaches to them may cause conﬂict in the implementation of the
alliances.
5.4 Mergers not Acquisitions
The terms merger and acquisition are commonly used interchangeably to describe the
combination of two or more companies into one economic entity. These terms describe
‘the nature of the transaction that brings two companies together’ rather than “the nature of
their subsequent life together’ (Reed-Lajoux, 1997: 4). Simply put, a merger refers to a
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transfer of ownership ‘when the assets of two similar-sized ﬁrms are combined’ whereas
an acquisition refers to a transfer of ownership “when a ﬁrm purchases another ﬁrm’
(Barney and Hesterly, 2005: 349,353). The essential feature of both mergers and.
acquisitions involves one ﬁrm emerging where once there existed two ﬁrms. It is said that
in the common, lay sense, the term ‘merger’ generally describes ‘any acquisition
consummated with a plan for integration of signiﬁcant resources, operations, and/or
technology’ (Reed-Lajoux, 1997: 4).
TECHCON 7 which had been operating as a sole venture in India decided recently to go
ahead with a merger with an Indian company. The Asia Manager explained the major
reason for his ﬁrm’s choice of a merger with a local ﬁrm. He believed that in an emerging
market, while material resources and semi-skilled (or even skilled) labour might be found '
in abundance, it might be difﬁcult to obtain high quality executive managers who can take
the lead in formulating a business strategy that is appropriate for the local environment.
This is often on account of the nature of business organisations in emerging markets,
where there is often no separation of ownership and executive management. Paucity of
high quality executive management in the host country may tilt the balance in favour of
Mergers, a form of entry that allows the retention of the incumbent executive management
with an appropriate contractual agreement or JV. When the Asia Manager was further
probed about the change in strategy and why his ﬁrm preferred a merger to a JV, he
explained:
We hadjoint ventures that did not work. We had two in Thailand which fell
through. A joint-venture with a 50:50 split or a 51:49 split, historically we
find it very difficult in the emerging markets to pick the right group to work
with. They are the local company, they know the local way of doing
business and they tend to take advantage. So we now find a merger
company and those people become a part of TECHCON 7, we give them
shares so they become part of TECHCON 7 and expand that operation. It
means all of their efforts are focused on TECHCON 7 rather than
maximising returns from the joint-venture for their advantage. We want to
make sure the Manager has shares of TECHCON 7 and would grow the
business. The management just transitions into TECHCON 7 systems and
they become TECHCON 7 shareholders. Wefound that this strategy worked
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well for us but other people have made joint ventures work. But we just
don ’t like joint ventures.
When questioned if this could be termed as an acquisition of a company operating in a
similar domain, the Asia Manager clariﬁed:
We don 't call it an acquisition because acquisition implies that you buy the
other company and there are no shares swapped. We use the term merger
on the basis that we don’t change the management. The management just
transitions into TECHCON 7 systems and they become TECHCON 7
shareholders. Acquisition would be someone wants to sell the company and
have nothing to do with it but we still call it a merger because we would not
change the management.
They carried out a thorough due diligence on the prospective Indian ﬁrm to ensure a good
ﬁt. The Asia Manager met with the CEO of the Indian ﬁrm with whom they were going to
do the merger at least 10 times before ﬁnalising the next step of discussing the deal. He
sent his team of engineers to India to do a report on the cultural ﬁt, and assess if teams
from both these companies could work together. He was quite positive, in his judgment,
that the outcome would be positive, because there were many people in the Indian ﬁrm,
who had a cultural ﬁt with TECHCON 7. He observed that:
There is enormous growth potential not just for work but for people. The
growth potential for people is say much greater there than in Australia.
Australia is saturated if we need a hundred people in Australia, Malaysia
could probably give 20 and in India we could get a hundred in a few
months. The growth potential to support our operations in Australia and to
support the Middle East is more in India. Just requires detailed managing.
Although the sample of this study has one case of a merger as a strategy post entry, it gives
us valuable insights into managing operations in an emerging economy. The case
highlights the importance of retaining the existing management expertise of the merged
company, by converting the senior members into TECHCON 7 shareholders, thereby
tapping into their local knowledge and networks. Once they become shareholders their
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objective is to work towards improving the business of TECHCON 7. This case also brings
out the importance of the due diligence process before the merger to ensure a cultural and
professional ﬁt between the two entities. Once again, partner selection appears to be of
high importance.
5.5 Managing Liability of Foreignness as a Sole Venture
Past research in international business has discussed at length the importance of having a
local joint-venture partner in emerging economies to overcome the liability of foreigners,
but not much work has been done to investigate how the sole venture ﬁrms manage to
mitigate such costs of doing business in an emerging economy.
As discussed, strategic alliances have become increasingly important, but there is a high
level of dissatisfaction with actual outcomes relative to expectations and many are not
successful (Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Park and Russo, 1996). Although it is difﬁcult to
identify precise failure rates, international strategic alliances are likely to have high
dissolution rates (Hennart, Kim, and Zeng, 1998). Apart from this fact, the other
disadvantage in a joint-venture arrangement is the loss of control by the MNE and the fear
of misappropriation of the intellectual property by the local JV partner.
Some of the ﬁrms from this study indicated an awareness of this reality and therefore
shied away from the JV option. Interestingly, the sole venture mode appears to be the most
popular modal choice (n10) for the Australian MNEs. These ﬁrms devised other strategies
for overcoming the LOF and at the same time exercising full control over their
subsidiaries. Their strategies to obtain local knowledge and access to networks through
other means were quite successful. These ﬁrms either hired the services of
agents/consultants or employed retired senior government or public sector executives or
used both these strategies to overcome the liability of foreignness. These strategies are
discussed in the following sections. The difﬁculty of ﬁnding an appropriate JV partner was
cited as one of the reasons why these ﬁrms preferred to operate in the Indian market as a
sole venture and they devised other strategies to overcome the challenges of the local
business environment. This can be seen in the case of TECHCON 4. The Managing
Director of TECHCON 4 which is also operating in India as a sole venture shared his
experience:
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There are some precedents that we looked at that didn’t work out.
Companies came here via JV route and it would appear after some time
when the JV was established that the Indian company would poach the top
people from the company's side and the JV folded and then the Indian
company took over the business.
It appears that for consulting ﬁrms, the most valuable assets are their employees and the
ﬁrm’s tacit knowledge. The fear of losing their people to an unscrupulous joint-venture
partner and the negative experience of some other MNEs which entered India as a JV
prevented TECHCON 4from seeking a joint-venture partnership. The ﬁndings suggested
that in order to overcome the lack of market knowledge and the liability of foreignness, the
MNEs that operated as a sole venture adopted the strategy of employing retired senior
public servants/bureaucrats who had rich experience in the local industry, a strong network
and who could open doors of opportunity for them. These MNEs tapped into a talent pool
of highly experienced retired public servants who had extensive contacts and local
knowledge. The interviews revealed that these retired ofﬁcials earned a higher salary after
retirement and proved to be a very valuable source of knowledge and information because
of their experience and contacts. The Managing Director of TECHCON 4explained that his
strategy to overcome the liability of foreignness without having to rely on a JV partner was
to engage highly experienced Indian professionals who assisted him in navigating through
the bureaucratic hurdles and regulatory challenges.
We have a very good Indian general manager for business development
who has a very good knowledge of the market and the right networks and
through that, the contacts generally grow to the extent, that marketing is not
a big problem of mine. It's not sales but its delivery, getting the right
people. Our top technical guy is ex-chairman of a hydropower project in
India, he was a member of an electricity board, retired at 60, spent 10
years as adviser to the Government ofMauritius.
These retired professionals worked in senior positions in government or the public sector
before retirement and therefore had valuable knowledge and experience of how the system
functions. Another Australian MNE which operates as a sole venture is TECHCON 5 and
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the Project Development Director employed a similar strategy of hiring people who have
strong networks and relationships:
You’ve got to have Indian people in your company who can do deals for
you, who have the right contacts. You hire retired people from the Ministry
of so-and—so, they come and work for you and you keep them as your
employees. They can go to meet theirfriends with whom they worked in the
past, have breakfast or lunch with them and get issues sorted out. My
technical manager can go and see people that I can 't in a million years.
The researcher’s personal experience of working in the public sector in India conﬁrms
observations of the senior Managers of the Australian MNEs that many times it becomes
very difﬁcult to meet senior government ofﬁcials without the right contacts. Therefore by
employing such professionals who have a strong network, MNEs can circumvent the
bureaucratic hurdles. The MNEs rely upon these senior executives who focus on pro-
actively generating new investment opportunities via leads and contacts that come from
large personal contact networks that come from a lifetime of experience in the industry.
TECHCON 5 India is a hundred percent Indian registered company although it is 100%
owned by TECHCON 5 Australia. This ﬁrm indicated that another reason for their
preference for a sole venture was the fear that they would lose their ﬂexibility to change
direction in the future. This MNE also had a large number of managers who had worked in
India in the past, giving them the advantage of access to local knowledge and the
experience of working in the host country. The Project Development Director of _
TECHCON 5 India explained:
Our strategy in having 100% Indian registered company is to demonstrate
that we are not a foreign company as such. We also have a number of
managers who have worked in this part ofthe world so it is not an entirely
new environment for us. We might do joint ventures on a case-by—case
basis. The problem with joint venture is that you are stuck with a partner
and you might want to go in a different direction and this leads to
difﬁculties.
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TECHCON 5 wanted to demonstrate that they are not a foreign company and so they
registered as a 100% Indian company. This supports the Insitutional theory perspective that
ﬁrms tend to choose organisational practices and structures such as entry mode primarily
to gain legitimacy from both internal and external sources.
In the case of SOFTWARE 1, a ﬁrm from the Information Technology (IT) sector, the
rationale for opting for a sole venture was different. The Vice President of SOFTWARE I
mentioned that the motivation to operate as a sole venture was the control factor in the
business. They wanted high control over the business as they were concerned about
intellectual property rights issues in India. SOFTWARE 2, another ﬁrm from the IT sector
expressed similar sentiments. The General Manager of SOFTWARE 1 stated that his
company's strategy:
was incremental in that we put one toe in the water andfound that didn’t
get too bitten oﬂand then we put our whole foot in the water carefully and
cautiously to do it all by ourselves rather than a joint-venture. We didn’t
outsource or go for a joint-venture because the reason was control. It is
much easier to directly manage and control the team in India ourselves
rather than working through another party.
Therefore it can be observed that the rationale for operating as a sole venture was the
difﬁculty of ﬁnding an appropriate JV partner, the need for high control due the fear of the
loss of their intellectual property, and the availability of high quality professionals who
could assist the ﬁrm in overcoming the LOF through their experience and networks.
5.6 Overcoming the liability of foreignness through collaborative arrangements
The ﬁndings indicate that a ﬁrm can reduce its inherent liability of foreignness - its lack of
local knowledge, networks, familiarity with business customers, - through collaborative
arrangements. One such arrangement could be engaging with a local JV partner. Joint
ventures also enable the MNE to tap into the unique skills of the partner to overcome
weaknesses in its own capability base. Developed market ﬁrms try to leverage their
resources through partner selection. In particular, they emphasise complementary
capabilities and unique competencies in their partner selection. They also want to minimise
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costs, especially transaction costs and a local partner can help them mitigate these costs.
For instance, in emerging markets, corruption is seen as a cost of doing business. A local
JV partner in an emerging market has the capability of minimizing this cost and this
emerged during the interview with the Director of EandY when he stated that another
advantage of taking the JV mode is that the local partner is more knowledgeable about the
local institutional environment and can therefore better manage issues like bureaucracy and
corruption. The Director, EandY informed during the interview that:
They (MNEs) rely on their joint-venture partner and turn a blind eye to it
(corruption). Rightly or wrongly your conscience is clear. When you have
paid consultancy fees to someone to get a job done fully well knowing
where the money is going, you get comfort in the fact that you are not
directly involved
' So the advantages of having a local joint-venture partner mentioned above are strong
enough to motivate MNEs in selecting the JV mode. Although joint ventures enable
companies to buy protection from business risk in an uncertain environment it also brings
with it additional “relationship” risks as many joint ventures end up in mutual
disappointment. This is probably one of the reasons why ﬁrms tend to opt for a sole
venture model and tackle the LOF in another manner.
Beamish (1994) argued that joint ventures, the most common form of strategic alliance, are
the dominant form of strategy used in emerging markets by multinational ﬁrms. The
ﬁnding of this research, however, suggests that the sole venture is the dominant form of
strategy of Australian service MNEs in India and to mitigate the LOF, these ﬁrms used
other collaborative arrangements such as engaging local agents or consultants or
employing retired senior professionals with strong local knowledge and networks. This
strategy helps MNEs overcome the institutional challenges and at the same time gives
them a high control mode resulting in high returns. The results also highlight some
important characteristics of these MNEs’ investment in large emerging markets like India.
These MNEs displayed a sound awareness of the current state of the host country business-
supporting institutions and environment when they entered India, such that these
institutions did not have any major impact on the strategies they employed. The cases also
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suggest a link between MNEs clarity of local knowledge and reliance on it for developing
adaptive strategies.
5.7 Conclusion
When ﬁrms operate in foreign markets, they face cultural, political, economic, and
institutional settings that may differ from those they know. This is one of the important
themes in the international business literature, because operating in foreign markets is
generally agreed to involve uncertainty and lack of knowledge. MNEs try to overcome
these challenges through collaborative arrangements such as joint ventures or mergers and
acquisition. An international JV allows the MNE to share the costs and the risks of foreign
entry and to use the local partner's knowledge about the local institutional framework, local
consumer tastes, and business practices (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1991;
Erramilli and Rao 1993; Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Gomes-Casseresl989, 1990; Kogut
and Singh 1988). Firms opt for joint-venture mode to overcome the liability of foreignness.
However, it was observed that most of the sample Australian service MNEs (n10) operated
in India as a sole venture giving rise to the question — what type of strategies do these sole
venture ﬁrms devise to overcome the institutional distance and the LOF? In response to
this question, evidence from this study suggests that MNEs evolve alternative tactical
strategies to reduce the potential impacts of knowledge deﬁcit in an emerging market
through: local agents or consultants to provide localised advice and access to networks
or/and employing retired senior professionals with strong social andprofessional networks
within the government or public sector. These ﬁndings therefore do not conﬁrm the
proposition that emerged from the theoretical framework set out in Section 5.1 of this
chapter.
A critical step in the success of an alliance is the selection of partner. Even though partner
selection is vital, there has been little past research on this phenomenon (Beamish and
Lane, 1990; Geringer, 1988). The study suggests that alliance partners are selected largely
for access to resources that can be leveraged and capabilities that can be learned so they
can minimise their transaction costs. The MNEs attempt to leverage their resources to gain
a competitive advantage by searching for partners with unique competencies and local
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market knowledge and access. These views have been conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings of this
study.
These MNEs also rely heavily on locally recruited personnel, who are hired as individuals
or acquired en masse through mergers and acquisitions, which bring a stock of knowledge
about local history, patterns of living, politics and economic trends. Local partners, who
range from individual professionals to formal joint ventures, bring a similar stock of local
knowledge. Instances of these strategies have been explained in this chapter and were
observed across the sole venture Australian MNEs in India.
The analysis suggests that ﬁrms with prior experience in international business could use
their knowledge and experience of operating in uncertain environments and therefore were
more conﬁdent to choose a sole venture entry mode. MNEs that have more global
experience enact variants of these strategies, which seem to be applicable across the
emerging markets. Thus, the ﬁndings contribute to the knowledge of how sole venture
ﬁrms overcome the LOF without relinquishing control to a JV partner. These MNEs
increase their local knowledge by using local staff, agents, partners and advisors to guide
and manage relations with external stakeholders. In the case of the service sector this
becomes even more important, considering the fact that in the service sector the success
factor relies more on the local knowledge and interpersonal relations.
Institutional theorists (Dacin 1997, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991, Scott 1995)
suggest that organisations are motivated to enhance their legitimacy by conforming to
other organisations in the environment, even in the absence of evidence that such actions
increase internal efﬁciency. They argue that although conformist organisations are not
guaranteed to be more efﬁcient than their more deviant peers, they are rewarded for being
similar to other organisations. That similarity makes it easier for them to transact with each
other (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and increases the likelihood of their founding success
(Dacin 1997). Following the institutional-based logic, it is argued that MNEs choose
strategies that will help them gain legitimacy in and conform to the host-country
environment. The form of these strategic alliances varies depending upon the industry in
which a business operates and interaction with actors of the host country.
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Finally, the ﬁndings are also consistent with studies (see Aggarwal and Ramaswami 1992;
Terpstra and Yu 1988) that suggest that the factors that inﬂuence the choice of entry mode
by manufacturing ﬁrms are generalisable to services. The limitation of this study is the
small sample size but the ﬁndings could possibly lead to an emerging paradigm where
ﬁrms manage to overcome the LOF in an emerging market without a JV partner thereby
retaining full control over their overseas operations. Future research should examine this
area of study to identify the process of acquiring and leveraging local resources in an
emerging market to mitigate the LOF. The next chapter discusses the adaptive strategies of
these MNEs to overcome corruption, one of the biggest challenges in emerging markets.
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Chapter 6 : Corruption: Adaptive Strategies
6.1 Introduction
Corruption is a phenomenon found in virtually all countries and is particularly widespread
in transition and less-developed economies (Hellman et al., 2000). It appears to be an
accepted norm in the business environment of these emerging economies. When MNEs
operate in emerging economies, they frequently confront challenges associated with
corruption in governments. Challenges of entry and post-entry survival include accessing
infrastructure services, obtaining local licenses and managing a host of legal issues related
to operations. Uhlenbruck et al., (2006) have observed that political and economic risks
have received substantial attention from management practitioners and scholars but the risk
of government corruption has received much less interest. Corruption is a very broad term,
widely used in many different situations and often referring to quite different things.
According to Transparency International (2006), “corruption is operationally deﬁned as the
misuse of entrusted power for private gain”. It further differentiates between "according to
rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. “Facilitation payments, where a bribe is
paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do I
by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain
services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing” (Transparency International,
2006)
There has been extensive debate on whether corruption "greases the wheels" by enabling
individuals to avoid bureaucratic delays, or whether it "sands the wheels", mainly by
lowering the security of property rights and misallocating resources. One of the early
investigations on the impact of corruption on foreign investment in a cross-section of
countries was undertaken by Mauro (1995). He made use of an older corruption index
provided by Business International (BI), a private ﬁrm that sold this and related indicators
of country risks to banks, multinational companies, and other investors. His ﬁndings
revealed that corruption negatively impacts on the ratio of investment to GDP. Similar
results were obtained by Keefer and Knack (1995), who incorporate corruption among
other explanatory variables into one single index of "institutional quality.” These studies
have observed the impact of corruption on national economies but not at the ﬁrm level.
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This study looks at the impact of corruption on the ﬁrm and strategies ﬁrms employ to
navigate through this challenge. Based on the impact of corruption on the ﬁrm, this study
also assesses whether corruption reduces the FDI ﬂow into a country as suggested in
earlier studies. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials
in International Business Transactions, which was signed in 1997 and went into effect in
February 1999, criminalises bribery of foreign ofﬁcials by ﬁrms from member countries.
In spite of this agreement amongst members, corruption still is a very important issue to
combat as is evident from the indices produced by organisations such as Transparency
International and World Economic Forum. A growing body of research has shown that
corruption signiﬁcantly reduces direct investment ﬂows into an economy (Mauro, 1995,
1998; Wei, 1997). Habib and Zurawicki (2002) argue that corruption reduces aggregate
FDI even when controlling for political risk, cultural distance, and the difference in level-
of-corruption between two countries. This leads to the second proposition of this thesis.
Proposition: Corruption represents major barriers for MNEs in emerging markets and
signiﬁcantly reduces direct investmentﬂows into an economy.
This chapter will discuss the ﬁndings of this research on the issue of corruption and outline
the strategies adopted by Australian service MNEs to overcome this challenge. These
coping strategies will be discussed in the subsequent section. It is relevant to compare the
perceptions of corruption in the Australian and Indian context before discussing the
analysis of the case studies. According to the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom of The
Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, corruption in Australia is perceived as
minimal and Australia ranks 11th out of 179 countries in Transparency Intemational's
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007. The Australian government actively promotes
international efforts to curb the bribing of foreign ofﬁcials. In comparison, corruption in
India is perceived as signiﬁcant and India ranks 72nd out of 179 countries in Transparency
Intemational's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007. The report has observed that
corruption continues to be a major concern, especially in government procurement of
telecommunications, power, and defence contracts. This comparison suggests that
corruption will pose a serious challenge to Australian MNEs operating in India and,
therefore, is in line with the arguments of existing literature. In another study titled The
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Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 of the World Economic Forum (Figure 6.1),
corruption has been rated as the third most problematic factor for doing business in India.
Figure 6.1 Global Competitiveness Report 2008—2009 of the World Economic Forum
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In a study on FDI in developing countries, Doh et a1., (2003) have observed that these
countries have poorly developed and often ineffective institutional systems and corruption
is most rampant in these environments and creates the greatest potential for distorting
investment plans. They further add that while corruption is present in a variety of
industries and country settings, it is more common in certain sectors like infrastructure
projects which are especially prone to corruption because they involve large investments
and complex contracts in which corrupt payments can be easily disguised.
Now that India is playing an ever larger role in the world economy, the issue of corruption,
in both the private and public sectors, is coming into sharper focus. One strand in the knot
of corruption is the legacy of the License Raj, which ended in the early 19903. As
explained in Chapter 2, the system created bureaucracies that were all but self-
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perpetuating. In a context where government workers were routinely underpaid, corruption
became an industry all on its own. Faster growth has also raised the economic cost to ﬁrms
of delays in public approvals, giving ofﬁcials that much more 'hold-up' leverage over
private investors. Corruption is a large tax on Indian growth because it delays execution
and raises costs. According to extant literature, bureaucracy slows down the process and
corruption reduces the inﬂow of FDI into an economy but interestingly the Indian
economy has grown at an impressive growth rate of 9.4 per cent during 2006-07 as against
9 per cent in 2005-06 (Consulate General of India, 2008). This growth in FDI over
previous years therefore contradicts existing theory on the, impact of corruption on the
inward FDI in a country. When this contradiction was discussed with a senior executive
from one of the case study ﬁrms, he lightly remarked, “India grows at night because that’s
when bureaucrats are asleep. "
As mentioned earlier there has been little attention accorded to the question of how ﬁrms
respond to corruption (Uhlenbruck et a1, 2006). Generally, in the literature on management
and international business, it is assumed that government and its ofﬁcials operate so as to
maximize public wellbeing (Dunning 1993, Lenway and Murtha 1994). As a result 'of this
common presumption there is a dearth of research on how ﬁrms adjust their strategies in
response to governments and ofﬁcials that engage in self-serving behaviour and there is
little evidence on how ﬁrms cope with corruption apart from avoiding entry (Uhlenbruck et
a1, 2006). The aim of this section is to identify the different strategies MNEs adopt to
efﬁciently manage the issue of corruption and to assess whether they actually avoid entry
into a country where corruption is pervasive. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that MNEs
use different adaptive strategies to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption
and thus inward FDI is not affected negatively by the presence of corruption.
6.2 Adaptive business strategies in response to corruption
This study examines how ﬁrms operate in corrupt environments through their adaptive
strategies for operating in emerging markets. Uhlenbruck et al., (2006) have argued that
there are two dimensions of corruption: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. Pervasiveness
reﬂects the level or degree of corruption and arbitrariness reﬂects the degree of uncertainty
about the outcome of corruption. In this study of Australian ﬁrms in India, no evidence for
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arbitrariness of corruption was observed and so for the purpose of this study, corruption
will be only viewed as being pervasive in the Indian context.
Institutional theory predicts that ﬁrms adopt broadly diffused business practices out of
convenience, and to achieve access to resources and support by critical stakeholders
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991). In order to overcome the challenge of
corruption in an emerging economy, ﬁrms employ different strategies. In this section, the
themes that emerge explicate the adaptive strategies of Australian service MNEs.
In a study of local and foreign ﬁrm adaptation to corruption in India, Collins and
Uhlenbruck (2004) ﬁnd that if managers’ perceive the government to be corrupt, then there
is more likelihood that ﬁrms will engage in the practice of corruption. Corruption is a
covert operation and the respondents from the case study MNEs did not discuss details of
the incidents they experienced but they were willing to share their experience without
going into speciﬁcs. The information they shared was sufﬁcient to arrive at a conclusion
that this phenomenon needed to be managed very adroitly. A number of MNEs (n 9)
responded that they had encountered corruption in some form or the other in India. The
remaining ﬁrms (n 7) either did not encounter corruption (n 2) or knew it existed (n 5) and
therefore avoided bidding for government projects. These MNEs belonged to Information
Technology and Technical and Management Consulting. They preferred to work in the
private sector or on projects of World Bank or other such institutions. The nature of the
work of these ﬁrms did not require much interface with government and bureaucracy.
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Table 6.1 Corruption encountered by sample Australian MNEs
 
 
Corruption N %
Encountered 9 56.25
Not encountered 2 12.5
Avoided 5 31.25
Total 16 100    
N: number of ﬁrms; %: percentage within total number of responding ﬁrms.
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In this next section, the themes that emerge explicate the adaptive strategies of the MNEs
to overcome corruption.
6.2.1 Managing Corruption through Joint Venture Partners
The Australian service MNEs that faced the challenge of corruption (n9) mentioned that
they relied on their local joint—venture partners to interface with bureaucracy and the
government. Research indicates that a joint venture provides signiﬁcant sOurces for
legitimacy gains, as well as knowledge of how to deal with the local government and other
institutions (Makino and Delios, 1996; Shan and Hamilton, 1991). Foreign ﬁrms may be
induced to trade ownership for legitimacy in the local environment (Yiu and Makino,
2002). A further advantage of a local joint venture partner is the reduction in interaction
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with government agencies and the associated chance of meeting corrupt ofﬁcials, because
foreign ﬁrms are more often subjected to regulatory constraints than local ﬁrms (Yiu and
Makino, 2002).
The local joint venture partner would bring in the experience and expertise in handling
corruption related issues. When a ﬁrm invests overseas, it requires not only a major
resource commitment, but also ongoing direct management of the subsidiary and long-term
interaction with various local government agencies (Pan and Tse 2000). The subsidiaries
require local registration, permits, licences and various other government clearances, all
involving opportunities for extortion (Radaev 2000). The General Manager of HOSPI 2, a
large hotel chain pointed out that they needed more than 46 licences before they could start
their operations in Gurgaon, a city near New Delhi. He mentioned that in most of the cases
where licences or permits were required, there was this expectation from the government
departments of some sort of extra payment. This MNE overcame the frustrations of getting
the licences on time with the help of their local JV partner who was well connected to the
local authorities. He further explained:
The Indian market is diﬂicult and complex. It is good to have a partner who
knows the business and bureaucracy, a partner who has the right
connections.
This perspective was echoed in the comments of a Project Development Director of one of
TECHCON 5, Australia’s largest project development and contracting group in the
infrastructure sector:
We don't get involved in corruption, but there are some situations which
you are not sure whether you call them corruption or not, we manage that
through our associates. We rely upon our associates to ﬁnalise certain
deals or certain arrangements that have to be made, but that isn't any
different ﬁom anywhere else. That happens in Australia too, people don 't
talk about it.
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Another insight came from the Executive Director of BANK 1:
...... that's why we sometimesjoint venture with partners because sometimes
when we see something and say it doesn’t make sense, then they can guide
us and tell us that on the surface it doesn’t make sense but in reality it does
and here 's why, and you know, you could be playing by the rules and still
lose, that’s where Ifind operating in India a bit challenging. But as I keep
going back to the point that in most countries that you are going to go to,
you’ve got to understand the local dynamics. You needpeople who can sniff
the air so to speak.
The other ﬁrms agreed that their joint-venture partners had the right contacts and could
sniff the air and successfully manage the bureaucracy and corruption. Firms that did not
opt for a JV partner expressed their frustration in dealing with the bureaucracy and
corruption. In one case, the annoyance of the Project Manager of TECHCON 3, a large
publicly listed engineering, construction and asset support contractor, was clearly evident
when he remarked that:
...at every stage ofinteraction with the bureaucracy, it requires some sort of
greasing ofthe wheels.
This ﬁrm had operated in India as a sole venture. When probed further with the question -
if you had to do it all over again, what is it that you would do different — the project
manager responded with a big laugh:
The question should be- Would I really do it again? But if I was to do it
again, I will have preferred to have a strong presence in India but with
local participation
The Executive Director of BANK 1 made a hint about the presence of corruption in the
government:
In India the government can be very very bureaucratic. They are incredibly
slow and then one morning they wake up and say it’s gotta be done
132
tomorrow. I have seen many places in the world where the government can
drag its feet for months, but when it has to be done it has to be done very
quickly but in India, the quickly is to me unrealistically quick. And
sometimes you are worried about whether that’s because the process is
effectively stitched up?
Therefore it can be argued that one of the strategies to manage corruption is to operate with
a local joint-venture partner. To a great degree, governments “set the rules of the game”
that make up the fundamental reward structure of an economy and thereby determine the
nature of commercial activity within it. Corruption - the abuse of public power for private
beneﬁt — warps the rules of the game. Coping with corruption is seen as an intrinsic activity
in international business that sometimes offers appreciable advantages to individual ﬁrms
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). In this study, 55.5 % of the ﬁrms that encountered
corruption agreed that having a local JV partner with the right contacts is a successful
adaptive strategy in overcoming the bureaucratic and corruption issues. This is in
agreement with the ﬁndings of Smarzynska and Wei (2000) that corruption increases the
value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. The ﬁndings conﬁrm
existing theory that where there is corruption, ﬁrms tend to use local JV partners for
legitimacy gains as well as knowledge of dealing with the local government (Makino and
Delios, 1996 ).
6.2.2 Project-based Joint Ventures
Project-based joint ventures (a special type of alliance) are an often-used method to form
competitive organisational structures in the global market as they allow participants to
quickly put together project-needed assets on a short-term basis. First, project-based JVs
have a predetermined, limited life span. Their activities are oriented towards well-deﬁned
objectives. These JVs are terminated upon the completion of the given project.
The ﬁndings suggest that project based joint ventures were formed on a case by case basis
and were popular with the Australian service MNEs operating in infrastructure
consulting/construction projects. In projects where the MNE believes it has a distinct
competitive advantage, because of its resources and capabilities, it prefers to operate as a
sole venture but in circumstances when the MNE ﬁnds it hard to understand how a
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particular system works because of the prevalence of corruption, it engages a local JV
partner for that particular project. The ﬁndings reveal that these MNEs identify a JV
partner who has complementary skills and the local expertise to manage bureaucracy and
corruption because they know whom to pay, how to pay and when to pay. On completion
of the project, the partnership is dissolved. This strategy appears to be most popular with
MNEs involved in infrastructure projects. On condition of anonymity, one of the
respondents mentioned that the local JV partner has a good understanding of how the
system works and how to manage corruption where and when necessary. The Asia
Manager ofTECHCON 7, a leading engineering and project delivery ﬁrm added:
We do not want to engage in long term relations because the motivation of
the local JVpartner is often different. So we partner with someone who has
complementary expertise for the duration of the project. The partner also
manages the interactions with the government. So we are not associated
with any act, which may be deemed as corrupt.
In another case, the Project Development Director of TECHCON 5 shared a similar
experience:
In India, we didjoint-venture on an infrastructure project whichﬁnished at
the end of that job. We are doing other small projects with a company that
knows how the system operates.
By using this strategy of setting up a project-based joint-venture, ﬁrms gain the knowledge
and understanding of how the system works and over time build their capabilities to run
projects independent of relying upon project-based joint venture partners. Such
arrangements are popular in cases where there are ﬁrm—speciﬁc competitive advantages
and there is insufﬁcient knowledge about how the system in the particular country works.
6.2.3 Managing corruption at arms length - Local Agents/Consultants
The MNEs which encountered corruption relied upon their joint-venture partners to
manage any such issues. The others employed Agents/consultants to interface with the
government departments where corruption was anticipated. It was observed that these
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Australian service MNEs operated as sole ventures and were of the view that foreign
companies should hire an Indian consultant who would help them in business related issues
speciﬁc to India, including those areas where corruption is usually encountered. The
consultant will solve possible problems and then send an invoice for his ‘services’. The
risk is thus placed with the external consultancy company since the ﬁrm is only buying a
service from them. When questioned how most foreign companies in India overcome
corruption, the response of the Director from MGMTCON 2 was consistent with the
ﬁndings:
They (MNEs) rely on the joint-venture partner and turn a blind eye. Rightly
or wrongly your conscience is clear. Some use agents and give them
consultancy fees well knowing where the money is going but they get
comfort in the fact that they are not directly involved. Corruption is there
everywhere but the question is how endemic is it? Is it to the point where
businessfreezes? In most countries it is seen as the cost ofdoing business.
In cases where ﬁrms preferred to operate as a sole venture and were faced with licensing,
permits or other issues with the government, they used the services of an agent/consultant.
The process of hiring the services of an agent to manage the bureaucracy and red-tape was
very clearly explained by the General Manager of TECHCON 2, a high quality
infrastructure services provider:
In the government sector you are better of having an agent, so you call
tenders to select the agent. Ifyou have to build afactory, you need to get all
the approvals andyou could deal with the government and getﬁustrated or
you put tender ﬁrst to get an agent. Andput a price for the agent to get the
approvals so you’re following all your own procedures. You give the
contract to the best person at the best price, cheapest price, whatever, and
pay them on delivery so every time they deliver an approval they get paid.
Make sure your approvals are scheduled, say we will give 30% upfront
because they will need that so that if they have to go and pay for those
things like facilitation fees, that's part of the business. So you say we give
you 30% upfront to get things moving and when this approval comes in
we ’ll pay say 5% to 10% or whatever. So you do two things here - first of
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all, all the dealings are at arm ’s length, you have followed all your
procedures so when you get audited, no problems, secondly you’re actually
getting performance ........ We have had projects delayed so we have
decided to have an agent from the same industry. When you get an agent
you get someone who knows these people, who has been getting approvals
in the past so when they see him they know him and if he has to pay them,
our assumption is that that is part ofhisfees to get thejob done.
In most cases where the ﬁrm entered as a sole venture, there was support for this strategy
of hiring services of an agent/consultant to manage corruption and overcome difﬁculties of
dealing with the government. The consultant would charge a fee-for-service, and therefore
this would not be seen as a payment made to disguise bribery. It would simply be seen as
consultancy fees. The Asia manager ofTECHCON 7 added:
As you are aware there are so many different licences to be obtainedfrom
different quarters andﬁrms might face difficulty if they are not oiling the
wheels. That’s where the use agents and services of the agent factors into
the cost ofgreasing the palms.
The global experience of the managers of such MNEs led them to believe that corruption is
prevalent in all countries, and it only differs in degrees. In either case, it was observed that
corruption was being managed efﬁciently at arms length. Therefore the above argument
leads to the point that the more pervasive corruption is, the more likely it is for the MNEs
to encounter such pressures to engage in corruption. Mitnick (1993) argues that alternative
forms of contracting the services of government agents (providing "facilitating services" or
"beneﬁcial decisions") have to be considered by an MNE in corrupt environments. The
ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this argument and indicate that ﬁrms conform to
the institutional practices of the countries they operate in. If the local ﬁrms are greasing
the wheels and getting their jobs done, the MNEs would be disadvantaged if they allowed
bureaucratic hurdles to delay their projects. Therefore they conform.
6.2.4 Avoidance strategy
Doh et al., (2003) have identiﬁed avoidance as a cost of corruption highlighting that ﬁrms
may be forced to engage in expensive efforts to avoid and limit their exposure to extortion
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by corrupt ofﬁcials, including hiding output and opting out of the ofﬁcial economy.
However, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that the Australian service MNEs did not opt
out of the ofﬁcial economy. Instead of opting out of the market, they either used the
contacts and local knowledge of the joint-venture partners, hired services of
agents/consultants or avoided participating in government contracts. Some MNEs found
other opportunities in the economy, like working for ﬁrms in the private sector or other
large MNCs, which they found to be free of corruption. They also found opportunities for
working on projects of international clients, like the World Bank or the Asian
Development Bank. The evidence therefore suggests that these MNEs did not opt for the
avoidance strategy in the face of corruption, as suggested in existing literature, but instead
identiﬁed other opportunities offered in the emerging market.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4explained that his ﬁrm stayed clear of corruption
by not getting involved directly with the government, but that he was aware of the reality:
There is this expectation ofgovernment ofﬁcials always wanting more and
more. TECHCON 4itself is a government owned business. We have
impeccable credentials in terms ofbribery. I’d be stupid to say that there is
no corruption, we do know our clients sometimes are involved in corrupt
practices to get contracts awarded. I’d be stupid ifwe say that we would not
deal with the client because we know that they are involved in corrupt
practices. Wejust know that we are not involved.
This suggests that the ﬁrm had no hesitation in dealing with other ﬁrms which might be
involved in corrupt practices as long as they were not involved in corruption. The Regional
Manager (India) of TECHCON 2 Group, a leading engineering and development
consultancy made the following remarks which tried to draw the line between what is
corrupt and what is not considered corrupt.
Australian laws enable you to make paymentsfor things that are done every
day, for instance, if you’re trying to get something clearedfrom customs,
you can make a payment there or ifyou are getting a bill cleared, can make
a payment there. We 're talking about baksheesh (a Hindi wordfor Tip) you
know, 500-1000 rupees. You have to do that because it keeps the machinery
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operating. Everybody does it whether they say they do it or not. It is allowed
under the Australian laws. Beyond that you have to take a stand, saying
we ’re not interested in that type ofproject andfocus more on projects from
World Bank and Asian Development Bank. This way we’re not directly
involved with the government. Private sector in India is booming. They need
quality work and there is no corruption within the private sector.
In the case of TECHCON 7, the Asia Manager shared his experience of his encounter with
corruption but, in this case, the ﬁrm refused to come under pressure of corruption:
Some of the big international consultants accept the fact that corruption is
part of the business when you’re dealing with these ministries. We did one
projectfor the Ministry ofDefence and that was quite a clean job. The only
problem was that we would get paid late because we were not willing to pay
to get paid It was a $6 million fee and at one time we had one million-
dollar outstanding. It was delayed by one year and I knew I could get it
done by bribing but I was not willing to do that. We will not get involved in
bribing anybody. That's the Australian law.
Similarly, TECHCON 1 and a few other ﬁrms preferred to avoid dealing in government
contracts and thus protecting themselves from the cost of corruption. The Senior Manager
of TECHCON 1 had similar views to share:
It is an offence in Australia to bribe aforeign official since July 1999 in line
with US FCPA. In my view, there are many successful companies that have
refused to make any illegal payments. Legislation in both US and Australia
draws a distinction between facilitation payments and bribe which is
designed to corrupt.
Ifyou give in to bribes in the first instance the bribe takers will come back
for more because people know that your company is dishonest.
These ﬁrms believed that the private sector in India employs top level staff and managers,
and they pay them huge salaries. Some salaries are higher than Australian salaries, and so
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there is no corruption but people in the government sector are not paid well enough and
this leads to corruption.
6.3 Corruption and FDI flows
Some studies have concluded that a widespread ﬁrm-level response to corruption appears
to be outright avoidance of a market which is characterised by corruption (Doh et al.,
2003). However, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that ﬁrms do not outrightly avoid the
market but instead look for opportunities where they are not directly involved with the
government. Alternative strategies are to or rely on their JV partners or use the services of
agents or consultants. As a result, the ﬂow of FDI into the economy is not directly affected.
This is further corroborated by the data from Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion, Government of India which shows that the FDI in India has shown an increase
from $US 4.03 billion in 2001 to $US 34.4 billion in 2008 (India FDI Fact Sheet, July
2009, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India).
In an earlier study, Mauro (1995) had claimed that if Bangladesh were to improve the
integrity of its bureaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay, its investment rate would
increase by almost ﬁve per cent of GDP. This implies that the investment would go up if
the integrity of the bureaucracy improves. In spite of the ranking of India by Transparency
Index and other rating agencies on corruption has not improved over the past few years, the
FDI in India has seen an increase. It is difﬁcult to suggest that FDI could go higher if
corruption reduced. However, based on previous studies on corruption, it may be added
that corruption might affect those markets like Uganda or Pakistan, which may not be very
attractive in terms of size, growth and political stability. And therefore ﬁrms probably
might avoid those markets, but in the case of large and attractive markets like India and
China, ﬁrms ﬁnd creative ways and strategies to overcome this challenge. China and India
continue to rank ﬁrst and second in the 2007 Foreign Direct Investment Conﬁdence Index,
a regular survey of global executives conducted by management consulting ﬁrm AT
Kearney. In a recent article, the Managing Director of AT Kearney India stated, “Both
developed and developing country investors will continue to cite India and China as their
most preferred destination for ﬁrst time investments” Therefore a closer look is needed to
understand in what ways corruption impacts the inward ﬂow of FDI in an economy if the
opportunities offered in the economy are very attractive.
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Although most of the Australian service MNEs had similar views on corruption in India
there were some who expressed a different view. When asked about corruption in the
Indian environment, a few stated that they did not face any corruption issues. These ﬁrms
belonged to the Consulting, Franchising and Information Technology sector. This suggests
that not all the ﬁrms are equally affected by corruption and therefore it cannot be
generalised that all ﬁrms are affected by corruption in an emerging economy. The
Chairman of a MGMTCON 1 further clariﬁed:
I think there is a wrong perception about India in Australia. I don't think
corruption is an issue. Most Australians are parochial and still think that
like the second-hand car salesman, the Indians are rug traders who cannot
be trusted
It appears that there is a mistaken perception in the existing literature that corruption
affects all ﬁrms in the same way, when in fact it can have different impacts on ﬁrms from
different industries.
6.4 Conclusion
The above analysis leads us to conclude that ﬁrms face different types of challenges of
varying levels of complexity in the host country context because every type of entrant has
specialised objectives, resource needs, activities, regulatory requirements, capabilities and
levels of exposure to government services. When corruption is widespread, i.e., highly
pervasive, local ﬁrms, as well as MNE subsidiaries, are more likely to comply with corrupt
practices (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006) and the ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this
argument. However, the ﬁndings do not support the views of Doh et al., (2003) which
suggest that MNEs that have a zero tolerance for corruption will avoid such markets. This
study revealed that MNEs do not have to avoid such markets because they ﬁnd business
opportunities in the private sector which they ﬁnd free of corruption. According to the
findings of this study, there are many corruption-related issues involved when doing
business in India and they can be separated into three categories.
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These include:
1. Access to government contracts: Many businesses are interested in obtaining
government contracts due to the huge proﬁt margins. This creates intense competition, as
ﬁrms struggle to be the ones to win such contracts. In emerging markets, this creates an
environment in which corruption thrives.
2. Obtaining permits and licences: Any business wanting to do business in India will need
to have different permits and licenses, usually many of them. Those responsible for issuing
these have the opportunity to earn an extra income by slowing the process down. This
would cause disruptive delays for ﬁrms, and to avoid such delays, ﬁrms will need to devise
“creative” strategies.
3. Taxes: The taxes in India are very complex and vary between states. The rules for these
are extremely complicated and create many problems for the ﬁrms.
While corruption is present in a variety of industries and country settings, the ﬁndings of
this study reveal that it is more common in certain sectors. For instance, infrastructure
projects are especially prone to corruption because they involve large investments and
complex contracts in which corrupt payments can be easily disguised. The evidence
indicates that Australian service MNEs use local joint ventures partners or
agents/consultants as part of an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the
presence of corruption.
The ﬁndings from this study questions that corruption necessarily is a barrier to FDI.
Rosenzweig and Singh, (1991) have observed that studies of international business
behaviour are built around the fact that crossing borders through trade and investment
brings a ﬁrm into different environments that require various types of adaptations. During
the course of data collection and analysis, it has emerged that Australian service MNEs
develop their own adaptive strategies to overcome the challenge of corruption, if at all it
exists in the particular industry in which they operate. The ﬁndings further reveal that the
previous experience of the ﬁrm/managers is a contributory factor in assisting them in their
ability to successfully develop adaptive strategies for managing the post entry phase.
It may therefore be incorrect to generalise that since there is corruption in certain sectors, it
impacts the volume of FDI into a particular country. Manufacturing sector appears to be
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more prone to corruption because of the number of regulatory clearances it might require
or the multitude of taxes it is subject to compared with the MNEs from the services sector.
Moreover, in spite of the prevalence of corruption in certain key sectors in India,
investment in India has grown rapidly over the past few years as is evident from the AT.
Kearney FDI Conﬁdence Index 2007 which rates India as the second most attractive
destination for FDI.
While previous research has found that the level of corruption reduces FDI (Habib and
Zurawicki 2002, Mauro 1995, Smarzynska and Wei 2000), this study has found evidence
that corruption does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the FDI ﬂow in an economy and
that ﬁrms sometimes adapt to corruption not by avoiding market entry altogether, but by
choosing joint venture partners or by leveraging on the contacts (networks and
relationships) of agents/consultants. These strategies provide opportunities for ﬁrms to
participate in economies where corruption is high, while minimising some of the costs of
corruption. In the case of services, where there is less interaction with the government
agencies as compared to the manufacturing sector, corruption does not pose a serious
challenge.
The more successful MNEs develop better repertoires and coordinate them more
effectively (Mahini, 1988). To sum up, it can be stated that the behavior of international
ﬁrms is affected by the industries to which they belong when it comes to dealing with
challenges of bureaucracy and corrUption. The ﬁndings suggest that corruption is a part of
the business culture in emerging markets. There are several other aspects of culture, which
can act as barriers to efﬁcient operations in an emerging market and these are discussed in
the following chapter.
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Chapter 7: Bridging the cultural distance
“Culture is more often a source ofconﬂict than ofsynergy. Cultural differences are a
nuisance at best and often a disaster. " -Prof. Geert Hofstede
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the cultural and normative challenges faced by Australian service
sector MNEs in India and identiﬁes their business strategies to overcome such challenges.
The differences in national cultures or the relative ‘cultural distance” between countries
have been an important concern in the study of MNE strategies (Barkema et al., 1996;
Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). Cultural distance refers to the distance between one
national culture and another in terms of values, beliefs and deep-rooted assumptions
(Kogut and Singh 1988). Cultural variation impacts both the MNE's external and internal
environments. In the environment external to the MNE, cultural differences are reﬂected in
varying levels of transparency related to the host country’s regulatory regime and the
institutional practices and procedures. In the internal environment, cultural differences
manifest themselves in observable behaviour differences and less observable value
differences of individuals.
When examining the role of cultural distance, most studies theorise that, as the cultural
differences between an MNE’s home country and a host market increase, the underlying
ability of the MNE to operate effectively in the host market decreases (Gomez-Mejia and
Palich, 1997; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Increased operational difﬁculties resulting from
cultural distance are in general derived from a lack of understanding of norms, values and
institutions. The proposition developed from the existing literature on Institutional theory
reviewed in Chapter 3 states that high cultural distance can limit the MNE’s ability to
operate efﬁciently because of a lack of knowledge about host country norms and culture
and the gaps in understanding caused by cultural differences.
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More formally:
Proposition: The ability of a MNE to operate effectively in a host country decreases as
the cultural distance increases because of inconsistencies in values and institutions
between the home and host country.
When a MNE operates in an emerging market environment, it is faced with unique
challenges stemming from external and internal stimulants which are culturally different
from those existing in its home country. The MNE will need to develop and be able to rely
on a number of new external relationships in the host country with suppliers, customers,
government ofﬁcials and other stakeholders. In addition, the MNE will be managing
employees from the host country who are used to working in the local environment without
much exposure to the Western management practices. Thus, the MNE must adapt to the
host country culture, as reﬂected in the external and internal environments, to minimise the
potential liability stemming from its foreign status (Zaheer, 1995). Much of international
business research today incorporates national culture as a key variable. Studies are often
aimed at understanding how culture explains patterns in the economic activities of
individuals, groups, organisations, nations, or regions. To study cultural aspects,
Sivakumar and Nakata (2001) assert that the cultural framework that has generated the
utmost attention from business scholars in recent years is Hofstede's cultural factors.
Therefore, to gain an understanding of the level of cultural difference between Australia
and India, Hofstede’s (1980) cultural values model has been adopted. This model deﬁnes
national culture using four dimensions of cultural values. A ﬁfth dimension of national
culture known as Confucian dynamism was later added by Hofstede (1997) based on
studies of values in Asian cultures (Hofstede and Bond, 1997) which focuses on time-
orientation and Confucian values and was derived from the Chinese value survey,
originally developed for use in China by the Chinese Culture Connection (Hofstede and
Bond, 1997). This determined that long-term orientation versus short-term orientation in
life was an additional dimension that differentiated Western and Asian cultures. The
limitation of Hofstede’s work is that the cultural dimensions were based on data collected
three decades ago. Its usefulness when matched to current ﬁrm data is increasingly
questionable (Shenkar, 2001). In a separate study, Fernandez et al. (1997) have suggested
that there have been signiﬁcant shifts in classiﬁcation of values in some countries since
Hofstede conducted his original study because of the external environmental changes over
the years. Inspite of these limitations, Delios and Beamish (2004) have observed that even
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though these value dimensions share overlaps with values elucidated in Trompenaar’s
cultural dimension model and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s value orientation framework,
Hofstede’s framework is the most frequently referenced model because it relates to the
practice of international business. The ﬁve dimensions of Hofstede’s framework are:
1. Power distance (PDI) - how a culture deals with inequality between superiors and
subordinates.
2. Individualism (IDV) - individualism, as opposed to collectivism, stands for the
preference of people to belong to a loosely versus a tightly knit social framework.
3. Masculinity (MAS) - masculinity, as opposed to femininity, represents the degree
to which people prefer values of success and competition over modesty and
concern for others.
4. Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) - uncertainty avoidance represents the degree to
which people tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity.
5. Time orientation (LTO) - a culture’s perspective on time.
The cultural differences between Australia and India on these ﬁve dimensions of culture
are displayed in Figure 7.1 The differences on each dimension seem signiﬁcant which
implies that the cultural distance between the two countries is large and, therefore,
according to existing literature, the Australian MNEs ability to operate effectively would
be adversely affected in India. This chapter examines the cultural challenges faced by the
Australian MNES and identiﬁes the strategies crafted by them for effective and efﬁcient
operations in India.
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Figure 7.1: Hofstede's Framework for Assessing Australian and Indian culture
 
Australi a
 
El I-‘UL'I I: ‘EmgrtaTm :3 Group v: om
PDI IDV MAS UN LTCI   
Source: (Online) http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede australiashtml
India
PD! IDV MAS UAI LTO   
Source: (Online) http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_india.shtml
The ﬁndings and discussion in this chapter are based on the themes that emerged from the
in-depth interviews with senior managers of Australian service MNEs operating in India.
One very interesting ﬁnding that merits attention before the results are discussed in detail
is that most of the managers of the Australian MNEs spoke about the commonalities rather
than differences that they saw between Australia and India. They pointed to the 3 Cs
common between Australia and India - Cricket, Curry and Commonwealth - and
believed that the 3 Cs gave them an advantage in India when compared with MNEs from
other countries like the US and UK.
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Although these managers faced cultural challenges while operating in India, the way they
succeeded in coping with them reﬂected their ﬂexible and adaptive management style. It
appeared from the interviews that their perception of the commonalities that Australia and
India shared gave them a positive outlook which helped in reducing the barriers. Cricket
seemed to be the biggest icebreaker in any business meeting or in dealing with bureaucrats.
Another common theme that emerged from all the interviews was the acceptance of
cultural sensitivity as a key factor in working around cultural issues, both internal and
external.
The existing literature suggests that if the culture of a host country is different from the
home country, it may adversely affect an individual’s ability to behave appropriately in
that culture (Black and Stephens, 1989). The study of cultural distance in international
business research carries with it the assumption that differences between host and home
country cultures increase the cost of entry, decrease operational beneﬁts and hamper the
ﬁrm's ability to transfer core competencies to foreign markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989;
Palich and Gomez-Mejia, 1999). However, the ﬁndings of this study differ from these
views because most (n12) of the participating MNEs conﬁrmed that culture was not a
major challenge in India because of the way in which they managed their operations and
the positive perception about the commonalities between the two countries. The remaining
MNEs (n 4) found that culture was a major issue and from the observations and interviews,
it appears that these MNEs had strong preconceived notions about the difﬁculty of doing
business in India. For example, the comments of the Project Director of TECHCON 3
Engineering - “Culture is probably the most difﬁcult thing for people to grasp, it is very
alien to the Western world”— are consistent with the arguments of Kogut and Singh (1988)
that in more culturally distant countries, ﬁrms would face higher management costs. These
costs may be perceptual only or accurate appraisals of the increased difﬁculties of
managing a foreign workforce in a culturally distant country. Therefore, cultural distance
has been linked to increased difﬁculties and higher costs of managing a foreign workforce.
These MNEs in did not see the commonalities between the two countries but instead
focussed only on the large differences in culture and the uncertainty in the environment.
The ﬁndings revealed another factor that may have also contributed to bridging the cultural
distance for most of the Australian service MNEs. This was identiﬁed as the favourable
perception Indians held of the Australians in comparison to the Americans and British.
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Although Australia, US and UK are considered developed countries of the Western world,
the difference in the way the Australians were perceived by the Indians gave Australian
MNEs a distinct advantage which has been termed as the “Aussie Advantage”. Therefore
it would be incorrect to assume that all developed Western countries face the same liability
of foreignness in an emerging market.
Table 7.1 Impact of Culture on responding Australian Firms
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7.2 The Aussie Advantage
The interview with the CEO of HOSPI 2 offered an insight into some of the commonalities
perceived by the senior managers of the Australian service MNES.
In India, even at the lowest level, it is very easy to understand what is
happening. There is a commonality because ofthe British rule. We have the
levelling issue, something to talk about and it is always cricket (laughs).
People laugh when I say that but I tell you, I was with some very senior
executives and politicians and the icebreaker was cricket. It’s quite easy to
deal with Indians. In comparison with China it is definitely much easier to
do business in India. Whenever I go to India, I go to China and I can easily
compare the difference. I am more used to the curry than eating frogs etc
ﬂaughs). China is more sophisticated in the cities but it is much easier for
me to make the cultural match-up in India.
Most of the respondents emphasised the commonality between Australia and India. The
Principal of MGMTCON 1 summarised:
We talk about cricket, we talk about Westminster system, about colonial
heritage, there is commonality between Australia and India, which is not
found between America and India or England and India.
He offered another insight into the Aussie advantage which referred to the personality of
the Australians and their adaptability.
One thing we always say, which may not be true is that the Australian
personality is pretty adaptable. We know we are not a big power, we don ’t
have the arrogance or snobbery of I am generalising now, ofthe British or
the arrogance and the bigpower thing about the Americans. We Australians
are not very class conscious or status conscious. Australia is a tough
country, to make this country what it is, people had to work bloody hard
You know the Digger thing. Australian soldiers roughing it tough in the
world wars. Australians are pretty good at working in diﬁ‘icult and dijferent
environments.
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The Principal of TECHCON 8 shared a similar viewpoint. When asked if he saw any
cultural distance between Australia and India he responded:
..... except on the cricket ﬁeld There are people in our Sydney ofﬁce who
are differentfrom each other so we can say that there are no major cultural
issues that we faced. We’ve worked in China and Indonesia and other
countries and so culture is not an issue for us. One of the reasons why
Australians are successful is that we are very exportable. We have a very
multicultural society. We are very easy with people.
These comments highlight the Australian characteristics that endear them to people of
other nationalities and according to the respondents, these positive impressions might have
played a part in gaining acceptance of the people in India and bringing down cultural
barriers.
The Director of MGMTCON 2 added a new dimension to the Aussie advantage. He spoke
about the cultural sensitivity of the Australians when he stated:
I don ’t think there is large cultural distance underlying the business drivers.
Cultural differences tend to be a problem where there is insensitivity.
Between Australia and India there are cultural differences but most
Australian companies are very keen to see that they are doing the right
thing culturally. Americans do business differently so it is not appropriate
to say that all Western countries operate in a certain manner because the
Australian companies invest a lot of time in understanding the culture and
behaving accordingly.
The ﬁndings of this study support his comments about the Australian companies’ concern
for culture which is explained in more details in the subsequent sections. The Executive
Director of BANK 1 echoed similar sentiments and as he put it:
The benefits ofcomingfrom a small market like Australia is that you expect
that you have to change and adapt unlike the US which has set standards
and gets very upset when they realise that people don 't do things their way.
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In a bigger market, people get used to doing certain things in the home
market and think it will be the same in other markets. It's like Americans
drink soft drinks and they think this trend will follow, and the rest of the
world will eventually come to their level of consumption. I'm not sure if
that ’s actually right.
The above examples suggest that in spite of cultural differences between Australia and
India, these managers were able to overcome the cultural challenges by their ﬂexibility,
adaptability, cultural sensitivity and positive perception of the commonalities between the
two countries. As a result, they did not view culture as a source of conﬂict. The
respondents frequently mentioned that multi—culturalism in Australia gave them the added
advantage to deal successfully with people from different cultures and therefore it may be
argued that as a result of the above stated reasons, Australian MNEs enjoyed a country-0f-
origin advantage over MNEs from other Western nations. More recently there have been
several efforts by the Australian federal and state government led business missions to
India to foster the business relationships between the two countries and according to the
respondents, this has further raised Australia's proﬁle in India. The Aussie Advantage
emerged as one of the key features of success in the data.
7.3 Cultural challenges in the external environment
The analysis of the case studies brought out the similarities between the Australian service
MNEs in managing the cultural challenges in India, both within and outside their
organisation. Cultural differences are reﬂected in the formal governance structures, laws
and practices, as well as in the more informal, undocumented contracting practices of the
market - all of which impact MNE transactions (Kostova and Zaheer,1999). Cultural
distance can be at the root of interpersonal barriers between members of the MNE and
outside parties, which may cause friction that interferes with doing business efﬁciently in
the new context (Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997). In order to overcome such friction,
individuals need to calibrate themselves to the new culture and adapt their behavior and
practices to the new setting (Newman and Nollen, 1996). According to the ﬁndings, the
challenges that the Australian service MNEs encountered in the external environment
include bureaucracy and corruption, dealing with family ﬁrms, dependability of suppliers,
negotiation and people's behaviour patterns. The strategies of overcoming the challenges of
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corruption have been dealt in detail in Chapter 6 where it was concluded that some MNEs
avoided bidding for Government contracts where they encountered corruption and instead
worked only for the private sector. There were other MNEs which either used
agents/consultants or relied on their JV partners to tackle issues related to corruption. The
ﬁndings indicate that the MNEs gained a clear understanding of the formal government
structures and used external knowledge sources where required to understand the informal
practices that facilitate or impede the formal processes. The following sections discuss the
cultural challenges faced by Australian service MNEs in their external environment and the
adaptive strategies employed by them to overcome these challenges.
7.3.1 Managing the bureaucratic process
In the cases Where the MNEs had to engage with bureaucracy and government departments
(n11), it was found that there was a reasonable level of frustration with regards to
transparency. BANK 1 had lost the bid for the restructuring and modernisation of the
International Airport in Delhi in 2005. The Executive Director of BANK 1 shared his
experience of the bidding process in India. Recounting his experience, he pointed out that
the process of bidding for major contracts in India was not very transparent. He compared
the Australian and Indian bidding process to highlight the difference:
In Australia the bid processes are very very structured. You have very strict
structured rules around what can be done and what cannot. Once you put
your bid in, that's it. Fundamentally you cannot change it. But in India it is
different. My people say to me that it is important to put the bid in and if
required we can make some changes later on. So that’s part of
understanding the local culture. That’s a tricky thing in globalising your
business, you need to understand that in different cultures there are
different accepted norms, that’s why we sometimes joint venture with
partners because sometimes when we see something and say it doesn’t make
sense, then they guide us and tell us that on the surface it doesn’t make
sense but in reality it does and here ’s why. You could be playing by the
rules, and lose, that's where Iﬁnd operating in India a bit challenging. But
as I keep going back, in most countries that you go to, you got to
understand the local dynamics.
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Comments such as the above fall in line with the question raised by Peng et al., (2008:
924) for MNEs in emerging economies: “How to play the game, when the rules of the
game are changing and not completely known?” In such situations, the importance of
understanding the informal/unwritten cultural norms and values in an emerging market
assume greater importance. To move forward, this Executive Director indicated that it
would be necessary to establish strong relationships that could provide knowledge about
the local context. He further explained his experience and strategy:
The bidding process was quite tortured, very bureaucratic and seemed to
favour home guys so to speak. We found for instance in Korea and India
that in certain industries in different parts ofthe economy, you need to have
contacts and connections and long-standing business relationships, and in
some cultures it is very important to have that long-standing relationship.
You cannotjust walk into the market and create it. So it is better to team up
with someone who has the long-standing relationships. Investing in
inﬁastructure gives you a high public profile so we thought we 'd rather
have a partner who has extremely good connections, local understanding
and knowledge ofthe home market.
An intemet search on the subject of the bidding process led to discovery of the following
information which indicated that BANK 1 did not score well in comparison to the other
bidders. This information had been accessed to conﬁrm if there was any reporting bias in
the respondent’s remarks. The table 7.2 below show the marks that were obtained by each
of the bidders for the Delhi and Mumbai airport bids as given in the Cabinet note of the
Government of India.
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Table 7.2 Delhi Airport: Bidders Marks in per cent
  Pan Parayatan-TAV 39.2 40.3
GMR-Fraport 84.9 80.1
D S Construction- 72.7 69.9
Munich
BANK 1-ADP 57 61.9
Reliance-ASA Mexico 80.2 81     
Mumbai Airport: Marks in per cent
  
 
Pan Parayatan-TAV 28.3
GMR-Fraport 84.9 92.7
D S Construction- 72.7 54.1
Munich
BANK1-ADP 57 ' 65.1
Reliance-ASA 80.4 80.2
MeXico
GVK—ACSA 75.8 59.3     
Source: (Online) http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/30paran.htm (accessed on 28
November 2008)
Based on this evaluation, two consortia —GMR-Fraport and Reliance-ASA were short
listed. In an article dated 30 December 2005 in Rediff News titled “How the airport bids
were evaluated” the authors, Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Ranabir Majumdar in New
Delhi had the following comments on the BANK 1 bid.
The BANK I-ADP bid, according to the cabinet note, gave 'an impression of
being put together in haste.’ It had 'substantial gaps’ in information that
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'reduced signiﬁcantly the score' given to the bidder. The Indian partner in
the consortium was part of the Sterlite group headed by Anil Agarwal.
BANK I had utilised a special purpose vehicle while participating in the
offer. This apparently meant that ’the experience ofthe Sterlite group could
not be taken into account in the evaluation.’
The article examines the details of the bureaucratic process involved in the evaluation of
the bids at the ministerial level and at one stage remarks: “Clearly, all was not well with
the biddingprocess. ”
This lends support to the contention of the respondents that bidding requires considerable
knowledge about the tendering processes and policies and familiarity with key decision
makers. The ﬁndings reveal that the strategy to gain access to the decision makers was to
partner with a local ﬁrm with well established connections. BANK 1 partnered with the
State Bank of India which is one of the largest banks in the country. Similarly, TECHCON
7 opted for a merger with a local company in Delhi and AIR 1 had a code sharing alliance
with Jet Airways. The alternate strategy to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles was to
employ retired senior public servants who have a deep understanding of how the
bureaucratic system operates and who have strong relationships with the key decision
makers. MNEs such as TECHCON 5 and TECHCON 4who are operating as sole ventures
employed this strategy discussed in detail in Section 7.4.5. The MNEs like SOFTWARE 1,
SOFTWARE 2 and MGMTCON 1 that did not participate in government contracts were
affected minimally by this challenge in the external environment. The ﬁndings indicate
that bureaucracy does not impact equally on all MNEs.
7.3.2 Dealing with family ﬁrms
When doing business in India, it is important to have an understanding of the family ﬁrm,
described by Litz (1997) as a business in which “ownership and management are
concentrated in a family unit and in which individuals within the ﬁrm seek to perpetuate or
increase the degree of family involvement.” Although family ﬁrms are also found in the
West, they are more common in India and it is important to understand where the focal
point of the control and decision-making centre is located in such ﬁrms if meaningful
discussions and negotiations are to take place. This aspect was highlighted by the
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Managing Director of MGMTCON 1 when discussing if culture was an issue of concern to
the Australian MNEs:
I think culture is not an issue. It is an issue but don 't make it bigger than it
actually is. 1 think the main cultural issue that manyforeigners have to deal
with in India is that many companies in India listed on the stock exchange
are owned by afamily and so you are not dealing with a normal culture ofa
corporation. You are dealing at the end ofthe day with afamily. So to get a
decision you might be thinking I am talking to the CEO who is a
professional but in actual fact, he ’s got to go and talk to the old man ofthe
family.
Although this respondent emphasised that culture is not a major issue, he did provide an
example of the complexity in dealing with most Indian business ﬁrms in which the control
and decision making rests with the head of the family and not the CEO. Therefore, it is
important to understand who the ﬁnal decision maker is in a particular ﬁrm so that the
appropriate person in the business is engaged in the discussion/negotiation right from the
start. Indeed Kotkin (1992) argues that in China, Japan and India, the family is the ﬁrm and
so MNEs should understand and appreciate how business families and their family ﬁrms
operate. The ﬁndings of this study support this View (n12).
7.3.3 Reliability of Suppliers
In terms of dealing with the external environment, the ﬁndings indicate that suppliers in
India are not dependable in terms of delivery time and quality. This can be very frustrating
for a business which is used to operating in the markets of the developed economies where
supplier reliability and dependability is high. This concern was shared by most (n14) of the
respondents who had to deal with external suppliers. In order to overcome this discontent
over the dependability of the suppliers, the CEO of HOSPI 2 advised that once managers
of MNEs gain the local knowledge of how the business operates, they adjust their
expectations according to the local ways and this reduces their level of frustration:
...things are better than they were. When we were doing the fit out of a
shop, the sign 0’or the shop) wasn’t there, so when we called the sign guy,
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he told us that the sign is on the truck and on its way. When I rang two
hours later he said yes, yes, yes, the truck got stuck in trafﬁc but it will
reach you soon. And I say don't lie to me. I can handle the truth but I can ’t
handle ifyou’re telling me something else. That is why I say, from a cultural
point of view an expat will kill somebody whereas an Indian manager will
work around it and try to get things happening. Ifwe know how things are
going to happen and they happen that way, then there are no surprises. It’ a
cultural thing but it’s getting better
On a similar note, the Asia Manager ofTECHCON 7 informed:
The Indian business people have a reputation of saying “yes” even if they
cannot do something. So you will have your moments offrustration but you
will need to go through your due diligence and be ready with a back-up
plan. You’d need to have a good understanding ofthe cultural differences in
order to overcome the challenges.
Most of the respondents agreed that awareness of the behavioural characteristics of the
actors in a business environment leads to an acceptance of the business norms and the way
things operate. They also suggested that conducting due diligence to evaluate potential
suppliers and their capabilities and the creation ’of a back-up plan was a good strategy in
such environments. Some of the respondents also relied on their social networks to identify
reliable suppliers.
7.3.4 Communications and Negotiation — The taxi factor
There is a Western convention that communication should be explicit, direct and
unambiguous (Gallois and Callan, 1997). People are expected to say exactly what they
mean. In contrast, in the Asian cultures the communication is implicit, indirect and»
ambiguous and these two styles have been termed as high-context and low-context
communication styles (Hall, 1976). High-context communication tends to be more indirect
and more formal, therefore, for the managers of Western MNEs, an understanding of
indirect communication is very important in order to be successful in such environments.
The ﬁndings suggest that the multi-culturalism of the Australian society was an important
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factor in enabling these managers to understand and appreciate the differences in
communication and negotiation styles in the Indian business environment. The Australian
managers displayed cross-cultural skills which they acquired over years of practical
experience. The ﬁndings indicate that business negotiations were difﬁcult to deal with
initially because they tended to get protracted and the Indian businessmen always tried to
drive the price down to the bottom dollar. As the MNEs gained the local knowledge and
understood the rules of the game, they became more adept at managing such situations.
They found that dealing with people in a certain context of culture requires a good
understanding of the norms of the business. Two examples are used here for elaboration. In
the ﬁrst case, the Managing Director of TECHCON 4 explained how he adjusted to the
local business culture:
In Australia we are very direct and t0 the point but here you go round and
round in circles. The people are very gentle and in negotiations, you have
lots and lots of cups of tea, they are very polite but these are hard-nosed
businessmen we are dealing with. Under the niceties you know the bottom
dollar rules, so I’ve learnt to be as nice as I can although [find all this very
superﬁcial, nonsensical (laughs) but that’s the way it’s done.
This illustrates his adaptive style in modifying his behaviour to suit the context. He further
went on to explain his negotiation strategy which he called his “taxi factor”:
Ifyou take an auto rickshaw in Delhi, you have to negotiate the price before
you get in although they have a taxi meter. In 90% of the time you have to
negotiate the fare. So when Iprepare a bidfor a client, I build into it what I
call a taxifactor. It is the amount that I build into the price that I am willing
to drop and still get my margins. I put in a strong technical case and add
what I call a taxifactor.
This negotiation technique is also used in the Western world but in India it is used in
almost every negotiation and the managers of TECHCON 5 and TECHCON 4 also
conﬁrmed this in their discussion. The General Manager (Asia) of AIR 1 observed:
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One thing about Indians is that they drive a pretty hard bargain, and they
don 't give in so easy. They sometimes use some tactics to drag things out till
you are sort ofcaught andyoufeel you have to make a decision now.
MNES must also learn about local habits and preferences and other external conditions
inﬂuenced by cultural distance (Barkema et al., 1996). The ﬁndings of this study are
consistent with this View as it was observed from the data that the Australian MNEs were
very familiar with the local habits of the Indian businessmen and their negotiation style and
were quick to adapt.
7.3.5 Time orientation
The way people view time differs from culture to culture as described by Edward Hall
(1976). According to Hall, monochronic time cultures (Western countries) emphasize
schedules, a precise reckoning of time, and promptness. On the other hand, in polychronic
cultures (Asian countries), adherence to time schedule is not very important. The General
Manager of TECHCON 2 said that time was a major issue in India. He displayed
frustration when he said that things do not happen on time. He mentioned that and his
company had projects which got delayed leading to cost overruns as there was no urgency
to complete things on time. The Executive Director of TECHCON 1‘ echoed the same
views:
In our country the objective is to see how we can deliver the project quickly
and efficiently and try to complete before time but here time doesn't matter.
Culture is one ofeveryone trying to protect himselfand not doing anything
that could expose them to risk. Our systems are set up to make things
happen and here the system is set up to stop things happening.
The AIR 1 manager also warned about how discussions and negotiations can get protracted
because in India, time is not considered to be of value:
...... and it's probably a stereotype but along those lines I guess our partners
and staﬂ like to discuss issues in great detail for a long period of time
where as in our culture we like to be a little succinct. Typically we don ’t talk
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things around so much, may be we miss some things that way. I’m not sure
if is good or bad but it is the difference. We learnt to set aside appropriate
amount of time to discuss with our Indian partners and meet the timelines
for negotiations. All those timelines do get extended Logic is to plan things
ahead and say okay now let us negotiate and then implement but these guys
just carry on and on.
The strategy to overcome this time overrun issue was spelt out by the Principal of
TECHCON 8 who stated that they include a strict time schedule in the agreement with
their Indian clients and add a penalty clause for delays caused by the other party (clients).
TECHCON 4, TECHCON 5 and other MNEs that faced this type of a problem adopted a
similar strategy in their contracts to prevent any losses due to delays caused by the client.
7.4 Cultural challenges in the internal environment of the MNE
Existing literature argues that transfer of MNE capabilities, routines and strategic
organisational practices becomes more difﬁcult if the institutional distance is large
between the home country and the host country because of the differences in work
procedures, frames of references, regulatory frameworks, business organisations, cultures
and environments (Kostova, 1999). Understanding, predicting and directing the actions and
behaviour of individuals across cultures can become very challenging because of
differences in norms, values and work practices. The ﬁndings of this study indicate that
most of the Australian MNEs recognised the cultural aspect extremely well and aligned
their managerial practices and interpersonal communications in line with the societal
values and cultural norms in India. This approach led to the successful management of
their operations. Past experience in overseas markets and the multi-culturalism of the
Australian society was also found to be an important factor in the MNEs ability to
successfully overcome the cultural challenges in the internal business environment.
Managing the human resources in an emerging market offers unique challenges. The
ﬁndings suggest that the Australian managers had a very good knowledge of the local
context and culture and this guided their efforts to successfully manage their employees by
crafting management policies and practices that appreciated the cultural differences. This
was evident in the discussion with the senior managers of the Australian MNEs and as the
Director of MGMTCON 2 put it:
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Between Australia and India there are cultural differences but most
Australian companies are very keen to see that they are doing the right
thing culturally. Americans do business differently so it is not appropriate
to say that all Western countries operate in a certain manner because the
Australian companies invest a lot of time in understanding the culture and
behaving accordingly.
As a result of their cultural sensitivity and ‘cultural intelligence’ (Barley and Ang, 2003),
most of these managers were successful in managing the cultural challenges in the internal
environment as well as in transferring routines and organisational practices to their
subsidiaries in India.
7.4.1 Ironing out differences through cultural sensitivity
Countries differ in their institutional environments and as explained by Kostova and
Zaheer (1999), the MNE must also manage its internal institutional environment. The ease
and success of control, coordination and knowledge transfer are inﬂuenced by the degree
of institutional similarity between a MNE’s home country and its subsidiary’s host country
(Kostova, 1999). The ﬁndings of this study do not fully support this View because even
though the institutional similarity between Australia and India is low, the managers of the
Australian service MNEs could successfully coordinate their business operations. They
displayed cultural sensitivity to the aspirations of the local employees. When asked if
cultural distance affects business operations, the General Manager of Accor explained:
No, I don’t think it does, provided you have cultural sensitivity and you are
able to extract the best from both the cultures and that’s the key. You must
be culturally sensitive without compromising on the standards you want to
achieve. You're never going to change the culture in India nor should you
want to. You should be able to massage some elements of culture within a
deﬁned structure so that if the work ethic is not as you would like it to be,
then you could change that.
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He was very optimistic in adding that in India there is the opportunity to bridge the cultural
distance between the two countries in a very positive manner and explained:
Interestingly, in India there is this keen desire or ambition in people to
educate themselves, to be successful and that's in the psyche. There is this
burning ambition unlike in some other countries where people are not in a
rush to change. Here in India people are in a rush to change so you can
build upon that and use that as a catalyst to implement new methodologies
and operating methods to improve efficiency and quality of output, quality
. ofmanagement, quality ofrelationships among colleagues.
This understanding of the character and psyche of the new generation of Indian workers
emerged as an important consideration for many Australian MNEs in terms of the positive
effect it has in introducing changes within the ﬁrm. The MNEs took advantage of this
knowledge of the Indian culture and introduced some behaviour modiﬁcation in the
workplace without compromising their standards in order to be successful.
As the Chairman ofMGMTCON 1 put it:
India has thousands ofyears of culture, it is like a river and you can ’t just
get in and say okay this is how we would change the course. You cannot go
into Delhi and say that this is how we operate in Sydney so this is how we
are going to work here. It is the same as some Indian company coming into
Sydney and saying that we are going to do it the Indian way. It just doesn’t
work that way, you are askingfor trouble.
He also highlighted the need to be respectful of the local customs and traditions when he
added:
You must be respectful of the customs and realise that there is more than
one way ofskinning a cat.
The General Manager of TECHCON 2 explained that one of the key reasons why most
foreigners get frustrated in India is their inability to understand the cultural differences. He
elaborated:
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There are a lot of cultural differences. Foreigners have a particular way to
achieve an outcome but often in India almost the opposite works. You can
get to the outcome in a number of different ways. Most foreigners get
frustrated in India because they tend to use the techniques they have
experience with but that does not work in India. It’s not that the people are
incompetent but that “You ” are not using the right methods. They think that
theirs is the only way it can be done and that’s why it frustrates them. You
need to bring people together and say - this is what we ’re trying to achieve
and make them walk along with you.
These examples demonstrate that MNEs will perform poorly in emerging markets like
India if they carry with them their taken-for-granted assumptions about the way they
managed in their home country. Managers need to unleam some of their old ways of doing
. things and be prepared to adapt. Other examples reﬂected a similar View. The Managing
Director of TECHCON 4looked at the cultural differences in the same light as the other
managers when he said:
When you come into new country you have to be sensible and you just
cannot say that I will do it this way. You have to find the right blend of
working in the Indian culture yet be an Australian company with your own
set ofstandards. I'd say in TECHCON 4we do it this way, and now that you
are a part of TECHCON 4you should try it this way. We need to find the
rightfit there.
The General Manager of AIR 1 emphasised the fact that the experience of AIR 1 in
different countries has led them to believe in cultural sensitivity in order to be successful in
foreign markets. International experience was another factor that seemed to enhance the
ability of the managers to become culturally sensitive. He summed up the policy of AIR 1
with regards to culture.
Businesses need to understand that cultural understanding is a great
platform from which to do business. You might make some short-term gains
but in the long term you need to have a good grasp ofthe culture and we ’re
herefor the long haul.
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Therefore, it is evident from the discussion above and the supporting examples that the
Australian MNES clearly understood the local host institutions and exhibited appreciation
of cultural differences. Better knowledge of the local environment and societal values
assists the MNEs to craft suitable strategies and this was evident in most of the Australian
MNEs. The ﬁndings revealed that the Australian MNEs closely observed the cultural
subtleties within the people and the organisation and tried to bridge the cultural distance in
a harmonious way. The knowledge of the local environment and respect for societal values
was recognised as a key factor in mitigating the challenges in the internal environment.
7.4.2 Introducing cultural change with a safety net
The Indian culture promotes a hierarchical structure in society as well as in the workplace.
Hofstede (1980) suggests that a society's level of inequality is approved by the followers as
well as the leaders. He describes power distance as the extent to which the less powerful
members of organisations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is
distributed unequally. India’s ranking on Hofstede’s Power Distance Index is 77 compared
to Australia’s 36. These scores indicate high level of inequality in power in India compared
with Australia where relationships are more equal and less hierarchical. In comparison to
India, Australia has low power distance and this cultural difference makes the task of
managing people in India more challenging, both within and outside the organisation.
The ﬁndings indicate that the Australian managers tried to bridge the power distance with
their subordinates through a strong focus on people and a gradual shift towards equality in
the workplace through introduction of some new management practices. Their effort to
integrate the Australian and Indian business cultures wherever possible was one of the key
factors in successﬁally operating in India. The managers of the Australian service MNEs
displayed an understanding of the fact that India has a hierarchical society and the people
have a deferential approach. This was not only obvious in the society but also in the
workplace environment. One of the respondents stated that in India, people within an
organisation address their seniors with a formal Sir or Madam whereas in Australia the
senior managers are called by their ﬁrst names. The ofﬁce environment in India is very
formal and this affects the free ﬂow of upward communication within an organisation
which in turn can adversely affect performance. Most MNEs agreed that cultural change
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involved changing some of the basic values, norms and beliefs among members of their
organisation in order to improve organisational performance. Some of the strategies
adopted by the Australian service MNES to introduce a gradual cultural change are
discussed in the following examples. The General Manager of HOSPI 1 succinctly
explained his strategy with some examples:
Traditionally India is a very hierarchical society. If you are in an old-
fashioned environment, you will notice that all the underlings, so they are
called, would go to the boss ’s office in the morning and say “Good morning
sir, how are you, ” before they go to their desk to start work. So there is a
deferential approach, while here in my company we work in an environment
of inclusion, transparency and the passing down of authority and
responsibility, empowerment, but ensuring there is a saﬁaty net that goes
with the empowerment. Companies talk ofempowering the staffso they give
them some decision-making authority and the first time they screw up, they
beat the poor guy over the head and say, “You are an idiot. ” So he will go
back to the norm which is — I am not going to make a decision which will
get me into trouble. You cannot do it this way. This is about changing the
entrenched way of working. If you see how the grandson greets the
grandfather, he bends down and touches grandfather ’s feet; there is a very
public display ofdeference, very entrenched in the culture here in India. So
we 're trying to say, that's great in the right environment, but in this model
here, this is how we ’d like you to act, so what we are actually trying to do is
- bring the two cultures together andfind a bridge for that and the key to
that is to offer him a safety net to increase his self-confidence.
It is evident from this example that the General Manager of HOSPI 1 was trying to bring
about a gradual cultural change at the workplace. He had a clear understanding of the
norms and behaviour pattern of his people and therefore his emphasis was on providing a
safety net when empowering them with more authority and responsibility. He went further
to explain in detail:
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You must have a safety net. Someone makes a mistake, you are able to go up
to him, grab him and say, “Congratulations. Great job. Well done for
taking the decision. ” Now it is our job to see whether we should go ahead
with the decision. This is a positive approach and irrespective of whether
the decision was right or wrong, they come out with a feeling that even if
they have done something partially right they have been given the tools to
do it better next time and that they will now take the authority and
responsibility. It's a very tough challenge to change the psyche ofpeople
who are so used to walking into the boss’s room and asking - what would
you like me to do today or this is my problem, what should I do? In my
environment, they come with a problem and they come with at least one
solution and then we talk through the solution. Ijust need to be guide or a
facilitator, a catalyst, for thinking, for innovation, for decision-making and
also for the safety net. And so that is a very diﬂerent cultural approach to
management which most of these people had not been exposed to
previously. I know that our approach is not the norm. We are in a group of
minority companies to take this approach.
The General Manager of HOSPI 1 was introducing behaviour modiﬁcations in the area of
authority, responsibility and decision-making in a very subtle manner. The idea of a safety
net gives conﬁdence to his workers that if they do something wrong they will not be
reprimanded. This encourages them to take initiatives which they had not done in the past.
During the course of the interview it was discovered that this respondent had done overseas
assignments with Accor in some other countries as well and that sharpened his cultural
intelligence. All the MNEs agreed that their experience in overseas markets inﬂuenced
their management style and strategy in India.
The ED of TECHCON 1 also spoke about encouraging delegation, authority and decision
making in his organisation:
We give our people a lot ofdelegation by telling them - it’s better to make a
wrong decision rather than no decision, by saying its okay to make
mistakes, you have our full support. We give you the authority to make that
decision. You get 7 out 0f10 decisions correct, that's a very good outcome.
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We empower our managers to do that in the hope that they do the same for
their staff
Another aspect of the Indian culture that comes across as a challenge is the deferential
approach in the Indian work environment. This kind of approach not only creates
formalities but also stiﬂes clear communication between different levels in the hierarchy
and therefore affects performance. In order to break the barrier of the formal behaviour at
work and to introduce some subtle changes in the work culture, the General Manager of
HOSPI I explained that he used humour as a tool:
Out here, my staff used to call me Sir, but now they call me Denis, they all
call me by my ﬁrst name. I have a couple of staff still struggling and they
call me Mr Denis. So that was the compromise. I am OK with that and I
don ’t want to make them uncomfortable. Everyone calls me Denis and I did
it in a very humorous way. They used to call me Mr Oldfield when Iﬁrst
came on board and I said to them, “Listen. Mr Oldﬁeld is myfather and he
lives in Sydney and I am Denis” They laughed and along the way, we broke
down a lot ofthose barriers. I have an open door policy. It is very rare that
my door is closed. A trusting and fraternal workplace climate also
facilitates employee involvement.
The Vice President (R&D) of SOFTWARE 1 shared similar views on communication and
formality within the hierarchy of an organisation when he mentioned:
There is another slant on this cultural issue. The Indian society has quite a
strong hierarchy. Ifyou’re in a certain position, people will look up to you
with certain expectations, and communication between people who are in
the hierarchy with people further up in the hierarchy is generally not open
and is very deferential whereas in Australia it is different. I did try to break
those communication barriers because being a technology company it is
very important because you are dealing with complex issues. So it is
important for your developer to ask you a question if he ’s not sure about
something rather than just nod his head and carry on doing something
which could impact the product. I had to break through some patterns like
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trying to convince people not to call me Sir. It took a long time to
breakthrough that. Another change initiative was to encourage a software
developer to challenge a senior and say there may be a different way of
doing this. Our senior developers now have taken this line because I’ve
encouraged them to say to me that there is a better way ofdoing this. It is
not to diminish the Indian culture but there is one consequence that comes
out and that is - hierarchy has a stifling impact on innovation because you
are discouraging independent thought. Of all the things that I'd say about
my experiences in India, the one thing that I discovered was that in India it
is more diﬂicult for people to take risk and to explore ideas that may be
innovative compared to my experience in Australia.
One of the challenges faced by most managers seemed to be related to the nature of the
employees. They observed a lack of initiative and risk taking ability amongst their
employees and therefore used different ways to build up their teams in these areas. The
General Manager of HOSPI I explained that he conducted a workshop to uncover the way
Indians and Australians were either motivated or irritated and regularly held meetings with
his staff. He further added:
We have a principle for meetings and we have three meetings a week. It is
called the NOOD principle, not as in nude, “No Offence Or Defence” very
simple. You can say anything you like as long as it is not offensive and do
not try to be defensive ..... we have brealdast together we laugh, we chat, talk
of movies and break down the barriers and then start the meeting and
create a positive environmentfor the meeting.
At TECHCON 7, the views were no different as informed by the Asia Manager:
Most of the engineers are not used to taking any initiatives. They are
trained that way. The style of working is not to do more than what you're
told. It’s not that the brains are not there. We train people to be proactive
and teach them that it’s okay to question your boss and try to do things
differently. And TECHCON 7fosters that relationship. We need one third to
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one halfofour people to walk in and question the way things are done and
the others should be able to do what they’re told. We don’t want everyone
questioning. (Laughs)
The ﬁndings illustrate that the Australian MNEs were successful in bringing about changes
in the normative behaviour of their employees by making them ask questions, encouraging
them to take initiatives and delegating authority and responsibility. Another issue which
emerged in relation to working within the norms in India was linked to the position title of
the employee. According to most of the Australian Managers, the Indians are very
particular about the position title as it reﬂects prestige in the hierarchical structure in the
workplace and status in society. It appears to be a status symbol to have an attractive
position title. The Managing Director of TECHCON 4stated:
What’s importantfor Indians is salary and also the title. It is quite different
from Australia how important the title is. The title on the card is a lot of
prestige. My boss in Hobart is a General Manager. He is very senior and
reports to the CEO of Hydro Tasmania. In India the number of levels
between General Manager and CEO will be a lot. I have three people here
working for me with the General Manager title and my boss is a General
Manager (laughs). So we said that it is okay if that is the norm as long as
they do the right stuﬂand the job is done. I recently interviewed a guy three
years out of Uni and I asked him at the end of the interview if he had any
questions and he said, “What will my title be? ”
The Project Director of TECHCON 5 agreed with the above View as well when he said:
For people in the company, position title is very important. You see it on
business cards, how the card describes them. In India these things are more
important than in other places that I have worked in.
Erez (1986) has explained that MNE performance depends on the ability of the MNE to
account for and ﬁnd congruence between societal values and managerial practices. The
above examples clearly highlight the ability of the Australian MNEs to fully appreciate and
understand the values, norms and culture of their employees and shape their actions
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accordingly. This knowledge appears to be a mitigating factor in managing some of the
complexities of the internal environment.
7.4.3 Local Employees vs. Expatriates
When operating in an emerging market, a key strategic decision revolves around the
stafﬁng of the MNE as there is a choice to be made between parent country nationals
(PCNs), host country nationals (HCNs) and third country nationals (Daniels, 1986). MNEs
differ in the extent to which they staff their operations in emerging markets with
expatriates. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that the Australian MNEs preferred to
manage the operations with local employees instead of expatriates for different reasons
such as: expatriates work out expensive, local knowledge, networks and relationships of
the host country managers and gaining legitimacy by employing a high degree of local
staff. But they all had PCNs in the top management team (CEO or CFO). This was evident
in the remarks of the Project Director of TECHCON 3:
When I was stationed in India, I was the only white face in the office. Most
ofthe office managers werefrom India and they made their own decisions.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4 mentioned that when they ﬁrst started operations
in India, they relied on expatriates but gradually they started hiring locally because of the
high costs of running the operations with expatriates:
In the beginning we had a lot of expatriates who worked out financially
more expensive. So we decided to grow our business in India and develop
people here and use India as the hub to service the other neighbouring
markets. We hired people who had the drive and the capability to work in
our systems.
The Project Director of TECHCON 5 offered another insight into the rationale of having
Indian staff:
......... that is why having a lot of Indian staﬁ’ is very useful because they
know how to get these things done. You can 't come in as an expat and say
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this is how we do things. You have to understand how things are done in
this business environment, you’ve got to adapt, you’ve got to be patient. We
have a number ofmanagers who have worked in this part ofthe world and
we employ Indianforemen and Indian supervisors and they have been very
successful in getting things done.
These MNEs recognised that the local managers can get things done more efﬁciently in the
Indian business environment because of their local knowledge and their networks within
the cultural context. The above views were also shared by the CEO of HOSPI 2 when he
stated:
I believe that you got to have an indigenous management team. An expat,
whether in India or China couldn’t manage the business as effectively
because ofcultural differences. I think I'm prettyfamiliar with the culture at
surface level. But most of the problems lie beneath the surface. The Indian
managers have the local knowledge and networks through which they can
manage to get things done which an expat possibly can't do. I think the
Indians are the most highly networked race on earth.
Across all the cases, the MNEs reliedupon the local employees for their operations and
were satisﬁed with their performance. They also believed they gained legitimacy by having
a high degree of local employees in their operations. However, there was a growing
concern about the increases in the salary levels in India. The ﬁndings indicate that if the
salaries continued to rise at the current rate, very soon it will be difﬁcult to ﬁnd the right
people and India will lose its advantage of offering a large pool of talented workforce at a
very reasonable cost.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4 exclaimed that one of his concerns was the
growing salary levels in India compared to what he was used to in Australia. He gave an
example of the annual increase in salaries in his industry in India:
In the Hydro Power sector, I have seen salaries jumping by 20 to 25%. In
Australia, I'm lucky if I get 3.5 to 4% and here I am giving an annual
increase of20 to 25% to my staﬂ.
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The Executive Director of TECHCON 1 made a very interesting comparison of the salary
differences between Australia and India:
When I started working in India in 2002 the average salary was 25% ofthe
Australian salary, today it is typically 50% ofAustralian salary. In senior
management it is the same or even higher. ' We have Indian companies
asking us ifwe can we give them project managers and we say yes but since
they will be expats you will have to pay $200-$300, 000 and they say - that 's
okay. When they are running billion-dollar projects they are prepared to
pay top dollars.
The ﬁndings indicate that MNEs preferred local employees because of their local
knowledge and skills to navigate through the local business environment. Gaur, Delios and
Singh (2007) developed an institutional perspective to advance understanding of how host
country environments inﬂuence subsidiary stafﬁng strategies and found that MNEs rely
more on expatriates in institutionally distant environments for reasons related to the
efﬁcient transfer of management practices and MNE-speciﬁc capabilities. The case study
ﬁndings partially agree with this argument because although India offers an institutionally
distant environment, the reliance on local managers was very high in all the cases and
expatriates were found only in very senior positions. The Australian service MNEs relied
upon local managers and none of them indicated any difﬁculty when they tried to introduce
new management practices.
Therefore, from the above discussions, it can be concluded that a local manager who
speaks the language, understands the culture and the political system and is often a
member of the local network will normally be more effective than an expatriate. However
the key managerial positions (CEO and CFO) were ﬁlled up by expatriates from the
headquarters. To keep their employees motivated, the successful MNEs offer competitive
salaries and position titles which ﬁt in with the existing norms.
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7.4.4 Talent Crises and Training
The Australian MNEs noted that recruiting and retaining the right kind of talent to staff
their operations in India was proving to be a challenge. Although it is well known that
India has a large pool of skilled and qualiﬁed people, many MNEs (n6) found it rather
difﬁcult to ﬁnd the right talent with the appropriate skill mix and experience suited to their
requirements. They belonged to the equity ﬁnance, infrastructure and professional
engineering services group.
The Asia Manager of TECHCON 7 explained his difﬁculty in ﬁnding and retaining the
right talent:
In India it is diﬁicult toﬁnd the right kind ofpeople and keep them. Some of
them will come and work for you for 6 months and then once they've got
your name on the CV, they will take a 10% higher salary and move on to
someone else, so there is not much loyalty. We also have that problem in
Australia now because people move for money. Ten years ago they did not
move for money, so now we have a big turnover in Australia but in India it
is even bigger.
The difﬁculty in ﬁnding the right kind of people was also echoed by the Principal of
TECHCON 8:
...... lack of resources in our industry is a major challenge. Our staﬂ is our
currency and there is so much work out there - the world is aﬂame with
development projects and our challenge is ﬁnding the right people and
retaining them.
The Executive Director of BANK 1 stated that although there are a large number of
graduates in India, getting the right people is a big challenge.
It was easier hiring Indians out of Singapore and transporting them to
India. That's kind of interesting. There are not many people in India who
have done what we do, infrastructure is still a relatively young industry in
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India. Even in the investment banking side, there are not enough people
with the kind of experience that we want because a lot of companies have
been in the fly-infly—out businesses. The big issue is getting goodpeople at
all levels. Initially we have been exporting people to India, even looking at
Indians in Australia or elsewhere wanting to work in India. These are
people who left India several years ago but are happy to go back andﬁnd
exciting work for a few years. In the beginning the problem is that your
name has got to be well—known to attract the right talent. It’s like people
having to decide whether they want to workfor Talas or Reliance (India ’s
largest industrial houses) or BANK 1 (spelt it). Over time we become visible
because the assets that we buy are quite high-proﬁle.
The above case suggests that in some instances when MNES faced a skills shortage in
India, they employed third country nationals or Indians from other countries who wanted a
short assignment in India. Some MNEs pointed out that having a brand name was quite
important to attract the top performers. BANK I chose some innovative strategies which
included hiring people from countries outside India as well as targeting Indians from other
parts of the world who wanted to work in India for a few years. The difﬁculty in finding
the right talent was additionally related to the nature of the business (equity ﬁnance,
infrastructure and professional engineering services) which is relatively new in India.
Another proactive strategy used by the Executive Director aimed at branding their
company in the top universities:
We tend to target the top universities and get our name known. It is a slow
process but once you get the traction, it builds up. People are most valuable
to us and one big challenge is having someone to think Western and think
local. This is extremely valuable because they can help you translate the
subtle issues.
He outlined preference for Indian staff that have had exposure to western management
practices. The CEO of HOSPI 2 also emphasised the challenge of ﬁnding people who can
think Western and think local and made a similar remark when he spoke about the
difficulties of ﬁnding the right skill set:
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Although you have highly educated people available, what we found was
that they were not exposed to I guess international form of retailing. They
were very stuck on how the Indians retail. The best people you could get are
people who had travelled overseas, say they had worked in America or
Australia and then come back to India after doing a stint with an
international company. Those are the people we are chasing and everybody
else is chasing them as well.
The strategy of BANK 1 to target top universities and get their name known to attract top
talent was taken one step further by TECHCON 5. Both these MNEs are very large and
reputable in Australia but in an emerging market where they have to make their presence
felt, they decided to work closely with the educational institutions and create a name. The
Project Director of TECHCON 5 informed that they entered into an arrangement with a
university in Mumbai, India (Sardar Patel College of Engineering) whereby they sign up
students in the second year of the engineering degree. These students are taught about
TECHCON 5 systems and after completion of their degree, if these students chose to join
TECHCON 5, they are quite well prepared to work within the TECHCON 5 systems and
principles.
We have 155 students signed up so far. When they graduate they can come
and work for us or they can work for someone else. We also help the
university in conducting some courses. There is a shortage of engineers so
when these students do join us, they are already aware of the way we
operate. We run courses on safety and quality control as such courses
normally are not taught at the University.
The ﬁndings suggest that the strategy of working closely with the educational institutions
is very well suited to large corporations which need to create brand awareness or build a
reputation in an emerging market. It can also be adopted by other MNEs regardless of the
size because it gives recognition, branding and legitimacy.
However, in the case of SOFTWARE 1 and SOFTWARE 2, the recruitment challenge was
different. They both operate in the information technology (IT) sector and because of an
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abundance of IT graduates in India, their challenge was to manage the volume of responses
and identify the best performers. The Vice President of SOFTWARE 1 gave an example to
highlight his challenge:
What it means to hire and employ people in India was certainly a
significant challenge and the other challenge was within the hiring process.
It is the volume ofresponses you would get forjust afew positions. To give
you an example, I advertisedfor three positions of Software Developers in
Hyderabad andfor three positions I had in excess of 600 responses. Now
going through those responses and identifying the ones you wanted to
interview itselfwas a big challenge.
India is known for its abundance of low cost technical talent pool. However, the quality of
staff is another issue that emerged during the interviews. A very revealing insight about the
quality of the Indian graduates was gained from the Executive Director of TECHCON 1
when he pointed out:
Top-level institutes in India provide world-class graduates. Once you go
below the top 5 or 10% of the educational institutes, the quality of tertiary
education deteriorates because it is mostly in the private sector and is not
very well regulated. I heard somewhere that the Head of Infosys (India’s
largest software house) is reported to have said that 75% of Indian
graduates are unemployable.
In a recent report published by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), May 2008 titled, “The
talent challenge in emerging markets,” it is stated that, “of all the emerging-market nations,
India expects to have the toughest time when it comes to recruiting and retaining talent. A
total of 57% of Indian respondents feel that it will be “signiﬁcantly harder” to recruit and
retain talent over the next three years.” Some of the EIU’s ﬁndings are detailed below:
0 The skills gap is widening
0 Firms will be hard put to meet salary expectations of talented staff
0 A strong brand is a powerful magnet for potential Employees
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0 Explore new approaches to sourcing talent.
The ﬁndings of this study are consistent with the EIU report on the talent challenge in the
emerging markets. Australian service MNEs are meeting this challenge by partnering with
Universities, creating a brand, identifying third country nationals, hiring retired public
servants and creatively managing salary expectations. In order to overcome the challenge
of improving the quality and productivity of the employees, these MNEs introduced their
employees to world-class standards through training initiatives. The CEO of HOSPI 2
spoke in a very positive note about the beneﬁts of training:
We have a programme starting early next year for the senior production
staﬁf working shoulder to shoulder with our guys in Australia to reﬁne our
processes and I have to say that after seven years we are getting
informationfed back to us as well that is very relevant. They are trying new
things that we are adopting; they are finding products that we can source at
a cheaper rate in India. In China it’s the same. It’s not the parent just
speaking to the children, the children are givingplenty back.
HOSPI 2 is very content with this strategy because their efforts have paid back in terms of
ﬁnding better ways of doing things (process improvement) and sourcing raw materials at a
competitive price. They have succeeded in setting up a two-way learning process and
communication channel. According to the ﬁndings of this report, a successful formula for
running the operations in India in line with the organisational practices of the MNE is to
hire people in the host country and then bring them to the Australian headquarters. These
employees get acquainted with the way the MNE operates in the home country so that
when they return to India, they can apply the new ways of doing things in the host country.
The ﬁndings suggest that the MNEs which operated in an area which was relatively new to
the Indian business environment, for instance, infrastructure and technical consulting,
faced the difﬁculty in ﬁnding the right talent. On the other hand, MNEs from the
Information Technology sector were faced with over-supply of candidates. Therefore, it is
argued that different MNEs within the service sector are impacted differently under the
same institutional environment.
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7.4.5 New Talent source: Retired public servants
A new talent source identiﬁed by the Australian MNEs related to a pool of retired public
servants. The ﬁndings revealed a very interesting trend emerging in India which involves
hiring retired public servants because of their extensive networks and relationships within
the government and strong industry knowledge. The common theme is the experience
factor. The respondents highlighted that this source of experienced and networked
professionals is sought after by most MNEs as they bring with them wealth of experience,
local knowledge and deep understanding of the “rules of the game” in India. These retired
professionals work out to be a valuable asset for a MNE which wants to overcome its
knowledge deﬁcit in an emerging market. Most Australian service MNEs (n11) found this
pool of retired public servants very valuable in opening doors of opportunities as well as
managing the local operations. They were instrumental in managing both the external and
internal environment for the MNEs.
The Executive Director of TECHCON 1 pointed out that they need managers who can
interface with bureaucracy and ﬁnd new ways through it as the bureaucracy could hinder
their work and set things back. In emerging markets, it is very important to have someone
within the ﬁrm who has the right contacts. This talent pool of retired public servants is
very valuable for MNEs because they have the right contacts (networks) to get things done
through the bureaucracy. They also have the knowledge of crafting strategies to overcome
the bureaucratic hurdles because they have spent their professional careers in public sector
or bureaucracy where they at one time created the hurdles. So it is easier for them to
understand the unspoken conventions of bureaucracy in a business context where networks
and relationships are considered extremely important.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4 was enthusiastic when he spoke about his
managers belonging to this category:
My technical guy is ex-Chairman ofsome Hydro Power project and was a
Member of and Electricity Board. He retired at 60, spent 10 years as
Adviser to the Government ofMauritius and is a very technically hands on
guy. We have a very good Indian General Manager for business
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development who has a very good knowledge of the market and the right
networks, so much so, that marketing is not a big problem ofmine.
During the course of the interview with the Project Director of TECHCON 5, he received a
phone call and after completing his conversation on the phone, he explained:
The guy who just called is Verma (Pseudonym). He was a Director for
Ports, he has worked in the industry for 30 years, he knows people and he
can go and see people that I can't in a million years. Our guy in Mumbai
has retiredfrom a major construction company in India and he works for
us. These guys are very well connected. You got to have Indian people in
your company who can do deals for you, who have the right contacts. You
hire retired people from the Ministry ofso-and—so, they come and workfor
you andyou keep them as your employees. They can go to meet theirfriends
in the Ministry with whom they worked in the past, have brealgast or lunch
with them and get issues sorted out. That 's relationships.
The ﬁndings suggest that in emerging economies, MNEs can enhance performance by
hiring people who have retired from the government/public sectors because they can
navigate efﬁciently through the bureaucratic maze to manage operations successfully
because of their networks and relationships. The Australian service MNEs were very
successful in harnessing this resource and making it a part of their success strategy. This
trend offers research potential in the area of International Human Resources Management
in emerging markets because of the advantages this group brings for the MNEs.
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7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the cultural challenges faced by Australian service sector MNEs in the
external and internal business environment in India were discussed along with the business
strategies adopted by these MNEs to cope with such challenges. There is an underlying
assumption in prior research in international business that cultural distance between home
and host country increases the cost of entry, decreases the operational beneﬁts and hampers
the MNE’s ability to transfer core competencies to foreign markets (Bartlett and
Ghoshal,1989; Palich and Gomez-Mejia, 1999). The ﬁndings presented here do not contest
this view. However, at variance with the literature, the data reveals that in the case of most
of the Australian service MNEs studied (n12), cultural distance did not impact on their
operations because of their adaptive strategies and the ‘Aussie advantage’ which was
discussed in Section 7.2.
A close comparison of the 16 case study ﬁrms indicates that most of the Australian MNEs
(n 12) came to accept a shared deﬁnition of social reality in India that includes “the way
things are,” “what is important” and “the way things are done” (Scott,l987). They
recognised that India presented a new business environment and therefore required a new
set of rules of the game compared with those in the home market. This acceptance of the
business reality, the positive perceptions of the managers about the business environment
and culture in India coupled with their cultural sensitivity contributed to their development
of successful strategies to overcome the challenges at the cultural cognitive level. The
remaining MNEs (n 4) faced some difﬁculties in managing cultural issues but they were
not signiﬁcant enough to adversely impact their business operations. The ﬁndings indicate
that their perceptions of India presenting a complex culture were largely responsible for the
challenging times they faced. This suggests that the perceptions strengthen beliefs which in
turn direct behaviour leading to a self-fulﬁlling prophesy; This study indicates that
although there is a high cultural distance between Australia and India, it did not negatively
impact the operations of the Australian service MNEs.
This chapter assessed the results of the research to identify a range of factors across the
cases which contributed to the successful management of the cultural issues. A key ﬁnding
was the importance of cultural sensitivity in shaping strategies in India These critical
success factors include: the perception of the commonalities between the two countries, the
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practice of cultural sensitivity in crafting strategies, introducing cultural change with a
safety net, ﬁnding congruence between societal values and managerial practices, gaining of
legitimacy by hiring locals instead of expatriates, ﬁnding and employing retired public
servants (an extraordinary source of skills, knowledge and experience), prior experience of
operating in overseas markets and creating brand awareness. These strategies enabled these
MNEs to gain advantages that allowed them to overcome the cultural challenges.
An important observation made during the in-depth interviews suggests that the managers
of MNEs are more aware of cultural differences today than they were 15 to 20 years ago
because of their education and the increased knowledge through the media and
communication technology and so they are more comfortable operating in countries with
different cultures. These MNEs exhibited an ability to create advantages based on a deep
understanding of and integration with the host country environment. Rather than looking to
overcome weakness in an emerging economy business environment, they displayed an
ability to craft a strategy that relies on resources and knowledge in the environment as
sources of competitive advantage (London and Hart, 2004). For instance, hiring of retired
public servants by some of these MNEs is an example of utilising resources and knowledge
in the environment. The ﬁndings are consistent with the views of Delios and Singh (2005)
that culture is not irrelevant but it is much less important than economics and strategy and
its major inﬂuence is on how strategy is implemented through tactical and operational
decisions. These MNEs saw the advantage of adapting their strategies with institutional
norms and requirements and were successful in achieving increased prestige, stability,
legitimacy, attraction of personnel and access to resources (DiMaggio, 1988). In summary,
the evidence from the case studies does not fully agree with the proposition developed
from the existing literature that the ability of a MNE to operate effectively in the host
country decreases as the cultural distance increases because of inconsistencies in values
and institutions between the home and the host country.
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Chapter 8: Networking and regulatory uncertainty
“What is calledforeknowledge cannot be elicitedfrom spirits, norfrom Gods, not by
analogy with past events, norfrom calculations. It must be obtainedfrom men who would
know the situation. "
--Sun Tzu (500 BC.)
8.1 Introduction
This chapter compares the ﬁndings of the 16 case studies and, exploring similarities and
differences between them, examines whether differences in their network connections and
capabilities impacted their business operations in India. It discusses the ﬁndings of this
research and highlights the importance of networks and relationships in overcoming
regulatory challenges in emerging markets. As the cases were analysed, it became apparent
that all the Australian service MNEs placed a high importance on networks and
relationships. However, the importance attached to networks and relationships varied
depending on the nature of the industry.
In the existing literature, sufﬁcient attention has been given to the fact that “no ﬁrm is an
island” (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989), but that its past, its existing activities, and its
future potential for strategic manoeuvres are largely a reﬂection of its links to other actors.
According to the network perspective, the knowledge a ﬁrm has about foreign markets and
the opportunities open to the ﬁrm in these markets, extend beyond the boundaries of the
ﬁrm itself; it is principally contained in the network that the ﬁrm has been developing and
will be able to develop, and anchored by key actors within them (Benito and Welch 1994).
Existing literature suggests that networks assume a greater importance in cases where a
foreign market is perceived as complex, different and distant — which is the case for most
Australian ﬁrms operating in India. The network perspective views organisations as a
system of objects that are joined together by relationships and‘ the objects include
individuals, teams, and the organisation as a whole, that can be connected both directly and
indirectly via these relationships (Tichy, Tushman and Fombwn 1979).
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As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, efﬁcient markets depend on supporting institutions that
can provide the formal and informal rules of the game of a market economy (Meyer,
2001). The institutional framework is made up of formal and informal institutions which
govern individual and ﬁrm behaviour and according to Scott, (1995) these institutions are
supported by three pillars: regulatory, normative and cognitive. The formal institutions
include laws, regulations and rules (such as regulation policy, intellectual property rights,
contract law and their enforcement) and the informal institutions are the norms and culture
in a society. In Chapter 7, the challenges posed by the informal institutions (cultural and
normative) were discussed along with the business strategies employed by the Australian
service MNEs to overcome those challenges. This chapter identiﬁes the challenges posed
by the formal institutions (regulatory) in India and highlights the importance of networks
and relationships in rising above such challenges. The regulatory elements of the formal
institutions include formal regulations and rules for governing behavior such as
constitutions, laws and property rights (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). The regulatory pillar of
the institutional framework lays out the ground rules for doing business, reﬂecting the laws
and regulations of a region or country and the extent to which these rules are effectively
monitored and enforced. The regulatory pillar refers to the formal rules and regulations as
sanctioned by a state (North, 1990).
In an emerging market, the uncertainty surrounding the economic transactions can often
lead to transaction costs which existing literature has broadly termed this as “costs of doing
business.” Networks and relationships play an important part in order to mitigate such
costs. Based on the existing literature, it was proposed:
Proposition: Firms that are better connected through their networks and relationships
have a competitive advantage in the regulatory environment ofan emerging market.
When formal rules that are supportive of market systems have not been well established,
‘ﬁrms’ strategic choices will be network-centred, heavily relying on strong personal ties’
(Peng and Zhou, 20052323). The ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this argument.
Overall ﬁndings indicate that in an emerging market, organisations and individuals rely
upon information from their network connections as a means of safeguarding against
uncertainty and gaining business advantage.
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This chapter is structured in two parts. The ﬁrst part discusses the challenges faced by the
Australian service MNEs in the regulatory environment in India within six broad aspects.
These are: regulatory concerns, operating the business, rules of the game, tax regime,
intricacies of the legal system and intellectual property rights. The second part discusses
the importance of developing and using networks and relationships as a strategy to cope
with the regulatory challenges.
8.2 Regulatory Concerns
Regulation is all about the rules governing business behaviour. It includes laws and acts,
but also pertains to other forms of formal and informal rule-making and enforcement
(Crane and Matten, 2004). An analysis of the ﬁndings from the in-depth interviews
suggests that in India the regulations at both the federal and state levels are often
overlapping and conﬂicting thereby making regulatory compliance one of the most
signiﬁcant challenges. The areas of shared concern were: some industries are highly
regulated (banking and ﬁnance) while others have very few regulations (technical
consultancy), the processes of starting and operating the business are slow and
cumbersome, systems do not seem to be in place for improving efﬁciency, bureaucracy
and red tape, taxes are complicated and duties are high, weak intellectual property rights
protection, legal system has inefﬁciencies, rules lacked clarity and ambiguity in the
interpretation of rules.
8.2.1 Federal and state level regulations
The respondents pointed out that at the federal government level there is a will to
streamline regulatory procedures but at the state level regulations are still very
cumbersome. This can be interpreted in the comments of the Director ofMGMTCON 2:
In India you have two levels of regulation. One is at the macro level and
the other is at the grassroots. At the macro level you do not have much
problem because it has a direction and a policy framework. The problem
lies in the grassroots with regards to implementation and execution.
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The Executive Director of BANK I offered a similar viewpoint about regulatory issues
that pose a challenge to business because of the differences in the regulations between the
federal and state governments:
The difficulty lies in the understanding of how these systems work. Some
issues are federal and others are state based For example, for highways,
like in Australia, New South Wales became very efficient in procuring toll
roads, then you move to Victoria and Victoria had not done it so there were
issues to deal with in Victoria. Same is the case in India. Unlike in the UK
where they have one ofgovernment department to deal with, when central
government decides to do something in the UK the same model gets rolled
out all across the UK Whereas in the US and Australia or India thefederal
government says one thing and lots ofthings are in the control ofthe states.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4shared a similar view:
Federal government sets up the guidelines for the hydro projects but the
states are in charge of the water and different states have different
regulatory requirements
The Project Director of TECHCON 5 informed the author of the challenges that businesses
face when dealing at two different levels of government. He cited the example of Tatas,
one of the largest business houses in India and of Posco, the largest steel producer from
South Korea to explain the complexities and difﬁculties in managing affairs at the federal
and state level:
Tatas had bought land and property for mining in Orissa. They had
compensated the people who were to be displacedfrom that village andﬁve
years later when they came back to start work and tried to put fences
around the huge block of[and they had purchased and paidfor, they were
in for a rude shock. They discovered that the people who had been
compensated had moved out ofthe village but there were many other people
who came and settled around the land These people had to be evicted
before work could start but they demanded compensation and when Tatas
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explained that they had already paid to the rightful owners, these people
refused to vacate the land and there were riots in which more than 20
people were killed.
Tatas walked away but maybe they will come back a few years later when
things have cooled down. They probably might have to pay again but this
time when they do I ’m sure they will enclose the area as soon as they can.
The State government seemed to have washed their hands of this case.
Central government may give you approval for something but state
government may not. POSCOfrom South Korea is in deep trouble because
one government authority gave them the land for mining and the other
refused.
8.2.2 Contrasting regulations
Existing literature makes the assumption that all MNEs are equally affected by the
regulatory distance in an emerging market (Eden and Miller 2004). The ﬁndings of this
study do not entirely support this View because it was observed that although the activities
of a majority (n 12) of MNEs were affected by the regulations and required clearly
discemable adjustments, in other cases, (11 4) ﬁrms were faced with very few regulations
and therefore had no problems in dealing with regulatory issues. In the case of AIR 1, the
regulations in India did not allow any foreign investment in the aviation sector and so even
if they were keen to make an investment in India, they could not do so because of the
regulatory barriers.
As the Manager of AIR 1 put it:
We do not have any traffic routes to operate in India, we can only operate
to andfrom India. The Indian legislation precludes anyforeign investment
in the airline sector.
AIR 1 had to settle for a code sharing arrangement with Jet Airways of India because the
regulations prevented them from making investment in India. In the banking sector, BANK
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1 informed that they had to contend with numerous regulations. The Executive Director
pointed out that the banking business is highly regulated:
In our business you need a lot of regulations and licenses. In ﬁnancial
services business you need a lot of regulatory approvals to do a lot of
things.
The ﬁndings indicated that the airlines and banking sector faced high level of regulations
in their industry. On the other hand, in some industries the respondents observed that there
were very few regulations as in the case of the technical consultancy business. This was
highlighted by the Executive Director of TECHCON 1:
One of the things about our industry is that it is in a very open market and
there is very little regulation. As an engineering consultancyfirm we can be
hundred percent owned, we don 't need licenses to operate. We are
registered and it is a simple process, we pay our taxes, of course taxes are
heavy and it’s costly to repatriate proﬁts but it ’s far easier than most other
countries. In China the regulations are very strict. In China there are many
different types of licenses and registrations for different projects, and they
are very diﬁicult to obtain.
This illustrates that TECHCON 1 did not face many regulatory challenges because of the
low level of regulation in the technical consultancy industry and this environment seemed
to be favourable for them. The retail business also had few regulations but in their case,
this adversely affected their business. This can be seen in the remarks of the CEO of
HOSPI 2:
The problem is that the shopping centres are unregulated. In Gurgaon near
Delhi, there is a very big shopping centre and we were in one of the
shopping centres there and within a short span oftime, 5 shopping centres
came up within a 1 km radius. This means none of them will perform well,
and eventually some of them will close down and convert into ojﬁces or
something and then everything will be okay. It'sjust a tough environment.
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This respondent further added that such kind of a situation would never happen in
Australia because the regulations in Australia stipulate that if there is a shopping centre in
a certain suburb, permission will not be granted to open another one within a certain
geographic radius. In India, the lack of such a regulation results in many shopping centres
opening up within a very short distance of each other leading to unhealthy competition.
The above cases and comments indicate that ﬁrms in different industry sectors are
impacted differently by the regulatory environment and therefore the ﬁndings of this study
disagree with the view that all MNEs are equally affected by the regulatory distance in an
emerging market. Some industries are highly regulated and in other cases there were very
few regulations.
8.3 Operating the business
According to the rankings of 181 countries in the World Bank’s “Doing Business 2009”
report, which covers the period April 2007 to June 2008, Australia ranks 9th on the Ease of
Doing Business Index. This means that the regulatory environment is very conducive to the
operation of business. In comparison, India’s rank at 122 indicates a high level of
bureaucracy involved in the regulatory environment (refer Figure 8.1). Most of the
respondents agreed that the process of setting up and operating a business in India is very
cumbersome.
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Figure 8.1: India compared to global good practice economy and to selected
economies
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The General Manager of HOSPI 1 pointed out:
There are always challenges wherever you set up a business. The process of
operating any sort of business is ﬁaught with a lot of issues such as
licensing etc. which can take a very long time because they don’t have a
one-stop shop kind ofa process. In Haryana (a state in India) you need 43
different types of licenses to operate a hotel, and there is no one place you
can go to and say, right, here are all my documentation, can you please
issue thesefor me. Some licenses are interdependent on others, like one will
not be issued unless a previous one has already been issued, and there are
various different agencies we have to deal with.
This respondent further clariﬁed that for every issue which involved interaction with the
government departments, they had to deal with multitude of forms, procedures and several
visits to the concerned government departments. The idea of having a one-stop shop for
getting regulatory approvals also echoed in the remarks of the General Manager of
TECHCON 2:
Anyone in the whole food chain could slow down your project. Things are
changing, like in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra they have a single window
clearance from where you can get all your approvals. This should be done
in all the states.
The Executive Director of TECHCON I noted:
Bureaucracy just adds to the cost of doing business. It just makes the
project more expensive. You need to factor in the cost of delays to the
business. It takes 150 days to get something done in India whereas in Hong
Kong, Singapore or even in Australia it takesjustﬁve days
Another difﬁculty faced by a vast majority of the respondents related to the lack of clarity
of government rules and their interpretation. The Executive Director of BANK 1 pointed
out the ambiguity in the systems when he mentioned:
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There are issues related to federal and state based systems. It’s not so much
the issues but the understanding ofhow these systems work.
The ﬁndings suggest that for successful operation of a business in India, it is very
important to use intermediaries to overcome the challenges of getting approvals and
clearances from the government departments. These intermediaries can connect foreign
ﬁrms to domestic networks and key decision makers in government departments. To
identify the right intermediaries, these MNEs relied upon their social and business
networks which they developed in India. A need for improvement in granting of
approvals/licenses from different departments and cutting down red tape resonated through
the interviews with most of the managers of the Australian service MNEs that had to
interact with regulatory bodies in India.
8.3.1 The rules of the game
It has been noted by Peng (2003: 275) that the institutional framework in any given
country is always in some sort of transition, but emerging economies tend to have more
“fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of
the game that affect ﬁrms as players.” Therefore an important question for MNEs in
emerging economies is: “How to play the game, when the rules of the game are changing
and not completely known”? (Peng et.al., 2008: 924). According to Scott (2001), the
regulatory pillar of institutions consists of rules and regulations and the extent to which
these rules are monitored and enforced.
The Executive Director-South Asia of TECHCON 1 pointed out the challenges faced when
ﬁrms come across a new set of rules in the business environment.
In a developed economy the rules of the game are straightforward
regulations and playing ﬁeld are fairly level. In India, there is lots
happening in the business and the government system that is not clear to the
outsider, which the outsider cannot understand or can 't see. Learning what
they are and how to deal with them, learning how to beﬂexible and to adapt
and listening to the most common mistakes people make is very important in
emerging economies. People face problems when they don’t listen.
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Regulations that come in can sometimes completely change the rules ofthe
game, sudden and dramatic change in regulation. This doesn’t happen in
countries like Germany and Australia.
The ﬁndings of this study are consistent with the argument of Peng et al., (2008) that the
sporadic changes in India’s regulatory environment often created challenges for the
Australian MNEs. In another case pertaining to the rules of the game, the Executive
Director of BANK 1 shared his experience of bidding for a major airport project in India
and explained the challenges of playing by the rules:
The bidding process was quite tortured, very bureaucratic and seemed to
favour the home guys, so to speak. I can tell you one of the things that has
intrigued me. The government can be very very bureaucratic and slow, and
then one morning they wake up and say it’s got to be done tomorrow. I have
seen many places of the world where the government can drag its feet for
months, but when it has to be done it has to be done very quickly. But in
India, the quickly is to me unrealistically quick. And sometimes what you
are worried about is whether that’s so because the process is effectively
stitched up.
This respondent further elaborated his experience:
Sometimes what you can do in a tender is, ifyou're helping one party in a
tender, then you can have a public tender but only allow the other parties
two weeks to respond when they really need two months and effectively
you ’ve picked the winner but the winner is the guy you've been talking tofor
a year. That does happen in different places in the world but in India it
happens a little bit more. Guys in the Indian oﬂice will tell me that we need
to put something in and tell me not to worry as they (government) will let us
change later on. Ifyou get your bid in on time, then they will let you modiﬁz
it. This is not exactly following the rules, that's kind of tricky coming with
that angle. You could be playing by the rules and still lose. That’s where I
find operating in India a bit challenging. You needpeople who can snijfthe
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air so to speak and we still need to interpret what they are telling us in the
context ofwhat we are doing.
In this case the Executive Director pointed out the need for people who can “sniff the air”
referring to the local people with knowledge of the informal rules of the game to assist
them with better understanding. This type of knowledge is extremely important when
competing for government projects in emerging markets. He emphasised that in order to
overcome such knowledge deﬁcits, the networks and relationships were very useful.
The Managing Director of TECHCON 4 shared his experience of the bidding process in
India:
We are consultants in the hydropower area and are fairly niche. We are
targeting the developers ofprivate hydropower. We have done some work
for the government's National Hydro Power Corporation and Ifound that it
was an extremely bureaucratic process I had to go through to a nerve
racking and frustrating experience. Because these government
organisations by law have to accept the lowest bidder, we often miss out
because we are not in that game and we don’t intend to be the lowest
bidder. Our Price structure is higher and we are oﬂering something
different. We are offering highest quality instead of cheapest consultancy
each time.
Such comments indicate that the Australian service MNE often faced a new set of rules in
India which challenged their way of doing business. North (1990) suggests that in
situations where formal constraints fail, informal constraints play a larger role in reducing
uncertainty. The Australian MNEs which participated in government tenders/contracts
were more prone to uncertainties in the tendering process thereby suggesting weak formal
constraints in the environment which leads to a higher reliance on the informal
connections. This can be observed in the remarks of the Executive Director of BANK 1
when he said, “...that (reliance on informal connections) does happen in different places
in the world but in India it happens a little bit more. ” The findings of this research support
the argument of Peng et al., (2008) that informal connections are important in most
countries but in emerging markets, they are more valuable when dealing with the
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government. To use the resource-based language, such assets can be very valuable, rare
and hard-to-imitate.
8.3.2 Tax Regime
The ﬁndings of this study indicate that although India's tax landscape is fast changing, the
challenge of understanding the tax system assumes greater signiﬁcance due to the
existence of several complicated and overlapping federal and state regulations governing
taxation. The respondents stated that though the government of India has launched
initiatives to make the tax environment more transparent, management of tax still remains
a difﬁcult and complex area. The ﬁndings informed that taxes in India are quite high and
they are often very complex. The Asia Manager ofTECHCON 7 added that the complexity
of the tax regime was another reason why they decided to merge with a local company
which had local connections and many years of experience in dealing with the
complexities of the tax structure:
That's why we preferred a merger because the company we merged with has
been operating in this environment for 15 years. They would know how to
get around tax and other regulations, and that is why I say going into India
all by yourself is like opening up a can ofworms. We have a tax manager in
Australia who looks after all the tax affairs in all the different countries
where TECHCON 7 operates. When he comes back from India, he is
ﬂustered and he says that ifyou need to understand the tax structure, you
need to live in India and that is why he has hired a tax specialist in India
l’lOW.
During the interview it transpired that the tax specialist of the Indian company had
networks and relationships in place in the tax department as a result of which managing the
taxes became less cumbersome. The CEO of HOSPI 2 also explained the challenges they
faced with the tax department:
We had a lot of issues with red tape especially the tax department because
the way our business operates. When we put the name ofour company on a
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paper bag for instance to serve the customer, and someone is using an
unmarked bag, you have to pay dutyfor having a name on the bag. There is
a very convoluted system out there and we had a running row with the tax
department since we started there but that ’s part ofthe game.
He also raised concern over the high tax and duty rates in India:
The duty is very high like 40%, so we had to set up a factory in India. Our
ideal position would have been to send raw material like dough etc. from
Australia but instead we had to set up a factory and we spent over $1
million on setting up afactory in Chennai because ofduty rates. Things like
oven and some ofthe materials and we had to sendfrom here because they
are not available in India, all these attracted 40% duty and this is very
prohibitive. Now Australia is talking of a free-trade agreement but I don 't
know howfar away that is.
These incidents indicate the complexities in the tax regime which the Australian MNEs
had to manage. The general consensus amongst the respondents was to hire local tax
experts who not only have the knowledge of Indian corporate and tax laws but who also
have a strong relationship with the key ofﬁcials of the tax department. This relationship
helps them in managing the complex tax system as it gives them access to vital information
on the workings of the tax ofﬁce.
8.3.3 Intricacies of the legal system
The Indian legal system is based on the English common law and the Australian MNEs
saw this as a commonality between the Australia and India. However, post-entry, they
discovered that the interpretation and implementation of the law could create legal
challenges that they had not anticipated. Most of the respondents agreed that the legal
processes are very long and delayed and engaging with the legal system should be seen as
a last resort. Some of the MNEs shared their direct experience in dealing with the judicial
system which they termed as ineffective, while other MNEs learnt about the inefﬁciencies
in the system through the experience of other ﬁrms in their network. The common View
was that the legal system in India is frustrating and has not had a revamp in many years.
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The case of TECHCON 3 Engineering provides a rich insight into the complexities of the
legal system in India. TECHCON 3 had gone into litigation with their client, the Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), a public sector undertaking of the Government of India.
TECHCON 3 and ONGC were parties to a construction contract providing for TECHCON
3 to undertake works for the development of oil and gas ﬁelds off the eastern coast of
India. The details of the dispute are covered in the article by Nigel Wilson and Susannah
Moran in “The Australian” dated 17 June 2007 quoted below:
“TECHCON 3 Engineering is in trouble again over an oil and gas industry construction
contract. ”
The Perth company has beenforced to go to court to protect itselfin a long-
running dispute with India's government-controlled Oil and Natural Gas
Corp. It comes one week after an independent arbitrator ruled against
TECHCON 3 over claims resultingfrom its $400 million Bass Gas turnkey
project in Bass Strait. Three banks have been barred from paying
performance guarantees to ONGC as part of a dispute over the $US215
million ($253 million) GI gas project oﬂIndia 's east coast.
TECHCON 3 took urgent action in the Australian Federal Court, asking
judge John Gilmour to block ONGC ﬁom calling on performance
guarantees from the Commonwealth Bank, HSBC and BNP Paribas, and
the banksfrom transferring any money to ONGC. Because ONGC is outside
Australian legal jurisdiction, TECHCON 3 also had to get special
permissionfrom the court to serve legal documents on the company.
TECHCON 3 alleges ONGC breached the Trade Practices Act and engaged
in unconscionable conduct in seeking the payments. The potential eﬂect of
the stoush on TECHCON 3 was noted by Justice Gilmour, who said in his
written judgment: "The evidence shows how TECHCON 3 will be
irreparably aﬂected (both ﬁnancially and through an adverse impact on its
reputation) ifONGCprocesses its demands and secures payments under the
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performance guarantees. " The banks were ordered by the Federal Court not
to pay ONGC any of the monies demanded until resolution of the case.
Justice Gilmour noted TECHCON 3 had completed 83 per cent ofthe work
but had only been paid 65 per cent of the original contract price. Court
documents show TECHCON 3 has already demanded $US125 million from
ONGC for delay costs, but ONGC has rejected the claim. Both sides are
claiming breach of contract. TECHCON 3 alleges that ONGC's failure to
undertake offshore work meant TECHCON 3 could not complete its
building works. TECHCON 3 has said the GI project involved shallow and
deep-water activities feeding an onshore gas plant. ONGC was responsible
for drillingfive deep-water wells which TECHCON 3 would then connect to
the onshore plant. "Despite repeated attempts, ONGC has failed to
complete any ofthe deep-water wells; hence TECHCON 3 has been unable
to complete its contract works, " the company said. TECHCON 3 chief
executive John Cooper said ONGC had now terminated the contract and
$US80 million was owed to TECHCON 3 by ONGC.
When the Project Director of TECHCON 3 was asked how satisﬁed they were with the
judicial process in India, the response was:
Terrible dissatisﬁed Frankly, not so much with the outcome but the process
itself Our arbitration with ONGC has engaged three former judges from
the Supreme Court of India. ONGC has put petitions in the Mumbai High
Court and more than a year has gone but no decision as yet. I am
dissatisfied with the timeframe, also with the support you receive from
Indian counsel, solicitors and barristers. None of them will commit to
support you in an ongoing basis. For example elsewhere in the world say in
the UK, Australia or Singapore, once they take a briefthey will see it to its
very end. In Mumbai we had 20 different counsels representing us.
Barristers are independent so we used a firm of solicitors to engage a
barrister. Barristers will just walk away or not make themselves available
to you, become disinterested and not perform. Then it gets into the
judiciary. Elsewhere in the worldyou have a precedent where case histories
are reviewed, the law will be interpreted by a particular judge and that
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judge’s interpretation would be used as a reference point by another judge
to make his determination ofa similar matter and these things build up and
provide the body of law which is well established and understood by
everybody. In India unfortunately almost every case where there has been a
ﬁnding of a particular point, you also find an exact opposite which is so
contradictory, and so judges take no reference to them whatsoever. The
judge makes up his own mind as he goes along. So there is a lack of
certainty in anything you do.
TECHCON 3 relied on the assumption that the legal system would produce the desired
outcome as expected under common law. However, in spite of India following the
common law tradition, the manner in which the judges decided cases without reference to
precedent came as a surprise to TECHCON 3. This lack of local knowledge about the way
the legal system operates cost them millions of dollars. Agreeing with the uncertainties of
the legal system, the remarks of the General Manager of Accor indicated that MNEs need
to have a thorough understanding of the nature of the legal system in order to improve their
chance of business success:
Whilst the legal system is based on the British system, it is a very
convoluted process with long delays and so it should be seen as a last
resort. So when you're buying land and property etc. you have to be very
very careful to make sure that you do not have problems like someone
claiming title over land etc. Things are not as structured in a way as they
are in say a place like Australia. It is easy to go down to the local council
and get the details of titles whereas it is not the same here in India. The
systems are not well developed so you have to be very very careful.
Uncovering everything to make sure the people you are dealing with have
the right to the titles and that you have employed people who are fairly
adept at dealing with the government is the key.
This respondent believed that a thorough due diligence must be carried out before
conducting a transaction which may have legal ramiﬁcation. If the matter has to be taken to
court, then getting a decision within a reasonable time frame is almost impossible. Some of
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the Australian MNEs who averted legal issues informed the author that they steered clear
of legal issues because the contracts they had drawn with their clients were quite detailed
and if a situation did arise where they entered into a dispute with the other party, their
preference was to resolve such disputes outside of the legal system because of the
excessive delays in settling cases. The following quotes from the senior manager of
TECHCON 4 and TECHCON 5 illustrate the strategies these MNEs adopted to avoid
getting caught up in the legal process. As the Managing Director of TECHCON 4informed:
We have drawn contracts with many of our clients and we are going with
the best ofinterests so that there is a win-win situation. Thusfar we haven ’t
had any problems but we have seen our clients going into litigation over
problems in the allotment ofhydropower projects and this causes delayfor
us as well. Our clients put in a bid to the government and we noticed that
the contractual arrangements were very poor. The government has very
poor processes to hand over these projects. Our clients are struggling with
the legality and due processes.
The ﬁndings suggest that most of the Australian MNEs did not have conﬁdence in the
efﬁcient performance of the legal system. When the Executive Director of TECHCON 1
was asked if the legal system was good enough to protect the contractual arrangements, he
exclaimed:
No-no-no. No point having a legal dispute in India, it is a waste of time to
go to courts. From time to time we do go into arbitration with government
clients but eventually you do get paid. It may take three to ﬁve years ifyou
go into arbitration but ifyou go to courts, it is a different matter. It can take
15 to 20 years and if the other party tries to block you, it can take even
longer. You just set up the contract so you are protected and if the other
party breaches, youjust stop the work. That's the only remedy. After talking,
discussing, cajoling and threatening, youjust have to stop.
Some of the respondents stated that securing payments from clients for work done was
difﬁcult at times. This could often lead to contractual disputes but most of the Australian
MNEs that faced such kind of disputes had an almost similar strategy of stopping work
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until the issue was resolved. The respondents informed that they were prepared to lose
money for a few weeks of work done in order to deal with such cases rather than relying on
the judicial system which according to them lacked efﬁciency in resolving commercial
disputes or enforcing contracts. According to the “Doing Business 2009” report of the
World Bank, India is ranked 180 out of 181 countries compared with Australia’s rank of 20
in terms of enforcing contracts. (See Figure 8.2) This low ranking of India for contracts
enforcement conﬁrms the Australian MNEs lack of trust in the judicial system.
Figure 8.2
Ranking ofIndia in Enfoming Contracts ‘ Compared to goodpractice and selected economies:
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Source: “Doing Business 2009” The World Bank. Washington DC
In another case, the Principal of TECHCON 8 adopted a different approach. He was very
upfront in his dealings with his clients in India as can be observed in his quote below:
Most businesses have a reputation for non-payment of debts and you have
to be mindful ofthat. I am very honest with my clients. I tell my clients that
this is the impression we have and ifyou want us to workfor you, these are
the conditions when we can come on board and work with you. I make it
very clear. If they don't agree, we don’t work with them. It’s a matter of
principle. We have been around the worldfor 15-16 years. We can supply a
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serious skill set and we don ’t sell ourselves short. Ifthey want us then these
are our conditions and ifthey don ’t pay, we will pull out our people and we
will stop work infour weeks.
The ﬁndings suggest that the Australian service MNEs had a very good understanding
about the complexities and delays in the legal system in India and therefore chose not to
engage with the legal system. They were aware that the legal process is very expensive and
protracted and so they tried to ensure that they got everything right the ﬁrst time. A recent
report published by Berlin based Transparency International (an international non-
governmental organisation addressing corruption worldwide) called the ”Global
Corruption Report 2007", discusses judicial corruption in India and attributes judicial
problems to a number of factors, including "delays in the disposal of cases, shortage of
judges and complex procedures, all of which are exacerbated by a preponderance of new
laws.” This report by Transparency International further highlights that the mere existence
of legal frameworks will not guarantee effective enforcement. The discussion with the
respondents conﬁrmed most of these conclusions of the report.
The Australian MNEs ensured that they had tight contracts which included clauses in the
contractual agreements to stop work in the event of non-payment. They minimise (1 their
losses by adopting this tactic and obviated the need to engage in the legal system. During
the data collection stage, some managers (n3) made a request to turn off the tape recorder
during the interview and on condition of anonymity, mentioned that “if you have the right
contacts, you can get legal decisions swayed in your favour.” This is corroborated by the
Transparency International report (2007) which states that "bribes seem to be solicited as
the price of getting things done" in India and the estimated amount of bribes paid in a 12-
month period was around $ 580 million. The report adds, "Money was paid to the ofﬁcials
in the following proportions: 61 percent to lawyers; 29 percent to court ofﬁcials; 5 percent
to middlemen." The legal system posed a major challenge to the Australian MNEs and they
all agreed that until it was revamped, it was best to deal with legal issues in ways which
avoided engagement with the legal system.
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8.3.4 Intellectual property rights
One of the concerns MNEs have when expanding business in emerging markets is the
protection of their intellectual property rights (IPR). Five of the Australian MNEs,
especially those in the software industry, believed that intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection was lacking in India. Theories that advance an institutional explanation of
development posit that enforceable property rights are a vital institution that promotes
development (Acemoglu, 2003). Most respondents informed the author that India’s efforts
in streamlining its IPR laws are a step in the right direction and but the problem lies in the
enforcement of these laws. This issue was of particular concern to MNEs from the
software industry that were keen to protect the IPR of their software in India. The Heritage
Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom for 2009 shows Australia's score for Property
rights at 90 compared with India’s 50. This implies that property rights are very secure in
Australia in comparison to India. The remaining (n 11) MNEs did not consider IPR as a
serious challenge to their business because of the nature of resources and capabilities that
their business relied upon. The MNEs from the software industry were most concerned
about the lack of protection of intellectual property. The senior managers of SOFTWARE
1 and SOFTWARE 2 (both software ﬁrms) were apprehensive about losing their software
capability because of the weak enforcement of intellectual property rights in India.
Interestingly, their business was not affected as adversely as they had initially anticipated.
According to both these ﬁrms, their initial perceptions appeared to be misguided. The
Vice President of SOFTWARE 1 explained:
Certainly within our company at that time there was fear verging on
paranoia that having a software capability in India meant we are exposed
to the risk that some unscrupulous person that we hire can copy all our
source code, take it out of the office and do something to undermine our
business. In physical security of things like that, it is more a threat there
than in Australia. But we are no more or less exposed to that risk in
Australia. It took some time for us in Australia to get over that fear but we
did eventually. We rationalised that whether it is in Australia, India or any
other part ofthe world, ifsomeone was to take the source code which is our
intellectual property, it is ultimately going to be of limited value to them
because we are continually developing the software. They would only get a
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static snapshot at that point in time where there copied it. Secondly even if
they copied and sold it to some other group they don’t have the body of
intellectual capability that we have within our company to extract value
from that source code that we can from our ongoing development. So there
are a whole range of reasons why the fears about intellectual property in
our case seemed misguided. At the end, we did not look at the IP law in
India andformulate any opinion whether we should or should not operate
in India
SOFTWARE I realised that they had a misguided fear when they rationalised the level of
threat they might face operating in India. Their conﬁdence in their resources and
capabilities and the expected degree of loss of intellectual property prompted them to
overlook this threat. The Australian Software ﬁrms realised that if India had become a base
for international software ﬁrms like Microsoft and other multi-national software vendors
under the existing IPR regime, then the threat of losing their intellectual property was not
as serious as they had anticipated. The Director of MGMTCON 2 was more positive about
the legal protections available in India with regards to IPR when he said:
That fear is always there with regards to [P but it has to be managed and
legal protections are available. In the mature markets it is less of a threat,
but it could still be an issue.
The Channel Manager of SOFTWARE 2 agreed with the above views when he stated that
although protection of intellectual property rights in Australia meets the world standards,
the threat to intellectual property is still existent in Australia. SOFTWARE 2’s strategy
was to raise awareness of the IPR issue at various forums in Australia and India at the
industry and government level so that necessary steps may be taken up by the concerned
authorities for improving protection of intellectual property. Therefore IPR was not seen as
a major challenge by the Australian MNEs.
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8.4 Importance of networks and relationships
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, the challenges faced by the Australian service MNEs in
India’s regulatory environment were discussed. These challenges impacted MNEs
differently depending on the type of industry they operated in and included: contrasting
regulations, managing government departments while operating the business, ambiguity of
the rules of the game, complexity of the tax system, inefﬁciencies of the legal system and
intellectual property rights protection. This part of the chapter will focus on the emphasis
given by the managers of the Australian service MNEs to the importance of networks and
relationships in navigating through the regulatory uncertainties in India. This will be
established by means of quotations taken from the in-depth interviews with senior
managers of the Australian MNEs.
The ﬁndings of this study indicate all the Australian MNEs shared the view that in order to
operate successfully in India the right networks and relationships are absolutely essential.
This was the common theme that resonated in all the interviews. Social networks provide
access to a better understanding of how the system works in a particular context and can
therefore help overcome regulatory hurdles. Most of the ﬁrms agreed that the networks and
contacts helped them in overcoming issues related to taxation, legal system, government
related matters and in understanding the rules of the game in India. Peng and Zhou (2005:
323) have argued that when formal rules that are supportive of market systems have not
been well established, “ﬁrms’ strategic choices will be network-centered, heavily relying
on the strong personal ties”. The use of networks and relationships in business activities in
India is widespread — from winning government contracts to settling disputes. This is
depicted in the common belief of most of the respondents: “it's not what you know but who
you know.” In other words, if a ﬁrm does not have the right contacts, it will most likely be
disadvantaged. The importance of cooperative relationships for businesses in Asia and
other emerging economies is due to the underdevelopment of institutions and markets.
(Buckley, 2004; Peng, 2002).
The Asia Manager of TECHCON 7 expressed in his interview that India did not offer a
level playing ﬁeld and outlined the importance of networks and relationships in emerging
markets in overcoming this handicap:
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A local relationship is absolutely essential to win a job. For a start, you
don’t win ajob on a level playingﬁeld It's not what you know but who you
know and who you know comes ﬁrst, second and third and whether you
know the right amount or not, it doesn't matter.
The Principal of TECHCON 8 expressed similar sentiments about the rules of the game in
the Indian business environment when he said, “it’s not what you know but who you know
that matters. ”
On the subject of relationships, the General Manager of HOSPI 1 came up with some
insights that highlighted the importance of relationships in the Indian market:
0 yeah, India is a landﬁlled with intermediaries; it is a land of the liaison
oﬁficer. If you're buying something, selling something there are always
intermediaries around who will say I can do this for you. That is typical in
any business environment. We're in the networking era. Networks are
absolutely crucial for any successful business. India is very relationship
driven country. Never underestimate the power of relationships. From my
social networks that I have built up in the area where I live, I get far-
reaching business ideas. They invite you for social gatherings, weddings
etc. Cricket and curry are common interests and ifyou like them both, your
problems are halfover.
Clearly his social network was an important resource that he used to acquire local
knowledge and reduce the liabilities of foreignness faced by his ﬁrm in the regulatory
environment in India. Peng and Luo (2000) have noted the importance of network ties in
an emerging economy like China. They report that such ties are necessary for ﬁrm
performance. Networks can provide ﬁrms with important connections which not only help
in facilitating internationalisation of operations
( Freeman and Sandwell, 2008) but also build key relationships, both direct and indirect,
that MNEs maintain in international markets (Welch and Welch, 2004) for operating
effectively. In an analysis of the role of network relationships in emerging markets,
Freeman and Sandwell (2008) have identiﬁed the crucial role played by social networks in
overcoming challenges pertaining to cultural issues, work practices and government
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regulations and the ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this view. This is evident in
the following cases of MGMTCON 1 and HOSPI 2.
The Chairman of MGMTCON I opted for a joint venture in India and his rationale for
choosing a joint-venture mode was to take advantage of the existing networks of the local
joint-venture partner. He explained that things would be extremely difﬁcult without a local
partner:
It can help to have local partner who already has the infrastructure, who
already has the networks that you can use. We joint ventured with a ﬁrm
called Dua Associates, probably the largest law ﬁrm in India. We joint
ventured on a 50:50 basis to do mergers and acquisitions and corporate
advisory work in India.
The CEO of HOSPI 2 also believed in the strategy of having a joint-venture partner who is
well connected:
I think what we lookfor in ajoint-venture partner, and that ’s what we did in
China, we lookedfor people that knew people.
HOSPI 2's entry into the Indian market was facilitated by an existing foreign relationship
with the potential partner as discussed in Chapter 5. In the search for new international
business partners, decision-makers seek to avoid high search costs, due to uncertainties and
complexity, and try to minimise these costs by relying on their personal network which
also seems to be the line of least resistance.
Highlighting the importance of relationships, the Executive Director of BANK I
mentioned that it is better to team up with someone who has long-standing relationships.
He was positive about the joint-venture with the State bank of India:
The local bank brought relationships and local knowledge, we brought in
technology and sophisticated processes to do business and you marry them
up and they work very well.
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The Project Director of TECHCON 3 Engineering, the Australian MNE which operated as
a sole venture, afﬁrmed that in India it is very important to have either a strategic alliance
or a joint venture because:
...... the local partner has ability to absorb shocks. They have the local
knowledge and networks to deal with tricky situations which the Western
company might be totally baffled with.
On a similar note, the CEO off HOSPI 2 made a statement about the Indians and the
importance of having networks:
I think the Indians are the most highly networked race on earth, in the
sense, somebody knows someone that knows somebody to get things done.
We have a CEO who is an Indian and is very well-connected. He's run the
business for the last ﬁve years. He is also highly networked and well
respected so doors open up through his networks and relationships.
The General Manager of TECHCON 2 expressed the need for creating relationships and
took it to a philosophical level when he stated:
When you go to India you leave behind what you consider are your
strengths because they worked in Australia and you don’t really know
whether they will work in India. In India it is about relationships, getting
close to people at a diﬂerent level. They are very professional in India.
Important thing is, how do I get close to them at a humane level, at the
spiritual level, so we can develop strong relationships. In the West we don't
see it in the same way. It is probably different perceptions I guess.
This respondent took the aspect of relationships to a different level by emphasising that if
one goes past the transaction level to a more humane level, a caring and kind level, this
makes relationships much stronger and in the Indian context, in his experience, this seemed
to work very well with the people in India.
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The General Manager of AIR I explained the role played by his Indian staff in building
relationships as well as the advantages of having an alliance partner in the Indian market.
The major role ofour people in India is to nurture the relationships with the
government so that things could go on smoothly. Our head of Indian
operations is an Indian who knows how things work and is very well
connected.
AIR 1 has a code sharing alliance with Jet Airways, an Indian airline and the respondent
mentioned that the alliance partner knows the system very well and has excellent networks
and relationships which are required for smoothly running the operations in India.
In the cases discussed in the above section, it appears that local JV partners were relied
upon for their local knowledge and relationships. However, this strategy of reliance on
local JV partners cannot be generalised to all ﬁrms because there were other Australian
MNEs which overcame the lack of local knowledge and networks by using a strategy
which is different to having a local joint-venture partner. These ﬁrms operated as sole
ventures and they employed a different strategy to overcome the lack of networks and
relationships to obtain similar results.
In the case of TECHCON 4 which operates as a sole venture in India, the strategy was to
identify and tap into a talent pool of highly experienced retired public servants who had
extensive contacts and local knowledge. The Managing Director explained that his strategy
to overcome the regulatory challenges was to engage highly experienced Indian
professionals who assisted him to navigate through the bureaucratic hurdles. Details of this
resource of highly experienced and networked professionals have been discussed in
Chapter 7. The Managing Director of TECHCON 4 explained:
We have a very good Indian general manager for business development
who has a very good knowledge of the market and the right networks and
through that the contacts generally grow to the extent, that marketing is not .
a big problem of mine. The top technical guy is ex-chairman of a
hydropower project in India, was a member of electricity board, retired at
60, and spent 10 years as adviser to the Government ofMauritius.
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Therefore, in spite of being a sole venture, this ﬁrm and some others chose to employ
highly connected professionals and this can be seen as a resource building exercise by the
MNEs to establish networks. These Indian professionals helped the Australian MNE
establish the social and business network through which the ﬁrm gets access to resources
and capabilities in the external environment. The resources which are accessible through
the network are relatively inimitable (Gulati, 1999). This strategy was successfully
employed by TECHCON 5 as well. The Project Director explained the advantages of
hiring people who have strong networks and relationships:
You’ve got to have Indian people in your company who can do deals for
you, who have the right contacts. You hire retired people from the Ministry
of so-and—so, they come and work for you and you keep them as your
employees. They can go to meet their friends with whom they worked in the
past, have breakfast or lunch with them and get issues sorted out. He can go
and see people that I can ’t in a million years.
This indicates the high importance given to the right contacts and networks in India. It also
highlights the fact that without the presence of existing relationships, it is difﬁcult to gain
access to people in high-powered positions in India unless one has existing relationships
with them. The Executive Director of TECHCON 1 shared some of his views on
bureaucracy in emerging markets and how to deal with it.
In emerging markets, bureaucracy is significant but there are ways through
it and companies have to learn that it is a way of life. You need managers
who can interface with bureaucracy and ﬁnd new ways through it as it
could hinder the operations and set things back. Once a company has made
a commitment to a particular market they will learn to live with it and after
a while once they are established on the ground they will not think twice
about it.
The General Manager of HOSPI l cited the importance of using a local intermediary to
navigate through the bureaucratic bottlenecks. He revealed:
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We have a local person from a small company, he runs around the halls of
government and gets things done for us, moving ﬁles from one desk to
another making sure the forms are properly ﬁlled in. Someone might say
that I need such and such a document whereas on a previous day they have
said that this is not required So at times it gets very confusing, and there is
no consistency in these requirements, so that’s a very challenging situation.
That’s the way it is at the moment and you have to work through
it..............that’s why you need a local contact to help you through the
complexities ofthe system.
The above remarks indicate some of the regulatory challenges faced by the Australian
managers in India because of the myriad of procedures for running the business. The
ﬁndings suggest that in order to overcome such challenges, MNEs use the network of
locals with the right contacts to run through the corridors of power and get the
administrative clearances by paying a “fee for services.”
Fukuyama (1995) argues that business networks in Asia are explained by inadequate
markets, corrupt governments, weak legal systems, poor ﬁnancial and banking sectors, and
the absence of reliable intermediaries. The ﬁndings of this study support the above
arguments because most of the respondents indicated that such conditions existed in the
Indian context. Therefore, having the right network and relationship assumes greater
importance in order to run a business efﬁciently. The Australian service MNEs gained
access to such networks through local participation in their business. This was possible by
having a local joint-venture partner or by hiring or contracting the services of retired
bureaucrats/professionals who were very well-connected with the bureaucracy and
government. Either of these strategies seemed to serve well in order to overcome the
challenges in the regulatory environment.
Another insight gained from the ﬁndings relates to the rules of the game in the Indian
business environment. It is succinctly depicted by a common saying: show me the face and
I’11 show you the rule. Rules are subject to interpretation and in countries where the
institutions are not well developed, people with the right connections in the bureaucracy
can get the rules interpreted to suit their needs. This is a challenge faced by ﬁrms needing
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permits and clearances/approvals or bidding for government contracts. The people who are
connected to the government ofﬁcials can get favourable decisions for their ﬁrms and
therefore in these markets, businesses that do not have direct connections in the corridors
of power tend to use the services of agents/intermediaries who have existing relationships
in place with government ofﬁcials. It is because of this reason that the reliance on contacts
and networks is much higher for business success in emerging markets. Business and
social networks can help overcome these kinds of informal institutional barriers. They help
in managing complex business relationships (Peng 2002).
The interviews also revealed that when local relationships were not well established,
Australian MNEs in the technical consultancy sectors preferred to do business with other
multinationals in India instead of engaging in government contracts because they felt that
the other multinational companies played by the same rules of the game that the Australian
ﬁrms were familiar with. The respondents reiterated that it was difﬁcult to secure
government contracts due to the bureaucracy and red tape inherent in the system and
without the appropriate networks and relationships in place, it became hard to win such
contracts .
The ﬁndings indicate that the Australian MNEs accessed the local networks either through
their local joint-venture partners or hired/contracted retired professionals (both bureaucrats
and public servants) in order to overcome the regulatory challenges that they faced in the
Indian business environment.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the focus was to gain insights into how ﬁrms manage the regulatory
challenges in an emerging market context. The ﬁndings suggest that social networks and
relationships play an important role in overcoming regulatory issues related to taxation,
legal and government matters (obtaining licenses and approvals, government contracts).
The ﬁndings reveal that Australian MNEs were quite aware about the importance of
personal connections and informal networks when doing business in India. This was
evident from the following statement used by many respondents, “who youknow is more
important than what you know.” It is quite similar to the use of Guanxi in China. Li (2004)
has put forth an argument that the predominant reliance on Guanxi is due to the lack of
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formal institutions such as an impartial and efﬁcient legal system, so that people must rely
on personal relationships to protect their transactions and property rights. When fair and
transparent rules are lacking, the state is unable to enforce contracts impartially and people
consequently rely on personal relationships to govern their interests and transactions (Peng
et.al.,2008). The ﬁndings of this research are consistent with this argument. The study also
revealed that personal connections through networks and relationships are used to
circumvent the legal and regulatory system. This generally happens when the formal
institutions tend to be somewhat ambiguous. Many senior managers indicated that through
the networks, they were able to access important information about the overall business
environment that was not available in the corporate sector. They could get information on
the local context, local legitimacy and access to needed resources (Rondinelliand London,
2003). Kogut and Singh (1988) have argued that in order to reduce psychic distance, ﬁrms
develop and strengthen relationships in countries which are institutionally distant to
overcome the local knowledge deﬁcit. The ﬁndings of this study support this view.
Australian service MNEs adopted different strategies to achieve the same outcome of
managing the regulatory challenges through use of networks and relationships.
Respondents relied on local joint venture partner; local consultants or retired bureaucrats,
hired to provide professional opinion for dealing with government departments; local
associations of Australian ﬁrms as well as the Australian High Commission; third-party
friends and acquaintances from other Australian ﬁrms who played a key role as
conﬁdantes and were trusted for honest advice because they were not competing in the
same domain. Finally, the evidence from this study indicates that more open-minded
managers triangulated among many sources of local knowledge to increase the breadth and
validity of their understandings of the regulatory environment. The importance attached to
networks and relationships varied depending on the nature of the industry because is was
dependent on the level of engagement the ﬁrm had with the regulatory authorities and
government departments. The ﬁndings revealed that a higher level of engagement led to
more reliance on networks and relationships
In particular, the research ﬁndings suggest that in a relationship based society such as
India, ﬁrms that have better relationships with the government may use it to their
advantage in securing contracts and projects. This may explain why some of the Australian
service MNEs indicated that the rules of the game are ambiguous or the playing ﬁeld is
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uneven and therefore there is a need to have strong networks and relationships in India. A
second argument in favour of networks and relationships emerges from the institutional
approach which posits that the predominant reliance on networks is due to the lack of
formal institutions such as an impartial and efﬁcient legal system, so that people must rely
on personal relationships to protect their interests and overcome regulatory challenges.
Network strategies are much more widely employed in the emerging markets because of
the lack of formal legal and regulatory frameworks - known as “institutional voids”
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this argument. In
a developing economy where information and efﬁcient access to it could be a bottleneck or
even a hindrance to getting things done, it is not surprising that such high importance is
attached to networks and relationships. Finally, the evidence supports the proposition that
ﬁrms that are better connected through their networks and relationships have a competitive
advantage in the regulatory environment of an emerging market.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
This is not the end. It is not even the beginning ofthe end.
But it is, perhaps, the end ofthe beginning.
- Sir Winston Churchill
9.1 Introduction
This research carried out an exploratory study of the strategies employed by Australian
service MNEs to mitigate the liability of foreignness in India. The focus of this study was
on the post entry strategies of MNEs from a developed economy (Australia) operating in
an emerging economy (India). The success of their strategic alignments was crucial to
determining effective operational achievement. Drawing on institutional theory and
network perspectives, this study addressed the key research questions: (1) What are the
post entry institutional challenges for service sector MNEs operating in an emerging
market, and (2) How doﬁrms respond to institutional distancefollowing their initial entry
into an emerging economy? Institutional theory has emerged as an accepted approach to
the study of relations between the organisation and its environment (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987) and as a leading theoretical foundation for
research on MNE strategies in emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000).
Most existing studies on emerging markets have focussed on the determinants of entry
mode of MNEs. This study goes beyond the rationales of entry mode choice and explores
the challenges posed by formal and informal institutions on the operations of MNEs in an
emerging economy. Further, it examines how these MNEs adapt their strategies to cope
with such challenges at the regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive levels (Scott,
2001).
The complex nature of the research problem called for a rich, in-depth study that
incorporates the relevant context. A multiple-case study design was applied to enhance the
quality and robustness of the ﬁndings and to provide the thick description needed to
understand the strategies employed by Australian service MNEs to overcome the LOF in
an institutionally distant emerging market. A qualitative case study approach to the
phenomenon was adopted to allow the researcher to grasp the total complex world of social
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action in its most complete form. Data gathering protocols and data analysis were driven
by propositions derived from the theoretical framework established in the literature review
in Chapter 3. This qualitative study used a multi-case research design using semi-
structured interviews with key decision makers of 16 Australian service MNEs operating in
India. The research ﬁndings have largely been discussed in Chapters 5 to 8. Therefore, this
chapter brieﬂy summarises the research conducted in this study.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst section summarises the main ﬁndings
of the thesis and highlights the strategies employed by Australian MNEs in India to
overcome the liability of foreignness. The second section outlines the contributions made
by this study to theory and practice. The third section describes the limitations of this
study, as well as the robustness and credibility of the data and concludes by proposing
areas of future research emanating from this study.
9.2 Summary of main findings
In recent years, researchers have started considering the impact of institutional processes
on the choice of entry mode (Davis et al., 2000), and have discussed the implications of
institutional distance for the MNE in terms of legitimacy-seeking behavior (Kostova and
Zaheer, 1999). This study extends existing research by looking at the institutional factors
that inﬂuence the operations of an MNE post-entry in an emerging market and by
examining how the Australian service MNEs overcome these challenges.
Although entry mode'choice is not within the scope of this study, some interesting insights
emerged during the data analysis which merit attention. It is argued in the existing
literature in Chapter 3 that institutional distance has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the choice of
entry mode of a ﬁrm and if institutional distance is large, ﬁrms prefer a joint venture.
However, the ﬁndings of this research do not support this view because although the
institutional distance between Australia and India is large, it did not have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on Australian MNEs’ choice of entry mode as well as their operations in India.
Indeed, 10 out of 16 MNEs operated as sole ventures. The ﬁndings revealed that their
success as sole ventures was largely due to the adaptive strategies designed by these MNEs
that addressed institutional factors. These strategic choices were made in such a way that
the MNE could maintain a high level of strategic and operational control and maximise the
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beneﬁts provided by local partners and personnel in terms of local knowledge, networks
and legitimacy.
Another important ﬁnding is that ﬁrms conform to the institutional environment to
improve legitimacy. Institutional theory-based MNE research has examined the dual
pressures of global integration and local adaptation upon the MNE, and found that the
latter force generally exerts stronger inﬂuences on ﬁrm behavior (Rosenzweig and Nohria,
1994; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). In host countries where the
institutional environment is substantially different from that of the home country, the need
for the MNE to adapt to, and secure legitimacy in the local environment gains more
importance.
Institutional theorists (Dacin 1997, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991, Scott 1995)
suggest that organisations are motivated to enhance their legitimacy by conforming to
other organisations in the environment, even in the absence of evidence that such actions
increase internal efﬁciency. They argue that although conformist organisations are not
guaranteed to be more efﬁcient than their more deviant peers, they are rewarded for being
similar to other organisations. That similarity makes it easier for them to transact with each
other (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and increases the likelihood of their success (Dacin
1997). Following the institutional-based logic, it is argued that MNEs choose strategies
that will help them gain legitimacy in and conform to the host-country environment. The
ﬁndings agree with this View because the Australian MNEs responded to variations in the
institutional environment by designing appropriate strategies in the host country, India, to
secure legitimacy.
9.2.1 Collaborative Arrangements
The ﬁndings indicate that a ﬁrm can reduce its inherent liability of foreignness - its lack of
local knowledge, networks, familiarity with business customers, - through collaborative
arrangements. One such arrangement is to engage with a local joint venture partner. Joint
ventures also enable the MNE to tap into the unique skills of the partner to overcome
weaknesses in its own capability base. An international joint venture allows the MNE to
share the costs and the risks of foreign entry and to use the local partner's knowledge about
the local institutional framework, local consumer tastes, and business practices (Agarwal
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and Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1991; Erramilli and Rao 1993; Gatignon and Anderson
1988; Gomes-Casseresl989; Kogut and Singh 1988). Firms opt for joint-venture to
overcome their liability of foreignness. The Australian MNEs that operated as a joint
venture in India (n 6) conﬁrmed the arguments postulated above and stressed the need for
having the right partner for the venture to be successful. Even though partner selection is
vital, there has been little research on this phenomenon (Beamish and Lane, 1990;
Geringer, 1988). The ﬁndings conﬁrmed the views that MNEs attempt to leverage their
resources to gain a competitive advantage by searching for partners with unique
competencies and local market knowledge and access to overcome the LOF.
Beamish (1994) and several scholars argued that joint ventures, the most common form of
strategic alliance, are the dominant form of strategy used in emerging markets by
multinational ﬁrms. The ﬁndings of this author’s research, however, suggest that the sole
venture is the dominant form of strategy of Australian service MNEs in India and to
mitigate the LOF, these MNEs used collaborative arrangements other than having a local
joint venture partner. This is consistent with the resource-based approach which assumes
that sole ownership is the default entry mode and is the most preferred chbice until proven
otherwise (Ekelado and Sivakumar, 2003) Although joint ventures enable companies to
buy protection from business risk in an uncertain environment it also brings with it
additional “relationship” risks as many joint ventures end up in mutual disappointment.
MNEs that operated as a joint venture placed a strong emphasis of on the choice of the
right partner. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is one of the main reasons why ﬁrms prefer to
operate as a sole venture and tackle the LOF in ways other than depending on a local joint
venture partner. The other collaborative arrangements include engaging local agents or
consultants to manage the external business environment and deal with government
bureaucracies.
An unanticipated ﬁnding was the emergence of a new strategy to overcome the liability of
foreignness in the regulatory and cultural domains and this involved employing retired
senior professionals from the government or public sector who have rich industry
experience, strong local knowledge and networks, details of which are discussed in
Chapter 7, section 7.4.5. The ﬁndings suggest that MNEs using the sole venture mode of
operations ﬁnd this strategy very effective in overcoming the institutional challenges. This
resource (retired senior professionals from the government or public sector) obviates the
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necessity of relying on a local JV partner, thereby giving them a high control mode
resulting in higher returns. These MNES also displayed a sound awareness of the current
state of the host country’s business-supporting institutions and environment when they
entered India, such that these institutions did not have any major impact on the strategies
they employed. The cases also suggest a link between MNES clarity of local knowledge
and reliance on it for developing adaptive strategies. This knowledge also helped them to
identify the most suitable retired senior professionals from the government or public sector
who had the requisite experience and networks in their particular industry. Such
professionals have long-standing relationships with decision-makers in the government
departments and are well experienced to manage the local business environment.
It can therefore be argued that MNES evolve alternative tactical strategies to reduce the
potential impacts of knowledge deﬁcit in an emerging market through employing local
agents or consultants to provide localised advice and access to networks or/and employing
retired senior professionals with strong social and professional networks within the
government or public sector.
The ﬁndings also suggest that ﬁrms with prior experience in international business could
use their knowledge and experience of operating in uncertain environments and were thus
more conﬁdent to operate as a sole venture. MNES that have more global experience enact
variants of these strategies, which seem to be applicable across the emerging markets
which have more or less similar institutional environments. It is argued that regardless of
modal choice, the focus of all the MNES was to collaborate with the locals to manage the
institutional challenges in the host country. The form of these collaborative alliances varied
depending upon the industry in which the business operates and on interaction with actors
of the host country.
9.2.2 Corruption: Adaptive strategies
As discussed in Chapter 6, there is a mistaken perception in the existing literature that
corruption affects all ﬁrms in the same way. When asked about corruption in the Indian
environment, a few respondents advised that they did not face any corruption issues. Such
MNES belonged to the consulting, franchising and information technology industry. This
suggests that not all the ﬁrms are equally affected by corruption and therefore it cannot be
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generalised that all ﬁrms are affected by corruption in an emerging economy. While
corruption is present in a variety of industries, the ﬁndings of this study reveal that it is
more common in certain sectors. For instance, infrastructure projects are especially prone
to corruption because they involve large investments and complex contracts in which
corrupt payments can be easily disguised.
However, when corruption is widespread, i.e., highly pervasive, local ﬁrms, as well as
MNE subsidiaries, are more likely to comply with corrupt practices (Uhlenbruck et al.,
2006) and the ﬁndings of this study are consistent with this argument. The evidence
indicates that most of the Australian service MNEs relied on the assistance of the local
joint ventures partners or agents/consultants as part of an adaptive strategy to overcome the
challenge of dealing with corruption without getting directly involved. The ﬁndings
indicate that in the case of agents/consultants, the fees charged by them disguised the extra
payments to get the job done. These local partners use their local knowledge and networks
to overcome the corruption issues in the emerging market. The proﬁt potential and the
market size in India prompted the MNEs to devise such adaptive strategies. Some of the
MNEs termed these payments as “facilitation fees” to indicate that these fees are to be paid
to manage operations efﬁciently and avoid unnecessary delays and that such fees are not
considered to be bribes.
Doh et al., (2003) argue that MNEs that have a zero tolerance for corruption will avoid
such markets and this in turn will affect the inward ﬂow of FDI. This study revealed that
MNEs do not necessarily steer clear of such markets. Instead, they ﬁnd business
opportunities in the private sector, in projects of international bodies like the World Bank
or deal with larger MNCs because they ﬁnd these environments free from corruption.
These ﬁndings therefore suggest that regardless of corruption, the ﬂow of FDI continues
into the country. This implies that the ﬂow of FDI into an emerging economy is not
necessarily affected by the presence of corruption as stated in previous research which
argues that corruption reduces FDI (Habib and Zurawicki 2002, Mauro 1995, Smarzynska
and Wei 2000). In spite of the prevalence of corruption in India, investment has grown
rapidly over the past few years, taking India to the status of the second most attractive
destination for FDI according to the AT. Kearney FDI Conﬁdence Index 2007. This study
has found evidence that corruption does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the FDI ﬂow
in an economy and that ﬁrms sometimes adapt to corruption not by avoiding market entry
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altogether, but by choosing a local joint venture partner or by leveraging on the networks
and contacts of agents/consultants. Alternatively they ﬁnd opportunities which are free of
corruption. These strategies provide opportunities for ﬁrms to participate in economies
where corruption is high, while minimising some of the costs of corruption.
9.2.3 Rising above Cultural Challenges
There is an underlying assumption in prior research in international business that cultural
distance between home and host country increases the cost of entry, decreases the
operational beneﬁts and hampers the MNE’s ability to transfer core competencies to
foreign markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Palich and Gomez-Mejia, 1999). The ﬁndings
presented in this study do not contest this view. However, at variance with the literature,
the data reveals that in the case of most of the Australian service MNEs studied (n 12),
cultural distance did not have a negative impact on their operations. This could be
attributed to their adaptive strategies, the commonalities they saw between Australia and
India in the 3 Cs (cricket, curry and commonwealth) and the ‘Aussie advantage’ which was
discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.2. In addition it can be argued that the cultural
dimensions of Hofstede were based on data collected three decades ago. Its usefulness
when matched to current ﬁrm data is increasingly questionable (Shenkar, 2001). This study
indicates that although there is a high cultural distance between Australia and India
according to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, it did not negatively impact the operations of
the Australian service MNEs.
A close comparison of the 16 case study ﬁrms indicates that most of the Australian MNEs
(n 12) came to accept a shared deﬁnition of social reality in India that includes “the way
things are,” “what is important” and “the way things are done” (Scott,1987). They
recognised that India presented a new business environment that required a new set of rules
of the game compared with those in the home market and therefore adapted their strategies
accordingly. The remaining MNEs (n 4) faced some difﬁculties in managing cultural
issues but they were not signiﬁcant enough to adversely impact their business operations.
The ﬁndings indicate that their perceptions of India as presenting a complex culture were
largely responsible for the challenging times they faced. MNEs that perceived a
commonality between India and Australia were found to face fewer cultural challenges.
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This suggests that perceptions strengthen beliefs which in turn direct behaviour leading to
a self-fulﬁlling prophesy.
Chapter 7 identiﬁed a range of factors across the cases which contributed to the successful
management of cultural issues. These critical success factors include: the perception of the
commonalities between the two countries, the practice of cultural sensitivity in crafting
strategies, introducing cultural change with a safety net, finding congruence between
societal values and managerial practices, gaining of legitimacy by hiring locals instead of
expatriates, ﬁnding and employing retired public servants (an extraordinary new source of
skills, knowledge and experience), prior experience of operating in overseas markets and
creating brand awareness. These strategies enabled the MNEs to gain advantages that
allowed them to overcome the cultural challenges. Rather than looking to overcome
weakness in an emerging economy business environment, they displayed an ability to craft
a strategy that relies on resources and knowledge in the environment as sources of
competitive advantage (London and Hart, 2004). A key finding was the importance of
cultural sensitivity and cultural intelligence (Thomas and Inkson, 2004) in shaping
strategies in India.
An important observation made during the in-depth interviews suggests that the managers
of MNEs are more aware of cultural differences today than they were 15 to 20 years ago
because of their education and increased knowledge through the media and communication
technology. So they are more comfortable operating in countries with different cultures.
These MNEs exhibited an ability to create advantages based on a deep understanding of
and integration with the host country environment.
In summary, the evidence from the case studies does not fully agree with the proposition
developed from the existing literature discussed in Chapter 7 that the ability of a MNE to
operate effectively in the host country decreases as the cultural distance increases because
of inconsistencies in values and institutions between the home and the host country.
9.2.4 Networks and relationships
The ﬁndings suggest that social networks and relationships play an important role in
overcoming regulatory issues related to taxation, legal and government matters (obtaining
221
licenses and approvals, government contracts). The ﬁndings reveal that Australian service
MNEs were quite aware about the importance of personal connections and informal
networks when doing business in India. This was evident from the following statement
used by many respondents: “who you know is more important than what you know.” The
Australian MNEs accessed the local networks either through their local joint-venture
partners or hired/contracted retired professionals (both bureaucrats and public servants) in
order to overcome the regulatory challenges that they faced in the Indian" business
environment. Formal as well as informal contacts between people provide the basic
mechanism through which relationships are created and maintained. The ﬁndings also
revealed that networks are strongly relied upon at the beginning of a ﬁrm’s
internationalisation as they facilitate the acquisition of experiential knowledge about these
markets (Freeman and Sandwell, 2008) as evident in the HOSPI 2 case.
The ﬁndings of this study suggest that MNEs face particular regulatory challenges in
emerging markets because of the weaknesses in the institutional environment. In some
markets, the legal framework concerning business law might be less developed, and in
other cases as in India, it might be very cumbersome with respect to regulatory policy,
taxation and deﬁnition and enforcement of property rights, including intellectual property.
Even where the necessary laws are in place, their implementation and enforcement may be
difﬁcult without access to the right networks and contacts in the business environment as
discussed in the previous chapter. When fair and transparent rules are lacking, the state is
unable to enforce contracts impartially and people consequently rely on personal
relationships to govern their interests and transactions (Peng et. al., 2008). The ﬁndings of
this research are consistent with this argument.
Many senior managers indicated that through their networks, they were able to access
important information about the overall business environment that was not available in the
corporate sector. They could get information on the local context, local legitimacy and
access to needed resources (Rondinelli and London, 2003) in order to manage regulatory
issues. Kogut and Singh (1988) have argued that in order to reduce psychic distance, ﬁrms
develop and strengthen relationships in countries which are institutionally distant to
overcome the local knowledge deﬁcit. The ﬁndings of this study support this View. Finally,
the evidence from this study indicates that more open-minded managers triangulated
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among many sources of local knowledge to increase the breadth and validity of their
understandings of the regulatory environment
Australian service MNEs indicated that in India, the rules of the game are ambiguous or
the playing ﬁeld is uneven and therefore there is a need to have strong networks and
relationships with decision makers in India. A second argument in favour of networks and
relationships emerges from the institutional approach which posits that the predominant
reliance on networks is due to the lack of formal institutions such as an impartial and
efﬁcient legal system, so that people must rely on personal relationships to protect their
interests and overcome regulatory challenges. Network strategies are much more widely
employed in the emerging markets because of the lack of formal legal and regulatory
frameworks - known as “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). The ﬁndings of
this study are consistent with this argument. In a developing economy where information
and efﬁcient access to it could be a bottleneck or even a hindrance to getting things done, it
is not surprising that such high importance is attached to networks and relationships.
Finally, the evidence suggests that ﬁrms that are better connected through their networks
and relationships have a competitive advantage in the regulatory environment of an
emerging market.
9.3 Critical success factors for managerial effectiveness
Several common themes arose in the course of conducting the in-depth interviews. In this
section, these are distilled into nine critical success factors for managing operations
effectively in emerging-markets.
I. Use local expertise. There is no substitute for local knowledge.
2. Understand the local behaviour and conduct business with cultural sensitivity.
3. Find a partner. Strong local networks and relationships are critical.
4. Understand that you cannot continue to do business the way you have been doing it
in established markets.
5. Understand local laws, regulations and ethics. Do not assume they are the same as
in your home market.
6. Understand the culture. Taking a consistent approach in all markets ignores cultural
differences and can produce wildly different effects.
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7. Communicate. Open, two-way communication is vital, and “gaps” are a common
cause of misunderstandings.
8. Be present. Relationships and understanding do not happen remotely.
9. Think long-term. Put capacity and resources in place to support the investment over
time.
Investment in emerging markets will only grow in the years ahead, as more and more
companies in Australia and around the world look to these new markets to realise their
business ambitions. Companies should be moving now to address shortcomings in how
they manage institutional challenges in these vital markets.
9.4 Limitations of the study
As this is an exploratory study, there are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn.
In the future, additional case studies and broader empirical analysis and survey testing
would be valuable in extending the results of this research effort. A limitation of this study
is the small sample size represented by the 16 MNE cases investigated. However, it can be
argued that the ﬁndings could lead to an emerging paradigm where ﬁrms manage to
overcome the LOF in an emerging market without a JV partner thereby retaining full
control over their overseas operations, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
The successful strategies were determined by looking at MNEs in ﬁve different industry
groups within the Australian services sector. More industry groups in the study would no
doubt further enrich the research. Moreover, this study was limited by including MNEs
only from the services sector in Australia.
The ﬁndings are based on a sample limited to Australian MNEs in India. Thus they should
not be generalised without further replication in a different context. As implied by
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the results of the present study might
reﬂect the characteristics of institutional pressures and social norms in India. The
operations of MNEs in other emerging markets should be studied to discover any
similarities or differences in the patterns of operational strategies. As a result of the
limitations mentioned above, the present study is only a ﬁrst step towards a more thorough
understanding of the strategies to overcome liability of foreignness in an emerging market.
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Another limitation is that the interviews were not transcribed by professional transcribers
but instead they were transcribed by the researcher, which may increase concerns of
validity. However, this limitation is mitigated by the fact that the interviews were tape
recorded verbatim, and after the interviews were transcribed by the researcher, the
participants in the study received a copy of their transcripts for review.
9.5 Robustness and credibility
The samples within each industry ranged from one (minimum) to six (maximum) MNEs.
Although the sample size was small, the information obtained was rich which strengthened
the robustness and credibility of this thesis. This can be attributed to the following factors:
(a) The interview questions were pre-tested and this led to the interview protocol being
more clearly deﬁned and the questions more focused to probe the phenomena of managing
operations effectively in an emerging economy.
(b) The interviewer personally conducted the ﬁeld research, doing face-to-face interviews
with senior managers (CEO, Vice President, Director or a Senior Partner) who by virtue of
their position and experience were able to provide credible information.
(c) Many managers revealed similar perceptions about the challenges in India and how to
manage them. The similarity of perceptions across company and industry provides
signiﬁcant evidence of data credibility.
(d) The interviewer is originally from India and the conceptual knowledge of this
environment played a crucial role in the comprehension of the current situation and the
dynamics of this region.
Further, the consistency within industry groups allowed the researcher to develop a
framework of strategies for managing operations in an emerging market context. A larger
sample within each industry group would no doubt have resulted in more industry speciﬁc
factors being incorporated; however, the interview methodology used in this study
provides richness of data because managers gave detailed information about their
perceptions towards the institutional environment and shared their experience of managing
operations in India. This in turn, provided the researcher with the opportunity to pursue,
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explore and “ﬂesh out’ unanticipated avenues of discussion and managers’ experiences
(afforded by the interactive discussion mode).
9.6 Roadmap for future research
From an academic perspective, the study of business strategies in emerging markets
provides an interesting opportunity to explore the trends that are part of an important future
research direction for strategy and IB scholars (Rumelt et al., 1994). Future research in this
area could include examining how ﬁrms understand and create a competitive advantage in
unfamiliar environments and examining further what strategies are valuable for successful
operations in an emerging market context.
The richness of this study is primarily in the data which was obtained through in-depth
interviews. To ﬁirther enrich and broaden the scope of this study for research and practice,
the following suggestions are presented:
Even though it is not possible to generalise from a small number of cases, a case study can
nevertheless provide the basis for further theory development and reﬁnement. Future
research could beneﬁt by increasing the number of companies and industries studied and
testing the propositions on a larger sample of companies using quantitative research
methods to see if more credible generalisations about operational strategies can be made
across MNEs.
Differences in goals and strategies, as well as in industry—speciﬁc factors, may affect the
results of this study. These differences may cause the MNE to be more easily affected by
some institutional dimensions than others. Future research, therefore, may incorporate
these ﬁrm and industry differences while adopting an “issue-speciﬁc” and “domain-
speciﬁc” approach suggested by Kostova (1996) to examine which institutional dimension
has a larger impact on what type of ﬁrms.
The validity of this study can be further examined by applying the institutional theory
framework in this thesis to other emerging markets. The ﬁndings of the study can then be
tested against other emerging markets to identify strategies that can be generalised across
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regions. The study can also be further developed by including more host countries
speciﬁcally from the Asian region.
Future researchers could use a procedure similar to the one employed by Hofstede (1980)
in developing the cultural dimensions, to design a framework which could include both
regulatory and normative constructs so that one can gain a comprehensive understanding of
the country level institutional environment in making cross country comparisons.
The ﬁndings of this study suggested that partner selection is a critical step in the success of
an alliance. Even though partner selection is vital, there has been little past research on this
phenomenon (Beamish and Lane, 1990; Geringer, 1988). Future researchers could
investigate the key determinants of partner selection. Another area of interest could be to
study the process by which sole venture MNEs acquire and leverage local resources in an
emerging market to mitigate the LOF.
Furthermore, while previous research has examined the effects of both cultural distance
and speciﬁc cultural dimensions on MNE behavior (Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Kogut and
Singh, 1988), this study also focuses on the regulatory and normative dimensions of a host
country. Future research may examine the effects of institutional characteristics of the
home and host countries on MNE strategy.
9.7 Contributions
This thesis has made several important contributions which have implications for both the
theory and practice of managing operations effectively in an emerging market.
Theory
This study extends the strategic response perspective of institutional theory to the global
setting by examining not only the effects of institutional distance on MNE strategies, but,
the operational consequences of these strategic responses as well. Many studies in
international business suggest a link between the performance of foreign entrants and
measures of cultural distance (Barkema et. a1., 1997; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kogut and
Singh, 1988; Sim and Ali, 1998), institutional distance (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and
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Zaheer, 1999; Xu and Shenkar, 2002) and psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).
Studies that take this perspective make the implicit assumption that cultural, institutional
and psychic distance encumbers all foreign entrants equally.
Certainly, as extant theories well predict, ﬁrms that enter foreign markets face unexpected
conditions and incur unforeseen costs when they misjudge and misunderstand local culture
and institutions. However, these conditions and costs are not uniformly distributed across
all entrants, as previously had been assumed. Instead, the ﬁndings suggestthat ﬁrms face
different types of challenges in varying levels of complexity in the host country context
because every type of entrant has specialised objectives, resource needs, activities,
regulatory requirements, capabilities and levels of exposure to government services. The
current study has, in effect demonstrated that cultural, institutional and psychic distance do
not have the same impact on all foreign entrants.
In addition, this thesis contributes to research on MNE strategy by introducing a more
comprehensive measure of cross-country differences, and by revealing its strategic
implications for the MNE. It contributes to institutional theory by extending the “strategic
response” perspective of the theory (Oliver, 1991) to the international arena, and by
attempting to assess the consequences of such strategic responses on the operations of the
MNE, with special reference to Australian service MNEs in India. The importance placed
on understanding a host country’s regulatory, normative and cultural—cognitive
environment for successfully managing operations in an emerging economy has been
further conﬁrmed by this study.
A modiﬁcation to current literature from this study, and certainly an area that would
require more extensive questioning was witnessed in some of the interview responses
provided by the senior managers of the Australian MNEs. This is centred on culture being
an important challenge in emerging markets like India. Most of the respondents agreed
that this factor was not as important as perhaps the literature suggests. Therefore this study
presents an opportunity to explore the extent of culture’s inﬂuence on an MNEs operations.
A noteworthy contribution relates to the conclusion made by some studies that a
widespread ﬁrm-level response to corruption appears to be outright avoidance of a market
which is characterised by corruption (Doh et al., 2003) thereby leading to reduced FDI in
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that country. However, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that ﬁrms do not necessarily
avoid the market outright but instead look for opportunities where they are not directly
involved with the government. Alternative strategies are to rely on their JV partners or use
the services of agents or consultants as detailed in Chapter 6. As a result, the ﬂow of FDI
into the economy is not directly affected. This study also revealed that some MNEs did not
face corruption and these belonged to the Consulting, Franchising and Information
Technology sector. This suggests that not all the ﬁrms are equally affected by corruption
and therefore it cannot be generalised that ﬁrms are adversely impacted by corruption in an
emerging economy. This study contributes to the creation of the need to review if and how
corruption impacts the operations in an emerging economy and seeks to further reﬁne
existing theory that corruption reduces the inﬂow of FDI.
Existing theory suggests that ﬁrms choose a JV over a wholly owned subsidiary to to
overcome local knowledge deﬁcit and to ﬁll voids in the business environment (Khanna
and Rivkin, 2001). Yet most of the Australian service MNEs in this study operated as a
sole venture. The ﬁndings of this study thus contribute to the knowledge of how MNEs
overcome the LOF without relinquishing control to a local joint venture partner. These
MNEs increase their local knowledge by using local staff, agents, partners, advisors and
retired senior bureaucrats/public servants to guide and manage relations with external
stakeholders.
The most valuable contribution of this study relates to the ﬁndings that demonstrate how
social networks contribute to overcoming knowledge deﬁcits in emerging markets
ultimately explaining why these relationships are considered to be of utmost importance in
overcoming the liability of foreignness. From an IT perspective, these ﬁndings reafﬁrm the
strategic importance of networks and relationships in navigating through the formal and
informal constraints in an emerging economy. Therefore a network approach provides one
of the most useful explanations of the post entry success in India. The development of
close personal relationships with key actors in emerging markets suggests ways in which
senior management can learn through the experience of others how. to successfully manage
their operations.
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Practice
Theoretical propositions discussed in this study have practical implications for the MNE,
as they provide a new context, namely institutional distance, for developing effective
strategies in an emerging market. Not only can researchers now study MNE strategy from
a new angle, but managers can also compete with other MNEs by designing strategies that
better match the MNE’s institutional context. This study enhances our understanding of
how MNEs can craft strategies to overcome/mitigate the difﬁculties of operating in an
emerging market.
This exploratory study has enabled the development of strategies that can be used by
managers to overcome the LOF in an emerging market. This was originally based on prior
theoretical research and then further enriched through qualitative interviews with senior
managers of Australian service MNEs. These strategies can be used as a guide for future
managers of Australian MNEs planning to operate in India. Potential MNEs can learn
from the experiences of those already operating in this market - both on the mode of entry
used as well as how to manage institutional challenges at the cultural, regulatory and
normative levels.
Most studies in IB have focused on enterprise strategies in emerging economies like China
and some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hoskisson et al., 2000) and India has
somewhat been understudied. This study provides a better understanding of the formal and
informal institutions in India and offers strategies to MNEs who are keen to engage with
India.
9.8 Concluding Remarks
In this ﬁnal chapter an attempt has been made to assess the wider applicability of the
ﬁndings of this research. While it is not possible to generalise from a small number of
cases, the case study approach can nevertheless provide the basis for further theory
development and reﬁnement. At the very least, the ﬁndings of this thesis suggest that
some common assumptions about the challenges of operating in an emerging market need
to be re-examined.
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At a conceptual level, this study suggests that greater theoretical insight can be gained
from understanding the relationship between institutions and organisations. Can the
strategies of Australian service MNEs hold for ﬁrms from the manufacturing sectors as
well? Can such strategies be applied in other emerging markets? Does the country of
origin give ﬁrms a competitive advantage? This study has therefore raised additional
questions and offered new concepts for a future research agenda into managing operations
in an emerging economy.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 — Invitation to participate in the research
As noted in Chapter 4, this appendix contains a copy of the letter sent to gain access
to case study companies, including a brief description of the research that explained
the commitment required of, and potential beneﬁts accruing to, the participating
companies.
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Pro Dean, Faculty of Economics and Business BUIIdmg H69
Professor of International Business cnr Rose and Codrington
Street
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA
telephone +61 2 9351 3552
facsimile + 61 2 9351 6755
email s.gray@econ.usyd.edu.au
Project Title: Strategies to succeed in an emerging economy: A study of
Australian service sector firms in India
Dear
You are invited to participate in a research study on “Strategies to succeed in an
emerging economy: A study of Australian ﬁrms in India.”
This study aims to understand the challenges for foreign entrants in an emerging
economy and what strategies do entrants actually use to cope with different levels of
challenges. This question is closely allied to the big question on the International
Business (IB) research agenda: What determines the international success and failure
of ﬁrms? The study is conducted by Narender Sharma, PhD candidate at the
University of Sydney, supervised by Professor Sid Gray.
Participation in this study is by interview. The interview is entirely voluntary. You
can withdraw at any time. You will be asked to complete the attached Participant
Consent Form
The interview is strictly conﬁdential. Access to information on participants is
restricted to myself and Professor Sid Gray. The interview data will be stored in a
locked ﬁling cabinet, except as required by law. Reports of the study will use
aggregate data averaging all participants’ responses. No individual participants will
be identiﬁable.
Thank you for your assistance.
Narender Sharma
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Appendix 2 — Ethics forms
Chapter 4 discussed how, in accordance with the conditions of the University of
Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee, agreement was obtained from
individuals prior to their participation in the research. This appendix contains copies
of the Information for Participants Sheet given to participants to outline the nature of
the research and their rights, and of the Participant Consent Form they were required
to sign prior to participation.
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NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA
Professor Sid Gray Economics and Business Building
Pro Dean, Faculty ofEeonomics and Business H69 cnr Rose and Codrington
Professor of International Business Streets
telephone + 61 2 9351 3552
facsimile + 61 2 9036 5378
email s.gray@econ.usyd.edu.au
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Project Title: Strategies to succeed in an emerging economv: A studv ofAustralian service
sector MNEs in India
(1) What is the study about?
This study aims to understand the challenges for foreign entrants in an emerging economy
and what strategies do entrants actually use to cope with different levels of institutional
challenges.
(2) Who is carrying out the study?
The study is being conducted by Narender Sharma a PhD candidate at the University of
Sydney under the supervision of Professor Sid Gray.
(3) What does the study involve?
The study involves participants completing an in-depth interview. The interview includes
questions about the choice of entry strategy, the challenges in an emerging economy and
strategies for overcoming the challenges. The interview will be tape recorded with
permission of the participants and the transcribed version will be sent to the participants for
their comments before being used for research.
(4) Can I withdraw from the study?
Participants can withdraw from the study at any time. Participation is completely voluntary.
(5) Will I be identiﬁed?
No individual or ﬁrm will be identiﬁed.
(6) Will the study beneﬁt me?
A Report will be provided summarising the ﬁndings of this study. This report will
highlight the practical managerial implications of the ﬁndings of this study.
(7) What if I require further information?
Narender Sharma will answer any questions you may have and provide further information.
Please do not hesitate to contact Narender at narender@idx.com.au or phone 0425287755 or
Professor Sid Gray at s.gray@econ.usyd.edu.au or phone +61— 2- 9351 3552
(8) What if I have a complaint or concerns? You may contact the Senior Ethics Ofﬁcer,
Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +6l-2- 9351 48] 1 (Telephone); +6l-2- 9351 6706 (Facsimile) or
gbriodygalmail.usydeduau (Email)
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The University of Sydney
Faculty of Economics and Business
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA
Professor Sid Gray Economics and Business Building
Pro Dean, Faculty ofEconomics and Business H69
Professor of [ntemational Business telephone + 61 2 9351 3552
facsimile + 6| 2 9036 5378
cnr Rose and Codrington Streets
email sigray@econ.usyd.edu.au
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
1, ..................................................................... ,
Name and title of current position (please print)
give consent to my participation in the following research project:
Project Title - Strategies to succeed in an emerging economy: A study ofAustralian
ﬁrms in India
In giving my consent I acknowledge that:
l. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been
explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered
to my satisfaction.
2. I have read the Participant Information Sheet and have been given the
opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with
the researcher.
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time,
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly conﬁdential and no
information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.
5. I agree to the interview being audio taped. (please circle)
YES NO
Signed ................................................................................................................................
Name: ........................................................
Date ...................................................................................................................................
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Appendix 3 —Interview Protocol
This Appendix contains the list of questions used for interviews. As discussed in
Chapter 4, this was modiﬁed in an iterative process as the study proceeded, although
the general content remained consistent throughout. The prepared questions formed a
discussion framework able to accommodate and stimulate discussion around each
participant’s speciﬁc area of knowledge and interest.
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
MNE name:
Industry:
Person Interviewed:
Position Title:
Date Interviewed:
(1) Introductory Questions
When did you ﬁrst establish operations in India?
0 Do you believe that there is a large institutional distance between Australia and
India? Why?
What in your opinion are the challenges and uncertainties of operating in India?
0 In your experience, how different is doing business in India compared with other
emerging economies.
What sort of barriers did you encounter when operating in India? How did you
overcome them?
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(2) Regulatory Issues
How would you describe the regulatory environment in India? Has anything helped
or hindered your operations in the market? If so, what were they, and what did you
do/are you doing?
>
>
How do the following affect your business in India?
Red tape and Corruption
Labour productivity
Tax system
Bureaucracy
Legal system
(3) Cultural-cognitive Factors
Do you see many cultural differences between Australia and India did they affect
your business operations?
Did the local work culture in any way impact upon the way you operate
How have you managed to 'adapt' to the business environment in India?
Are your senior managers mainly from the home country or host country? Why?
What inﬂuence do local managers have in the decision-making? Does this cause
any difﬁculty in your business operations?
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Have you experienced any difﬁculties operating in these markets because of
cultural issues? If so, what are/were they, and how did you overcome them?
What aspects of the culture (in the workforce) do you like India? What don't you
like?
Did you face any cross-cultural communication problems? How did you resolve
them?
(4) Normative Factors
Does India offer you a level playing ﬁeld? Have you had difﬁculties in managing
customers and suppliers? If yes, how did you overcome the difﬁculties?
Can you think of any bureaucratic problems that you encountered and how did you
ﬁnd your way around it.
Did you ever use agents to overcome any challenges on hurdles
Do you think that social and professional networks impact a ﬁrm's performance?
How do you see your network position (linkages to important local actors) when
compared to local ﬁrms in the host country.
Can you give example of informal norms in the local environment that you had
difﬁculty with. Did you face any internal cultural conﬂict when local practices (for
example corruption) were inconsistent with the parent company values.
Did you at any time justify actions with the claim that “that's just the way things are
done around here”. (social conformity)
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Do you see any challenges inﬂuencing more or future investments by you? Which
ones?
What do you think of the pace of reforms in India? Do certain policies impact
and/or concern you? If so, which ones, and why? How do you (or will you) operate
within this environment?
How important are personal relationships and connections in overcoming barriers
to your business?
(5) Market Size and Growth
How important is the size of the market for your products/services? How does this
inﬂuence your business decisions?
How important is the growth rate of the regional market for your products/services?
Is this an inﬂuencing factor, and will it inﬂuence future investment to the market?
(6) Level of Information
Do/did you get visited by local (a) government ofﬁcials, (b) companies who
promote the (a) market and (b) region? If so, how often? If not, any suggestions?
How helpful has this been in increasing your knowledge about the country and
regions? Has it been helpful in other ways, and how so? If not, why not?
How did/do you obtain your information about this market? What information
sources would serve you better?
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(7) Infrastructure
How do you view the country's infrastructure for your operations?
Is there anything you don't like, or would like to see improved?
(8) Concluding Questions
Were your previous experiences in foreign markets important for inﬂuencing your
business operations in India? If so, what particular experiences were important?
Did you ever face the risk of misappropriation from your business partner?
Have you generally been satisﬁed with your business operations-because if you had
to do it all over again, what would you do differently, and why?
Are there any key issues that you would like to add, that I have not already asked
you about?
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Appendix 4
A brief proﬁle of the participating Australian services sector MNEs
MGMTCON 1
The MGMTCON 1 is an Australia based corporate advisory and consulting ﬁrm
which combines the skills and experience of its 20 year history of creating alliances,
relationships and transactions in Australia, South East Asia and India. It has recently
merged with Venture Group which has 14 year history of corporate and equities
advisory in Australia, undertaking merger, acquisition, divestment and fund raising
for private and public companies.
The new entity called ABC Venture Group is an Asian and Australia based corporate
advisory and consulting ﬁrm focused on business services. AFG Venture Group is
also a partner in an international group ofM&A partners which service the
economies of north and south America, Europe, Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa,
and through its own network in Asia and Australasia
The principal ofﬁces are in Sydney but this ﬁrm has representative and joint venture
ofﬁces throughout Asia including Bangkok, Chennai, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City,
Hong Kong, Hyderabad, Jakarta, Vientiane (Laos), Manila, Mumbai, New Delhi,
Singapore, Yangon (Myanmar).
HOSPI 1
HOSPI 1 is a major leader in hotels, as well as the global leader in services to
corporate clients and public institutions. The head ofﬁce for the Asia Paciﬁc region is
in Sydney and operations in countries like India and China are controlled from the
Sydney head ofﬁce. HOSPI 1 offers owners and investors a wide range of contractual
solutions: Management contracts, for owners interested in handing over the
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management of their hotel to Accor; Franchise contracts, for owners interested in
managing their hotel directly. The owner is given a license to use an HOSPI 1 brand
and access to all of our hotel services (booking system, marketing, purchasing,
training, etc.); Leases, for owners interested in leasing their property to HOSPI l for
the operation of a hotel.
In 2006 HOSPI 1 opened the Hyderabad International Convention Centre, India’s
largest and ﬁrst purpose-built convention facility, and the adjacent Novotel
Hyderabad. Today, Accor has 47 hotels committed to open in India under the Soﬁtel,
Pullman, Novotel, Mercure, Ibis and Formule 1 brands—24 of these are due to open
before 2010. As the world leader in economy and mid-priced hotels, Accor’s vision
will redeﬁne the economy hotel sector in India and position Ibis hotels as the
preferred best value international hotel brand across the region.
TECHCON 2
TECHCON 2 Australia is one of the largest multi service groups operating in the
construction and infrastructure services markets in Australia and abroad. The group
consists of leading construction companies as well as the infrastructure services
company. Its range of services encompasses the development, design and ﬁnancing
of facilities, including their turnkey construction, maintenance and operation.
TECHCON 2 is listed on the Frankfurt and Stuttgart stock exchanges. The global
presence of the TECHCON 2 spans ﬁve continents with operations in Europe, United
States, South East Asia, Africa and Australia. TECHCON 2 provides clients with
integrated building and civil engineering services. The operations in India are
managed from the Sydney head ofﬁce. TECHCON 2 has a turnover which has
grown to $3.6b and has grown from approximately 3000 employees in 2004 to over
4000 employees in 2007.
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TECHCON 3
TECHCON 3 is a publicly listed Australian based engineering, construction and asset
support contractor providing full project life cycle solutions primarily to the upstream
Oil and Gas sector. The Group's turnkey services range from complex front-end
engineering design, construction, installation and commissioning to long-term
operations and maintenance. Innovative technology and the ﬂexibility to meet
changing market conditions have assisted TECHCON 3 to deliver world class
solutions in the most remote and isolated regions of Australia, Asia, the South
Paciﬁc, the Middle East and the deepwater offshore provinces of the world.
HOSPI 2
HOSPI 2 is an all Australian owned business which is easily recognised by its
distinctive décor, the fabulous fresh cookie aromas, and the unique cookie oven
which bakes the fresh, cookies which are synonymous with the HOSPI 2 trade mark.
Their ﬁrst retail shop to be opened in Australia was in 1958 in a prime location in the
Myer department store, in the city of Melbourne. This store proved to be the model
for a successful retailing formula which has been expanded into over ﬁfty outlets
throughout Australia. At the heart of the HOSPI 2 retail outlet is the automated
cookie oven. These retail cookie ovens are supplied exclusively to HOSPI 2 Pty Ltd
both here in Australia and the international markets.
XY (I) Pvt. Ltd., the makers of HOSPI 2 cookies is an Indo-Australian joint venture
that commenced its business operations in India in January 2000. The lack of
recognized cookie players in India motivated Australian Foods to enter the market
and open its ﬁrst store in Chennai in January 2000. HOSPI 2 cookies have rapidly
grown to become synonymous with international quality and are today the #1 brand
of fresh baked cookies in the country. Currently, HOSPI 2 operates 41 outlets in 19
cities in India in cities like Chennai, Madurai, Coimbatore, Bangalore, Hyderabad,
Gurgaon, Noida, Jaipur, Kalyan, Lucknow, Punjab, Mumbai, Kolkata, Indore, Pune,
Vijayawada, New Delhi, Jamnagar, and Ahmedabad,.
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MGMTCON 2
MGMTCON 2 is a global public accounting ﬁrm, and was formed in 1989 when A &
B then the fourth-largest accounting ﬁrm, merged with C & D, the ﬁfth-largest ﬁrm
(Datamonitor, 2003). While MGMTCON 2 central management group retained
authority over the organisation as a whole, the initiative for success or failure passed
largely to the top corporate managers in national companies and regions.
MGMTCON 2’s global ﬁrm provided support to its member ﬁrms behind the scenes
while each of the member ﬁrms around the world paid a fee on a percentage of its
revenue to the global ﬁrm for the management of global activities. Global
management used this budget strategically to enhance the competitiveness of
national-level businesses by, for example, investing in redesign of the audit
methodology. MGMTCON 2 provide global services in four main
areas: Assurance, Tax, Transactions and Advisory. Through these services, they can
help ﬁrms retain the conﬁdence of investors, manage risk, strengthen controls and
achieve their potential.
SOFTWARE 1
SOFTWARE 1 provides software technology and services to mining companies
seeking to increase mine productivity. SOFTWARE 1 has a global reach delivering
comprehensive solutions in all major mining centres in more than 90 countries. Every
major mining company, including BHP Billiton, Codelco, De Beers, Newmont and
Vale, is a SOFTWARE 1 client. Through a combination of organic growth and
strategic acquisitions, the Company has become the largest global supplier of
specialised mining productivity solutions with its highly-skilled mining and IT
professionals. The Company is home to world renowned and award winning mining
solutions and to industry thought leaders who are pushing the boundaries of what’s
possible in mining.
Mining companies rely on SOFTWARE 1 to drive efﬁciency and proﬁtability in their
mining operations because they partner with them to develop a framework that
optimises their entire mining value chain.
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TECHCON 4
TECHCON 4 s a Government Business Enterprise, owned by the State of Tasmania.
The value of their total power system is realised through trading electricity and
energy products as a participant in the National Electricity Market. They have a total
generating capacity is 2615 MW and assets are worth about $4.8 billion. The
company has a proud 100-year history in power engineering and dam construction
and have expertise in renewable energy business. They have completed a number of
new renewable energy generation projects
TECHCON 4 has ofﬁces in Hobart, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Adelaide as
well as in New Delhi. TECHCON 4 India Pvt Ltd is a wholly owned subsidiary
established in December 2006. The Indian operation is continuing to grow in the
area of hydropower investigation and design, mainly to private sector clients.
TECHCON 5
TECHCON 5 is a diversiﬁed service provider to a range of private and public sector
clients. The Group utilises its ﬁnancial and intellectual capital to provide integrated
solutions to clients' infrastructure and project requirements. TECHCON 5 Limited is
the parent company of Australia’s largest project development and contracting group.
The group’s activities include construction, mining and services. Key resources
include an experienced, long serving management team, a strong balance sheet and
the largest ﬂeet of mobile plant and equipment in Australia. Headquartered in New
Delhi, the company started operations in India in mid-2005 and is engaged in pan
India projects across Residential, Commercial and Retail, Hospitality, Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) and IT parks, Education and Healthcare.
BANK 1
BANK 1 is a global provider of banking, ﬁnancial, advisory, investment and funds
management services. BANK 1’s main business focus is making returns by providing
a diversiﬁed range of services to clients. As an owner and manager of signiﬁcant
community assets, BANK 1 works closely with governments around the world to
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deliver important services including transport, roads, airports and utilities. Founded
in 1969, BANK 1 operates in more than 70 ofﬁce locations in 26 countries. BANK 1
employed approximately 12,700 people at 31 March 2009 and had assets under
management of $A243 billion at 31 March 2009.
The Indian operations commenced in 2005 and BANK 1 now has more than 90
employees in Mumbai and New Delhi. The BANK 1’s Indian operation provides
specialist investment, advisory and ﬁnancial services for the local market. BANK 1
in India has memberships of the National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock
Exchange. They have capabilities in equities trading and execution, are licensed to
advise and trade stock and index derivatives, and through international afﬁliates are
an active participant in the issuance of access products like participatory notes. In
India BANK 1 offers securities brokerage, equity research, equity capital market and
corporate ﬁnance capabilities and seeks opportunities in sectors like infrastructure,
property, telecoms and media and resources, which are global strengths of BANK 1.
TECHCON 6
TECHCON 6 offers a unique paint removal system suitable for the removal of
multiple layers of all types of old paints. The product is a smooth alkaline paste
somewhat akin to the consistency of peanut butter. It is easily applied with a spatula,
or by brush or roller. The product is then covered with a laminated cover. This allows
the product to emulsify up to 30 layers of lead based enamel paint in one application.
The laminated cover is then peeled away and with it the paint and the paste.
The company has its head ofﬁce in Sydney and has been in business for over a
decade. It prides itself in the safe removal of multiple layers of old ﬂaking paint,
containment and safe disposal, the reduction of contamination into the water system
and reduced health risks to the public and industry.
AIR 1
AIR 1 is Australia's largest and oldest airline carrying over 34M passengers
annually. AIR 1 was privatised in 1995, with AB 1 assuming an initial 25%
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shareholding (which has since been sold). Air 1 has a two-thirds share of the
domestic market and accounts for approximately one third of Australia's share of
international inbound and outbound passengers.
AIR 1 was ﬁrst established in India in 1947-48, following the signingof the original
bilateral agreement between India and Australia. AIR 1, AB 1 and AB 2, developed
what was then called a ‘Pool Partnership' - the ﬁrst ever airline alliance. As India’s
reform process kicked in (in 1991), the economy stabilised and tourism began to
ﬂourish in both directions, AIR 1 resumed 767 operations via Singapore in July 1996.
The service continued until 2002, when the effects of 9/11 and the down-turn in
aviation led to a route rationalisation within AIR 1. As AIR 1 international network
grew and the Indian economy showed prospects of an upswing, Air 1 resumed
Mumbai operations in 2004. They have their own sales ofﬁce in Mumbai and 12
GSA locations in key cities and towns across India.
AIR I entered into a code share agreement with AB 3 of India that has expanded
their services. The expansion enables AB 3 customers to travel on Air 1 ﬂights
between Australia and Singapore, connecting to AB 3 services between Singapore
and India. This complements AIR 1’s existing A330-300 services which operate
three times weekly between Sydney and Mumbai.
“The Australia-India route — a key market for AIR 1— continues to grow, reﬂecting
strengthening trade links and increasing numbers of tourists and business people
travelling between the two countries” said AIR 1 Group General Manager Sales and
Distribution Rob Gurney.
TECHCON 7
TECHCON 7 is a leading engineering, sciences and project delivery ﬁrm. They have
42 major ofﬁces across Australia, New Zealand, Europe, the Middle East, South
America and Asia. TECHCON 7 works in close partnership with key clients in the
public and private sectors, providing independent technical, strategic and commercial
advice to deliver a wide range of projects. This ﬁrm employs approximately 6500
people who come from a diverse range of disciplines including engineers, planners,
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architects, economists, scientists, project managers, technicians and administrative
staff and is wholly employee-owned.
TECHCON 7 works across four broad markets: Buildings and Infrastructure; Mining
and Metals; Power and Industry; and Water and Environment. They continually
strive to help their people reach their full potential, engaging them in challenging and
inspiring projects that shape industries and build nations
TECHCON 1
TECHCON 1 — Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation — is one of the world’s
leading engineering and development consultancies. This is an Australian based
company with an international network of more than 20 subsidiary and associated
companies and ofﬁces in 25 countries. TECHCON 1 was forged from Australia’s
biggest-ever engineering project, the Snowy Mountains Scheme, a massive 25-year
long multipurpose project (1949-74) involving hydropower, roads, bridges and
infrastructure that drew highly skilled engineers from all parts of the world.
TECHCON l delivers specialist consultancy services across a wide range of
disciplines and plans, designs and manages projects to the highest professional
standards. It is a multi-disciplinary engineering and development consultancy
that consistently ranks in the world's top 100 international design ﬁrms. TECHCON
1 has progressively widened its expert capabilities from water resources
development, power generation and transmission and road engineering to irrigation,
environmental planning and management, rural, urban and social development,
training and capacity building.
TECHCON I started business in India in about 1980. Their clients include an array
of international funding and aid agencies, government organisations and private
sector-companies.
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SOFTWARE 2
SOFTWARE 2 is a developer of software for design, production, management and e-
commerce solutions in the embroidery industry. Software 2 has a history of on going
innovations that push the boundaries of creativity in personalized expressions, be it in
decorated goods or interiors. In the decorated goods industry they are most renowned
for the world’s best embroidery and print design software, utilised by leaders in
Schifﬂi lace/fashion work, industrial sports/apparel decorations and popular in the
home hobby/craft market. In the interior decorations industry they have carpet design
software and custom rug robots. They provide business solutions and web services
for the corporate business as well as the small business and retailers. Today,
SOFTWARE 2 is present in over 70 countries with products in over 12 languages
and over 200,000 licensed customers.
TECHCON 8
TECHCON 8 is a leading architecture, interiors and planning company with more
than 80 years in the industry. It is based throughout Australia, Asia and Europe. The
company is committed to design excellence and environmentally sustainable design
solutions. TECHCON 8 has expertise in defence, commercial, hospitality, retail,
transport, and residential facilities both in Australia and overseas and has completed
several projects in these domains.
TECHCON 8 started operations in India when they were commissioned on the new
Australian High Commission in New Delhi in 2001 and since then have been picking
up many new projects.
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